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Abstract 
 
 
This dissertation studies the EU’s normative power role at the Human Rights Council (HRC), which 
is the key UN body in the field of human rights. The EU has proclaimed an active and visible role in 
the HRC as an important part of its external human rights agenda. However, the EU’s normative 
ambitions face challenges; other actors are not necessarily willing to accept the EU’s role claims and 
deliver competing human right positions. In this respect, the HRC provides an interesting case for 
studying the recognition of the EU’s normative power role in practice.  
 
The first two chapters present the theoretical, conceptual and methodological background of this 
dissertation. In particular, the EU role as a normative power is examined by combining it with role 
theory. As a consequence, the normative power role is seen as being closely related to the EU’s own 
role conception or self-image. According to this self-perception, the EU claims to act as a “force for 
good” in global politics by promoting universal norms and standards through non-coercive measures. 
The EU is also seen to differ from other actors. However, as the EU’s ambitious role claims do not 
necessarily correspond with its actual behaviour, the normative power role is better understood as an 
ideal-type. The EU’s acts can more or less approximate this ideal in external human rights promotion. 
Because the normative power role is a highly Eurocentric notion and the debate is conducted mainly 
by European scholars, the alter side of this role is needed. Role theory enables a more critical approach 
to the normative power role by also directing attention to the EU’s role performance and external 
perceptions of this role among different others.  
 
The EU’s normative power role claims are especially evident in its external human rights promotion. 
Hence, this dissertation concentrates on examining the EU’s role in global human rights governance. 
Chapter 3 demonstrates how domestic, regional and international factors have facilitated the 
development of the EU’s role in this field. The normative power role draws attention to the EU 
definition of human rights and to the instruments it uses in human rights promotion. In order to be a 
normative power, the EU should also be able to achieve normative changes in others. In this respect 
the EU faces challenges, which become evident in the UN human rights machinery. Chapter 4 
presents the UN Human Rights Council and the legal-institutional and political preconditions for EU 
participation therein. It demonstrates how the HRC is a case of “inconvenient multilateralism” for the 
EU, as the EU needs to balance between its normative commitments and multilateral preferences. 
 
The EU’s normative power self-image and the coherence of this role are often taken for granted. 
However, an actor’s role conceptions are rarely homogenous. Chapter 5 examines the self-perception 
of the EU at the HRC through official EU documents and statements. Furthermore, 23 theme 
interviews were conducted in 2013-2014 with the EEAS and EU member state human rights experts 
in Geneva and Brussels to reveal a more unofficial EU self-perception. The findings demonstrate that 
the official image underlines the EU role as a defender of universal human rights principles, a 
supporter and contributor to the UN, and a partner for others. Furthermore, the EU’s role has remained 
rather unchanged since the establishment of the HRC (2006). The policy practitioners’ views also 
supported the EU’s normative power self-image; the EU was perceived, for example, as a promoter 
and defender of universal norms, a leader through its own example, and different from other actors. 
As a conclusion, the EU’s self-perception at the HRC confirms the normative power role image, even 
if the limitations for practicing such a role at the HRC are acknowledged. This normative power self-
perception is also shared among different EU actors.  
 
The EU’s performance at the HRC has a key role in legitimizing its role claims as a normative power. 
Role performance refers to the actual behaviour of the EU, and it often differs from both ego and alter 
role expectations. Evaluating EU performance in different international organizations is important, 
but a demanding task because of its complex actorness. Chapter 6 examines EU performance along 
the lines of relevance, effectiveness, resource viability, and efficiency. These elements are able to 
capture the EU’s success in relation to both HRC processes and outcomes. According to HRC 
participants, the EU has high relevance internally and externally, which provides legitimacy for EU 
participation. Effectiveness reflects the outcomes the EU has been able to achieve and can be studied 
through different measures. According to the data, the EU has succeeded in being internally effective 
and coherent, and has shown considerable external effectiveness through delivering statements and 
adopted resolutions. In this respect, EU records match well with its ambitious role claims. However, 
the EU’s ability to contribute to the effectiveness of the HRC, as well as its efficiency, remains only 
moderate. With its enormous resources, the EU would have the potential for much more. The EU’s 
inefficiency is related to its heavy internal dynamics, but also largely on external conditions.   
 
Chapter seven studies the external perceptions of the EU role at the HRC through 40 semi-structured 
interviews conducted in 2013-2014. The views of external others are able to outline the alter side of 
the EU’s role. Studied external others include other UN member states, human rights organizations, 
and HRC Secretary Staff. States are classified into groups, such as EU allies, Moderates, Developing 
states, and EU opponents by taking into account their norm consistency with the EU and voting 
behaviour at the UN. The findings point to variable recognition of the EU’s normative power role. 
The EU is seen as an important example that supports universal principles and the UN. The EU is 
also seen to prefer non-coercive measures against other actors. However, the EU’s leadership is 
considered to be only issue-specific and the normative power image generally suffers from several 
inconsistencies. The EU’s different approach is especially apparent when it is compared with the US. 
As a conclusion, the EU’s normative power role is only partly recognized among its others, which 
gives reasons to reconsider the legitimacy of the normative power role. 
 
This dissertation provides an alternative approach to the EU’s role as a normative power. The 
theoretical framework underlines how the EU’s roles in the world should be studied by taking into 
account not only the EU’s own role aspirations, but also its role performance and the alter side of 
these roles. The most valuable and interesting contribution of this thesis is the research interviews 
concerning internal and external perception of the EU role as a normative power. In general, the 
empirical chapters provide a comprehensive and detailed picture of the EU role in one particular 
institutional context, the UN Human Rights Council.  
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Introduction  
 
The European Union is founded on a shared determination to promote peace and stability 
and to build a world founded on respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law. 
These principles underpin all aspects of the internal and external policies of the European 
Union.1 
 
This thesis studies the role of the European Union (EU) in the global governance of human rights, 
more particularly at the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC). The main idea is to link the 
theoretical discussion concerning the EU’s role as a normative power to a particular policy domain 
and institutional context. Role conceptions are beneficial in explaining why actors act in a particular 
manner. In this thesis, the normative power role of the EU is used as a theoretical starting point for 
understanding the EU’s ambitions and actions, but also the challenges it faces in its norm promotion. 
The normative power role emphasizes the importance of values and principles in the EU’s external 
action, and serves as an important source of legitimacy. Foreign policy actors frequently refer to 
values, images of the world and principles that are used to characterise the EU and provide the basis 
for its role in the world2. In this debate, the protection and promotion of human rights has central 
place. Human rights have formed an essential part of EU identity since the 1990s. The proclaimed 
strong commitment to a set of core values is also considered to make the EU an exceptional global 
actor, especially because it shows the willingness to bind its power through international law and 
institutions3. The EU’s emphasis on effective multilateralism4, both as a means and an end, is 
interpreted to reflect its normativity in global politics. However, as this thesis claims, the EU’s role 
is not solely dependent on the EU’s intentions to construct a certain kind of self-image. The actual 
behaviour of the EU, its role performance, is highly consequential in constituting the EU’s role in the 
world. It also needs to be acknowledged that the EU’s actual performance does not necessarily 
correspond with its ambitious role claims5. A notable gap may exist between the EU’s own role 
conception and other actors’ perceptions of it6. If the EU aims to carry a normative power role, this 
role should also be recognized by external audiences and different EU partners. Hence, this thesis 
studies all these three aspects of the EU’s role; self-image, role performance, and external perceptions.  
 
The EU as a Global Actor  
 
When the global role of the EU is studied, first it needs to be outlined what is meant by EU actorness 
and who acts in the name of the EU. The EU is complex and multi-faceted political entity, and its 
agency may refer to the agency of EU institutions, but also includes the cooperated actions of 
individual EU member states (EUMS). It is also likely that there are differing views concerning the 
EU’s appropriate global role, as role conceptions reflect various political preferences and power 
                                                 
1 Council of the European Union 2012. 
2 Lucarelli 2006, 2-3. 
3 Diez 2005, 636. 
4 Stated in European Security Strategy (ESS): A Secure Europe in a Better World (2003), see Biscop & Gibney 2010. 
5 See Balfour 2012, Elgström & Smith 2006b, 248. 
6 Lucarelli & Fioramonti 2010; Lucarelli 2013. 
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relations. Secondly, the EU’s global actorness is a relatively recent phenomena; it started to develop 
properly only after the Cold War. The new situation included many opportunities, but also demands 
for a more active EU role in the world. After the Maastricht Treaty (1993), the EU quite rapidly 
developed formidable actorness in several policy areas7, as its member states were willing to improve 
and strengthen the EU’s collective clout. Today, the EU is able to act relatively autonomously, for 
example, in relation to several third actors and in many multilateral institutions. Some have even 
suggested that it has been the EU rather than its member states that have played a pivotal role in the 
West’s major foreign policy successes of the last decades.8 The EU’s agency is seldom restricted by 
its formal status; the EU’s control over a significant amount of resources and capabilities in specific 
fields enables it to be a considerable actor9. As a consequence, the EU has acquired relevant global 
actorness, upon which various role conceptions can be based. 
 
Despite the increased global presence and influence of the EU, it cannot act without the acceptance 
of its member states. The division of competencies between the EU and its member states is a subject 
of continuous dispute, and sometimes these tensions can paralyze the EU’s ability to respond 
collectively to some foreign policy challenges10. For many observers, the fundamental obstacle to EU 
foreign policy-making is its member states’ willingness to pursue their foreign policy interests 
separately.11 At the same time, it has become increasingly clear that the EU must combine its 
resources and knowledge in order to also be influential in the future. That is why the Lisbon Treaty 
aimed to enhance the EU’s global visibility, effectiveness and efficiency through the creation of the 
post of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP) and 
the European External Action Service (EEAS). However, the timing of these reforms was not the 
easiest; the Eurozone crisis has dominated the political agenda, and other concerns have received less 
attention. The EU must also face a less favourable external environment, where often quite 
unexpected large-scale changes, such as unrest in the European neighbourhood, migration flows and 
violent terrorism by ISIS, create strong pressures for a collective EU response. 
 
One of the most important avenues where the EU has aimed to improve its visibility and effectiveness 
are international organizations (IOs). The EU has aspired to upgrade its status in many organizations 
to meet the enhanced actor capabilities. The problem is that most of these organizations are created 
for states, and formal EU participation, such as voting, remains restricted. Legal-institutional as well 
as political factors precondition the EUs participation and role. The Lisbon treaty was to streamline 
EU representation in international fora, but representational practices vary in different locations12. 
                                                 
7 See Bretherton & Vogler 2006. 
8 Cases mentioned include the stabilization of countries in Central and Eastern European countries, as well as the 
Western Balkans, fighting against piracy in Somalia, the case of Serbia and Kosovo and environmental affairs. 
(Keukeleire & Delreux 2014, 322). 
9 These resources are related to the financial instruments of the EU, but also on institutional capacities to work on 
specific issues, see Gehring et al. 2013, 861. 
10 Most notable failures of the EU include, for example, the inability to end ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, disagreement 
about the Israel-Palestinian conflict, the political rift between EUMS on the war on Iraq, and more recently, difficulties 
to deal with the Arab Spring and migration. 
11 Smith K. 2008, 10. 
12 Scholars have argued that the impact of the Lisbon Treaty is most significant for the UN General Assembly 
(Bouchard & Drieskens 2013, 116). However, elsewhere the consequences have not been that direct. The EU needs 
member states’ representation especially in those forums where the EU does not have official status and rights for 
representation. 
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Often the EU plays roles alongside its member states, which causes complexity, sometimes, even 
competition. This is because the EU delegations may conduct important negotiations and present 
common EU positions on behalf of the member states. However, at the same time, individual member 
states may also promote their national priorities. The mixed nature of the EU’s actorness poses a need 
to specify what “the EU” means in particular contexts. As this thesis examines the EU’s role at the 
HRC, where both member states and the EU are active participants, it aims to take into account the 
EU’s “multiple voices”. Because of divided competencies in human rights issues, maintaining EU 
coherence and consistency is a real challenge13. Externally, the EU aims to appear united and promote 
common positions. However, acknowledging the different tones inside the EU is relevant in cases 
where the EU cannot put forward a common position.  
 
Role Theory and the Normative Power Role of the EU 
 
This thesis uses the concepts and ideas developed in role theory to examine the EU’s role at the HRC. 
Role theory is rooted in sociology and social psychology, and its key theoretical promise in 
International Relations is to bridge agency and structure. Role theory emerged in foreign policy 
analysis in the 1970s when scholars started to examine the regular behavioural patterns of classes of 
states in the bipolar Cold War environment14. However, this early scholarship focused mainly on role 
taking (ego side), while later on, the different external constraints and possibilities for roles were 
better acknowledged (alter side). In short, role theory explains foreign policy behaviour by exploring 
the roles an actor plays in the international system. By definition, roles refer to patterns of expected, 
appropriate behaviour and they may serve several functions; they classify actors, they influence how 
actors define their interests, and they shape their policy choices. This thesis claims that an 
understanding of EU foreign policy roles needs to acknowledge three aspects of roles; the actor’s 
own role perception, its actual role performance, as well as role prescriptions held by other actors. 
Together these components make up the role bargaining process15 in which the ego and alter sides of 
roles interact to determine an appropriate role for the actor. Furthermore, it is necessary to look at the 
actor’s role performance, as it does not necessarily correlate with the role expectations16. The actor’s 
role performance is influenced by ego and alter expectations, but at the same time it feeds back these 
expectations. 
 
The concept of a role has become common in the literature dealing with the global activities of the 
EC/EU. Studies concerning the global role of the EC date back to the 1970s when the European 
Political Cooperation (EPC) in foreign policy issues was launched. In research literature, the EU role 
is most often used as a synonym for influence but also as an umbrella concept for more general 
patterns of EU behaviour. The EC/EU role in the world has often been described in a positive manner. 
For example in the 1970s the EC was characterized as a “civilian power” or even a “civilizer” of state 
relations17. This narrative was considered highly persuasive in defining the future EC role also after 
                                                 
13 More recently it has also been contested whether such consistency is actually needed for effective EU action, see for 
example Delreux 2014. 
14 Harnisch 2011, 7. 
15 See Thies 2013, 2-3. 
16 Aggestam 2006, 20–21. 
17 See Duchêne 1972, 1973. 
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the Cold War. One of the most popular EU role conceptualizations, normative power Europe (NPE) 
launched by Ian Manners in 2002, was a continuum and reconsideration of this debate. According to 
Manners, the EU is a normative power in the sense that it has the ability to shape the “normality” of 
international relations by changing existing norms and standards.18 This thesis claims that the NPE 
ideal-type is based on core EU values19, which are assumed to be universal, and a willingness to adopt 
non-coercive instruments in EU norm promotion. The NPE thesis has been highly successful in the 
analysis of EU external relations and has influenced the EU role debate. At the same time, the NPE 
concept has evoked strong criticism. One of the main reasons for this criticism is that the concept is 
claimed to be an analytically poor and a politically loaded concept20. However, as this thesis 
demonstrates, the normative power role concept may be useful in examining the EU role in global 
human rights promotion. It can be interpreted as a self-image of the EU, which may or may not 
correspond with its role performance. Furthermore, the recognition and acceptance of the normative 
power role (alter role) must be examined in the EU’s different others. 
 
Roles are always products of a certain historical time and they reflect the prevailing political realities 
and circumstances. One of the important functions of the normative power idea was to provide 
legitimacy for the EU’s developing foreign policy actorness. It was also used to differentiate the EU 
approach from the approaches of other actors. At the turn of the millennium, the normative power 
role was constructed especially as an alternative for the US preference for unilateralism. In the 
European Security Strategy (2003) the EU strongly expressed its commitment to effective 
multilateralism and the UN. For the EU, saving and reforming, as well as extending the multilateral 
system constituted a significant new role in international politics.21 This was closely related to the 
idea that the EU would represent some kind of post-Westphalian, post-national political community22, 
which, instead of narrow national interests, would serve humanity at large by promoting universal 
principles and normative global governance. Hence, the legitimacy of the EU was constructed by 
emphasizing the EU’s beneficial contribution to international politics23. The problem is that the 
normative power role merely reflects an ideal type, not necessarily the actual EU role as it is, which 
is typical for self-declared foreign policy roles. Achieving acceptance for such a role in the eyes of 
others has become an increasingly difficult task for the EU in the changing world.  
 
The EU Role in Human Rights: the Case of the HRC 
 
The EU role in human rights is rather novel; only during the last two decades has the promotion and 
protection of human rights developed into one of the key issues in EU foreign policy. According to 
Catherine Ashton, human rights provide “the silver thread that runs through everything the EU does 
externally”24. The EU promises to actively promote and defend human rights both inside the EU, and 
                                                 
18 Manners 2002, 239. 
19 According to Manners the main EU values include peace, liberty, democracy, human rights, rule of law, equality, 
social solidarity, sustainable development and good governance (Manners 2006b, 33-36.) 
20 Forsberg 2011a, 1199. 
21 Jørgensen 2006b, 30. 
22 Linklater 1998, 218-219; 2011, 446-447. 
23 See Bickerton 2011. 
24 Catherine Ashton upon the adoption of the Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, 
25.6. 2012.  
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when engaging with different external actors. The external promotion of human rights carries 
relevance also for the EU’s normative power role claims. According to Manners, if the EU aims to 
be a normative power it should promote normative principles, act in a normative manner, and achieve 
normative impacts in others25. From this perspective, the EU should promote human rights norms 
that can also receive the acceptance of the possible norm-takers. The EU’s human rights interpretation 
underlines the universal nature of human rights, as well as the legitimacy of international human 
rights treaties and bodies. However, in the UN human rights machinery, which the EU sees as an 
important arena for its normative efforts, the human rights debate is politicized, and finding a common 
ground on rights is often challenging. In such an environment, the EU’s role as a normative power 
faces challenges, which do not fit with this image.  
 
This thesis studies the EU’s normative power role more particularly at the Human Rights Council 
(HRC), the key UN body in the field of human rights. The HRC is based in Geneva, Switzerland, and 
it was established in March 2006 to strengthen the promotion and protection of human rights around 
the globe. The HRC consists of 47 UN member states elected by the General Assembly for a three-
year period. Even if the work of the Council has been politicized by strong bloc dynamics, it has also 
produced important outcomes in the form of resolutions. The HRC provides the most global arena 
for the human rights debate and hence the EU finds it an important place to search for legitimacy for 
its human rights positions. The EU has demonstrated its willingness to support and contribute to the 
work of the HRC already from the beginning. Since 201226 the EU has also promoted a more strategic 
approach to human rights and aims to achieve better effectiveness and efficiency in human rights 
questions, especially in the multilateral fora. This new approach has also had consequences for EU 
action at the HRC. However, influencing other actors at the HRC is not necessarily an easy task. The 
EU has a minority position in this global body27, and during the first years of the Council’s work the 
EU had difficulties in achieving success. Despite high ambitions and unity, the EU could reach only 
moderate results because of the dominance of the non-Western majority. The EU’s interpretation of 
human rights, as well as its persuasiveness in the eyes of others, was put into the test. Should the EU 
strongly defend its values or should it aim to build bridges and courage multilateral cooperation and 
solutions? Whatever the EU chooses to do, it will have both positive and negative consequences for 
its image as a human rights power. This dilemma demonstrates why the HRC is an interesting case 
for examining the EU’s normative power role claims. 
 
Aim and Relevance of the Thesis 
  
This thesis studies the EU’s normative power role at the UN Human Rights Council, by taking into 
account the ego and alter sides of this role, as well as the actual EU role performance. The main 
research questions are:  
                                                 
25 Manners 2009c, see also Aggestam 2013; Forsberg 2011a. 
26 In June 2012 the EU adopted the Strategic Framework for Human Rights and Democracy, which was to present a 
watershed in the EU’s human rights policy. The strategy included an ambitious Action Plan for the following years with 
focused priorities. In 2015 a revised Action Plan was published and it concentrated on improving EU action in those 
areas where more development was needed. 
27 The EU member states represent only around 15 % of the HRC membership. 
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- How can the Normative Power Europe (NPE) idea help to explain the role ambitions, practices 
and outcomes of the EU’s human rights policy? 
- How does the EU (EU and EUMS) perceive its role at the Human Rights Council? 
- Does the EU’s actual performance at the HRC match with its self-image? 
- How do other HRC participants perceive the EU’s role? Do these perceptions differ from each 
other and from the self-perception of the EU? 
 
The HRC celebrates its 10th anniversary year in 2016, and lately it has demonstrated an increasing 
level of activity. Clearly the EU needs to be involved at the HRC if it aspires to have a normative 
power role in global human rights governance.  The post-Lisbon developments, such as the EU’s new 
Strategic Framework for Human Rights, are in place to increase EU visibility and effectiveness in the 
multilateral human rights system. These external and internal evolutions give reasons to reconsider 
and evaluate the EU’s role in human rights. However, the roles the EU is able to play in the world are 
often highly context-dependent and issue-specific. That is why the EU’s role needs to be studied by 
taking into account the specific preconditions for its role-playing in more particular institutional 
contexts. This thesis concentrates on the case of the HRC and provides interesting new information 
concerning the EU’s role potential and reality. Hence, the most important contribution of this thesis 
to EU role studies is the empirical data collected through 63 human rights expert interviews in Geneva 
and Brussels. These interviews demonstrate how the EU role is perceived by EU actors themselves, 
as well as by its different external others, such as other UN member states, human rights organizations 
and the HRC Secretary. This information is highly beneficial for a more comprehensive 
understanding of the EU’s human rights role in global environment.  
 
Research Structure 
 
This thesis starts by clarifying the theoretical, conceptual and historical questions related to the EU’s 
global role. Chapter One discusses social constructivism as a meta-theoretical background for EU 
role research, and explains how the key concepts of this thesis can be understood from these premises. 
It also presents the methodological choices and research data. Chapter Two studies the EU’s global 
role as a normative power from a conceptual and historical perspective. This chapter develops a more 
specific framework for analysing the EU’s role in global human rights governance. The Normative 
Power Europe idea has been an influential perspective for studying EU external action. However, 
using this framework does not mean that it is accepted as a true definition of the EU’s role; it is rather 
used as a critical perspective for EU human rights actorness. Normative power presents an ideal type, 
which the EU’s action may more or less approximate in human rights policy.  
 
Chapter Three introduces how the EU’s rather novel role in human rights has been facilitated by 
global, regional and domestic developments. It also studies the more specific EU definition of human 
rights, and presents the key EU instruments used in human rights promotion. One of the most 
important ways through which the EU aims to promote human rights globally is by working through 
international organizations, such as the UN. The UN Human Rights Council is an important area for 
the EU’s norm diffusion and norm export. The chapter concludes by discussing the relevance of the 
normative power role formulation for the EU’s human rights policy as well as the challenges this role 
faces in global context. Chapter Four introduces the HRC and explains how it works. It also presents 
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the main preconditions for the EU’s role in this forum. Evidently, the legal-institutional factors, 
related to EU internal dynamics and the external UN context, condition the roles the EU is able to 
play. Even if the EU member states have agreed to speak with one voice at the HRC, domestic politics 
influences EU cooperation and its ability to produce outcomes. However, external political conditions 
set the most demanding conditions for the EU’s role at the HRC. As a political forum, the HRC suffers 
from the politicization of issues and bloc dynamics.  
 
The empirical part of the thesis studies the EU’s role from three perspectives; self-conception, role 
performance and external perceptions. First, Chapter Five studies the self-perception (ego part of role) 
of the EU through official documents such as EU human rights reports and HRC related statements. 
In addition, 23 theme-based interviews were conducted with EEAS staff members (in Brussels and 
Geneva) and with EU member state human rights experts working in their national delegations in 
Geneva in 2013-2014. The collected data can be used to show how different aspects of the normative 
power role are reflected in EU role conception. Chapter Six studies the EU’s role performance at the 
HRC along the lines of relevance, effectiveness, resource viability and efficiency. Previous research 
on the EU’s role at the UN human rights machinery has concentrated on EU voting records, but as 
this chapter notes, such a perspective cannot capture the entire picture of the EU’s performance. 
Chapter Six adopts a wider evaluation perspective and demonstrates the EU’s performance at the 
HRC through interviews and different EU performance records. Because the EU’s role and 
performance is highly dependent on how other actors perceive it, Chapter Seven studies external 
perceptions of the EU’s role (alter side of role) in the HRC. It is based on 40 semi-structured theme 
interviews conducted among the representatives of third states, human rights organization and the 
UN Secretary in 2013-2014. The perceptions of others are studied through classifying actors into six 
groups following their normative closeness to the EU, and by taking into account their voting 
behaviour at the HRC. Together, these external perceptions are able to provide important information 
on the alter side of the EU’s human rights role. They also have direct practical relevance for EU 
action, as others’ perceptions shape the EU’s possibilities to play roles and achieve outcomes in 
multilateral fora.   
 
All chapters end with short conclusions. However, in Chapter Eight more general conclusions for the 
main research questions are provided. Chapter Eight also points to a reconsideration of the EU’s role 
as a normative power at the HRC. The thesis concludes by providing three future role scenarios for 
the EU at the HRC, based on the interview material. 
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1 Theoretical and Conceptual Framework 
 
The philosophy of social science offers interesting insights for studying the global role of the 
European Union. These philosophical questions are often described as meta-theoretical debates in 
International Relations (IR), and not all researchers are convinced of their relevance for practical 
research. However, all research is based on some meta-theoretical background assumptions 
concerning ontological, epistemological, and methodological questions. These concerns are not just 
abstract philosophical deliberations; they have an impact on how a researcher perceives the world 
and the objects of her research. Metatheory also guides the interpretation of concepts and the selection 
of methods, as well as what sort of analysis will follow. These choices together make up the more 
general framework for the research and position it into the wider research tradition. This chapter 
introduces the theoretical foundations of this thesis, clarifies the key concepts used, and introduces 
the methodological choices and the research data.  
 
The theoretical challenge of this thesis is to study the EU, an ontologically highly complex political 
entity. Even if the sui generis nature of the EU is often exaggerated, in practice European integration 
has created a need to reconsider many traditional assumptions and concepts of IR.  EU integration 
has worked against the predominant realist view28, which emphasizes the state-centric and anarchical 
nature of the international system29. Like many other efforts to understand the EU, this thesis also 
starts from a social constructivist perspective. First, this chapter explains what social constructivism 
entails. Especially European foreign policy seems to be an ideal case for showing the potential of the 
rich toolbox of constructivism30. The second section clarifies the key concepts of this thesis, such as 
agency, identity, roles, norms, interests and power, from a constructivist viewpoint. The last part 
explains how the theoretical framework guides the empirical research on the EU’s role at the UN 
Human Rights Council. The social constructivist approach is open to a variety of methodological 
strategies and research data. Different methods can reveal different aspects of reality and they should 
be chosen on the basis of their appropriateness. This thesis focuses on both, statistical data and the 
subjective perceptions of the EU role among EU and non-EU policy makers. These perceptions are 
studied through semi-structured interviews, the details of which are explained in the last section. 
 
1.1 Social Constructivism 
 
For research that concentrates on ideational factors such as identities, roles and norms, the choice of 
constructivism as a background theory is natural because it emphasizes the relevance of cognitive 
processes and non-material factors. However, constructivism has many meanings and it can be used 
in several ways. Social constructivism is not an actual IR theory, but a wider meta-theory, and it 
provides help mainly in ontological, epistemological and methodological questions. It also allows 
conceptual and meta-theoretical pluralism, and there is no common view on how to proceed with the 
approach. Most importantly, constructivism is able to challenge the rationalist assumptions and 
                                                 
28 As foreign policy lies at the heart of national sovereignty, it was assumed that states will not integrate in this field. 
29 It took a long time for European integration and the EU to be included in the IR textbooks. The introductory books 
lacked the concepts of integration and the EU as late as in the middle of the1990s. See Ojanen 2007, 53-54. 
30 Jørgensen 2004, 13. 
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highlight alternative aspects of the integration process; policy formation through rules and norms, the 
transformation of identities, the role of ideas and the uses of language31. This section sheds light on 
the analytical insights provided by constructivism. 
 
Since 1945, political realism has been the dominant theory of International Relations. The different 
versions of realism32 underline the importance of material factors and the centrality of power 
considerations. Constructivism can be considered as an idealist answer to the realist dominance in IR 
in many senses. Ontologically it has challenged the predominance of materialism by giving more 
emphasis on ideational factors. For a prominent constructivist, Alexander Wendt, constructivism is a 
kind of “structural idealism”, where structures of human association are determined primarily by 
shared ideas rather than material forces. According to him, these structures have emergent powers 
that are not reducible to individuals.33 Constructivist thinking gained popularity in the 1990s after the 
end of the Cold War. The mainstream IR, neo-realist and neoliberal theories, had difficulties in 
explaining those more systemic, especially ideological, changes which were taking place. 
Constructivism was tailor-made for the period when debates about identities and the effects of 
normative structures34 on world politics were increasingly raised. A constructivist perspective of 
agency as an active shaper of history was an important reason for applying its tools in the IR field35. 
This period marked the “constructivist turn” in IR36, and the debate between rationalists and 
constructivists was central in the discipline.  
 
As a meta-theory, social constructivism can take several forms, and there is a lack of clear definition 
what this analytical approach more closely includes37. Still, certain core commitments form a 
distinctive theoretical approach to IR. From an ontological point of view, all constructivists share a 
critique of the static material and individualistic assumptions38 of traditional IR theory. For the 
constructivist, social reality is socially constructed and there is a fundamental distinction between 
“brute facts” about the world, and “social facts”, which depend for their existence on socially 
established conventions. Things like money, sovereignty and rights have no material reality, but they 
exist only because some people collectively believe in them and act accordingly39. Constructivists do 
not deny the existence of an independent reality of material objects, and many of them have adopted 
a scientific realist40 perspective according to which underlying reality provides the conditions of 
                                                 
31 Christiansen et al. 2001b, 12. 
32 For example Classical, neo-, and structural realism. 
33 Wendt 1999, 1. 
34 Normative structure refers to collectively held ideas such as knowledge, rules, beliefs, and norms that not only 
constrain actors but also construct categories of meaning, constitute identities and interests, and define standards of 
appropriate behaviour. (See Barnett 2011, 163) 
35 Ruggie 1998, 878. 
36 Checkel 1998. 
37 Brown & Ainley 2009, 48; Zehfuss 2002, 3. 
38 Material structures that were considered to constrain behaviour according to neo-realists and neo-liberals include the 
distribution of power, technology and geography. Individualist ontology of previous rationalist IR theory see the 
individual (human or state) as the basic unit of analysis. 
39 Finnemore & Sikkink 2001, 393. 
40 Critical realism is a philosophy for the social sciences that was born as a critique of the positivist approach, which 
had dominated many of the social sciences since the 1930s. Critical realism is mainly associated with the British 
philosopher Roy Bhaskar. Common to all critical realist views is the combination of ontological realism, 
epistemological relativism and judgemental rationalism.  Critical realism is thus a philosophical position, not an 
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possibility for actual events and experienced phenomena41. However, constructivists are more 
concerned with human consciousness and on how actors interpret their material reality. Thus, social 
phenomena, such as norms, rules, institutions, and discourses, are a product of human interaction and 
sharing of meanings. Social reality is constantly under change, and people have a role in the 
construction of their reality. We live in “a world of our making” as the man who coined the term 
“constructivism”, Nicholas Onuf, argued in his famous book in 198942. Because social facts exist 
only due to the meaning and value people attribute to them, social realities are fragile, changeable 
and contestable. Furthermore, social realities seem to have a more local than global presence, and 
also a limited timeframe.43 At the same time, these realities may also be relatively durable and difficult 
to change.  
 
For the constructivist, the processes of interaction between agency and structure are essential in 
understanding social reality. According to constructivists, structures are not about distributing 
material capabilities, but about distributing ideas. Structures not only constrain; they are also able to 
constitute the identity and interests of actors. At the same time, actors aim to shape the underlying 
structures through their actions. This co-constitution of agents and structures is a key aspect of the 
constructivist approach and cannot be claimed to be “ontologically primitive”44. Another relevant 
concept is contextualization, which refers to the fact that actors are always embedded in social 
structures; they act as “social agents”. Structures have both normative and instrumental dimensions 
and they express not only individual, but also collective intentionality45. Furthermore, these structures 
are fundamentally historically and culturally bound, and help individuals construct and give meaning 
to reality.46 Sometimes structures make actors behave against their externally perceived interests. The 
interests of actors cannot be established purely exogenously, or be deduced from some material 
structure47. Social institutions have a constitutive effect on actors’ identities and define the rules of 
the game and actors cannot be analysed without reference to the social structures in which they are 
embedded. Hence, according to constructivists, actors are guided by the logic of appropriateness; they 
try to do what is right rather than instrumentally maximise their interests. This challenges the 
rationalist logic of consequences. Much of the early constructivist empirical research concentrated on 
showing how different norms matter and emphasized the ways in which ideas and norms run counter 
to, or undermine conventional conceptions of strong state interests. Norms were seen to have 
constitutive effects as they reshape an actor’s identities and interests. What is then considered rational 
is a function of legitimacy, defined by shared values and norms within institutions or other social 
structures. Here constructivist approaches come close to sociological institutionalism48, an approach 
used for explaining features in European integration. 
 
                                                 
independent theory of the IR, and as such it produces second-order, conceptual and meta-theoretical claims to the study 
of IR. For a good introduction to key ideas of critical realism, see Patomäki 2002. 
41 Patomäki & Wight 2000, 221. 
42 Onuf 1989. 
43 Christiansen et al. 2001b, 3. 
44 Checkel 1998, 326. 
45 Saurugger 2014, 146. 
46 Barnett 2011, 155. 
47 Saurugger 2014, 147. 
48 According to sociological institutionalism individual behaviour is shaped by structural conditions created by the 
social, cultural and institutional climate.  
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In epistemological terms, the breach between constructivism and traditional IR theory is not 
necessarily vast. There is no common epistemological ground for constructivists, and they disagree 
on whether the constructivist ontology is compatible with a rationalist epistemology. More rationalist 
approaches are associated with a positivist and explanatory perspective to IR theory and research.49 
At the same time, post-positivist approaches reject the idea of testing hypotheses altogether50. Hence, 
social constructivism occupies a position between rationalist and reflectivist approaches51, or 
different constructivists occupy different positions along the continuum between these two extreme 
poles52. Many constructivists have been closer to rationalism or synthetized these views53. Especially 
so-called “conventional constructivists”54 or modernist/neo-classical constructivists55 have not 
rejected the basic assumptions of positivist science, and by accepting positivist epistemology they 
have gained considerable legitimacy within the discipline.56 The more post-positivist constructivists, 
interpretative constructivists, explore the role of language in conditioning, mediating and constructing 
social reality. The focus is on the meanings of different concepts, and how they change when 
discourses evolve and cognitive frames transform. The third group of scholars, critical/radical 
constructivists, maintain the linguistic focus but add an explicitly normative dimension by probing a 
researcher’s own implication in the reproduction of the identities and world under study. Discourse 
theoretical methods put emphasis on the power and domination inherent in language and aim to 
comment on what should be done instead of just describing facts. A better understanding of the 
mechanisms behind political and social orders can lead to emancipation.  
 
A few constructivists57 have developed their epistemological views further by following critical 
realism and its epistemological relativism. According to critical realism, there is no guarantee that 
our knowledge corresponds to the way things actually are58. Critical realists think that the world 
cannot be reduced to the knowledge we have of it. Instead, they advocate the primacy of ontology, 
and argue for a reality comprised of different levels; the real, the actual and the empirical. Rationalists 
believe that the reality is just what can be known of it, mainly through empirical methods. However, 
empirical observations can only reveal the surface of things. Also conceptual analysis and theoretical 
abstraction are needed to notice the unobservable structures, powers and mechanisms which provide 
the conditions of possibility for actual events and perceived phenomena59. Different methods are able 
to capture different aspects of reality, and should be used on the basis of their appropriateness. 
According to judgemental rationalism, some explanations are better as they are able to explain what 
happens in the world. The ideas of critical realism have influenced this thesis. Epistemologically it 
aims to provide different explanations for the EU’s role but at the same time acknowledges the 
underlying power structures and mechanisms, which create and sustain them. 
                                                 
49 Kurki & Wight 2010, 24-25. 
50 Saurugger 2014, 145. 
51 For example critical theory, poststructuralism, different forms of feminism. Reflectivism foregrounds the non-
neutrality of political and social explanation and rejects rational choice assumptions. 
52 Christiansen et al. 2001b, 9-10. 
53 Zehfuss 2002, 5. 
54 Conventional constructivists have been inspired by the work of Alexander Wendt.  
55 Ruggie 1998, 881. 
56 Checkel 2005 & Fierke 2010, 183-184. 
57 Most notably Wendt, but he has also been criticized for not going far enough from positivist assumptions. 
58 Joseph 2014. 
59 Patomäki & Wight 2000. 
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1.2 Key Concepts 
 
Constructivist approaches have become popular in EU studies, especially since the turn of the 
millennium. Constructivism is often classified in EU textbooks amidst critical perspectives60 because 
it challenges the rationalist background assumptions of dominant integration theories61. More 
rationalist theories underline how the motivation to integrate derives from the benefits it brings for 
states. For the constructivist, European integration is a large scale process of community formation, 
where ideational factors, such as world-views, ideas, norms, identities and values play a prominent 
role. This constructivist focus is also reflected in the analysis of EU foreign policy. However, relations 
between the concepts of actorness, identity, role and power are rather ambiguous in the debate. 
Understanding the EU as an actor that may adopt foreign policy roles is already a challenge for 
traditional IR theories. The EU’s actorness in foreign policy is multifaceted and the EU as such is not 
always recognized as a proper actor. In order to carry a role in a particular policy area, the EU must 
be able to show actorness. Furthermore, coherence and consistency are often considered important 
component parts of EU credibility, for example in multilateral negotiations. Secondly, the EU’s 
complex nature makes it important to look at the notion of European identity in order to understand 
the self-perception of the EU. This self-perception forms the ego part of the wider role of the EU. 
However, the EU cannot only adopt some roles; it needs to form these roles in interaction with other 
actors. Thirdly, actor’s roles are related to interests, norms, values and power relations. This section 
clarifies these key concepts, and sketches out a framework for role analysis applicable to EU human 
rights policy.  
 
EU Actorness 
 
The first conceptual challenge is how the EU should be defined as a global actor – an entity that is 
capable of agency, for example, of formulating and acting upon decisions62. EU agency has been 
contested because it is neither a state, nor an intergovernmental organization, but an actor sui generis. 
However, the EU’s uniqueness is often exaggerated which has led to the insulation of the EU from 
wider IR themes and from comparisons with other powers63. The focus on actorness has also shifted 
the focus from the EU’s actual impact on world affairs. Theoretically the EU’s global actorness can 
be approached by looking at different criteria of actorness. Most of the early contributions in the 
1970s64 concentrated on the state-like properties of the EC, which were not able to capture the 
complex reality of EU actorness. In the 1990s, Jupille and Caporaso aimed to show the EU’s 
considerable potential to influence by setting out four more general requirements for EU actorness; 
recognition, authority, autonomy and cohesion65. Bretherton and Vogler66 also studied EU actorness 
in a similar manner through the interconnected criteria of opportunity, presence and capability. These 
criteria emphasize, in a constructivist manner, the interaction between behavioural and structural 
components of actorness. On the internal side, EU actorness would demand, for example, shared 
                                                 
60 See Bache et al. 2015, 63. 
61 Namely functionalism, neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism, but also versions of multi-level governance. 
62 Different definitions of agency and actorness, see Bretherton & Vogler 2006, chapter 1. 
63 Niemann & Bretherton 2013, 263. 
64 Sjöstedt 1977, Galtung 1973. 
65 Jupille & Caporaso 1998, 214-219. 
66 See Bretherton & Vogler 1999, 2006, 2009, 2013. 
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commitment to a set of values, domestic legitimation of political choices, and the abilities to form 
common priorities and policies. Also the availability and capacity to utilize different policy 
instruments, such as finance, institutions, military or economic tools, is essential in order to claim 
actorness. At the same time, it needs to be noted that these criteria of actorness can be fulfilled better 
in some policy areas, whereas in others the EU does not necessarily appear as a relevant actor. The 
EU’s actorness is closely related to EU authority or legal competences to act, and to its autonomy in 
relation to member states.  
 
The research on the EU’s global actorness has concentrated on studying the evolving internal 
conditions and possibilities. The most important precondition for the EU’s global actorness is its 
member states’ willingness to act together, share resources and deliver a unified message. Only 
through such collective appearance can the EU be recognized as a relevant actor. Even if, over the 
years, the level of ambition to speak with “one voice” in foreign affairs has steadily increased, also 
adverse tendencies are possible67. The complex distribution of competencies and representation may 
diminish the EU’s global actorness and credibility in the eyes of other actors. The EU has succeeded 
to claim actorness in those fields where member states have agreed on values, goals, tactics and 
preferable outcomes. The particular challenges related to the EU’s actorness can be captured by the 
concepts of consistency and coherence. From a political perspective these concepts do not differ much 
as both point in the direction of co-ordinated activities with the objective of ensuring that the EU 
speaks with a single voice68. The demands of consistency are related to several issues; consistency 
between member states, EU institutions, EU and the member states’ policies and different policy 
areas69. Bretherton and Vogler use the notion of coherence to refer to the internal policy processes of 
the Union, and to the wider possibilities to find positive synergies between foreign policies in 
different policy and issues areas70. The EU’s consistency problems have been approached through 
institutional reforms, which are thought to alleviate inconsistencies gradually71. However, for a hybrid 
and complex entity such as the EU, consistency/coherence present ideals that cannot be completely 
achieved. Improved consistency between words and deeds as well as over time are essential elements 
of the EU’s credibility. Actors who are able to show that they carry out announced policies will be 
trusted. Building credibility will take time, as other actors may not be easily convinced. It is still 
worth the efforts, as credibility is central to the effectiveness of policy. 
 
On the external side of actorness, opportunity refers to the structural context of action, ideas and 
events which frame and shape EU action72. Opportunities may include external conditions such as 
institutional rules, Cold War realities, wars, or crisis. This thesis notes the high relevance of external 
                                                 
67 These processes may be called the Europeanisation/nationalisation of foreign policy. Recently, the pace of integration 
in foreign policy has decelerated and more flexibility has been accepted. For example different open methods of 
coordination (OMC) make possible non-uniform integration processes (so called differentiated integration, multi-speed 
Europe or ‘à la carte’ integration). The idea is that states select those policy areas where they wish to cooperate with 
other EUMS and jointly set objectives, measurement criteria and benchmarking practices. 
68 Duke 1999, 3. These concepts are also used interchangeably, even if consistency is the word used in English EU 
treaty versions. 
69 Different forms include for example interstate, institutional, horizontal and vertical consistency, see Keukeleire & 
MacNaughtan 2008, 121-123; Duke 1999, 11-12; Portela & Raube 2012, 3-4. 
70 Bretherton & Vogler 2009, 35. 
71 For these institutional developments, see Portela & Raube 2012, 7-10. 
72 Bretherton & Vogler 2006, 23-25. 
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factors in constituting EU actorness. First of all, actors need recognition from other actors as an 
essential condition for their actorness. De jure recognition refers to diplomatic recognition under 
international law or to formal membership of international organizations. The EU’s de jure 
recognition depends on the context and, for example, in many state-centric IOs such recognition is 
still missing. However, this has not prevented research on EU action in different institutional 
frameworks, and as Koops notes, research on the EU in global affairs has undergone somewhat of an 
“inter-organizational turn”73. As the conditions for EU participation differ, these studies must take 
into account the specific institutional framework and avoid simple generalizations74. Hence, the EU-
IO research relies heavily on a wide range of case studies, often driven by practical concerns.75 
According to these studies, the EU’s capability to act as well as its external recognition depends on 
its control over governance resources, and the formal or legal status is not that relevant76. De facto 
recognition deals with the actual third party engagement with the EU. Do external others, for 
example, negotiate directly with the EU or do they prefer negotiations with its member states? Is the 
EU perceived as a relevant actor and does its message carry relevance in the eyes of other 
participants? In this respect the focus should be on how the EU is perceived in different bilateral and 
multilateral contexts. Interest in studying external perceptions of the EU has increased,77 producing 
information on how the EU is seen from the outside. According to these studies, de facto recognition 
of the EU is often higher than its legal status would suggest. However, perceptions of the EU differ 
in different contexts and also geographically, which makes it impossible to make broad 
generalizations. Furthermore, external conditions may change and alter the opportunities of the EU. 
These issues suggest that more context-related studies are needed to explain the windows of 
opportunity for EU actorness. 
 
European Identity 
 
Another important concept related to the EU’s global actorness and role research is identity. Identity 
aims to answer to the questions “Who am I?” and “Who am I in relation to others?” In this sense, 
there is always some pre-existing identity with which the actor enters into interaction with others. 
Traditionally, identities have been perceived as subjective, rooted in an actor’s self-understanding78. 
However, the meaning of those understandings depends on whether others perceive the actor in a 
similar manner. According to constructivists, identities are social constructions reflecting shared 
understandings about the essential nature of an entity79. Different identity discourses related to the 
EU may focus on the construction of a collective European identity, the reconstruction of national 
identities under the integration conditions, or whether a common European political culture can be 
founded on this heterogeneity of national identities and cultures80. For the EU, identity can be seen 
as an important source of its foreign policy roles81. This is because the actor’s identity generates broad 
                                                 
73 Koops 2013, 71. 
74 Kissack 2010, 5. 
75 Koops 2013, 71. 
76 Gehring et al. 2013, 861. 
77 See Lucarelli 2013. 
78 The concepts of identity, self-understanding and self-image are used here interchangeably. 
79 Bretherton & Vogler 2006, 36. 
80 Christiansen et al. 2001b, 14. 
81 Aggestam 2006, 21. 
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expectations, which limit the range of roles available. It also creates a broader context for how these 
roles are played out in practice. 
 
European identity is a form of social or collective identity82 that relates individuals to social groups 
that are not pre-socially given. According to Delanty and Rumford, collective identities do not 
necessarily differ theoretically much from national identities83. They may contain specific substances 
based on common fate, history and culture, but they also create emotional attachments, such as feeling 
of loyalty. The European identity does not necessarily undermine the relevance of national or local 
identities; in many cases it is only complementary to them84. Multiple and contested identities live 
side by side in Europe and this diversity may even be taken to form the core of European identity85. 
From a constructivist perspective, European identity can be understood with reference to a discourse 
in which competing identity claims are worked out. Risse makes a beneficial distinction between 
subjects and objects of identification, referring to who identifies with whom or what86. Following this 
view two competing visions of positive inclusive and negative exclusive European identity can be 
defined. The inclusive identity reflects the EU’s value-basis and perceives outsiders as more or less 
European, while the exclusive identity draws boundaries and sees others as non-European, or even 
alien.87 Populist conceptions draw from cultural and ethnic interpretation of identities, and they are 
increasingly used by Eurosceptical and nationalist parties around Europe.  
 
Another important division can be made between European and EU identity. Here European identity 
refers predominantly to cultural components of identities, while EU identity is more strictly 
political88. Political identity refers to the identification of citizens with particular political institutions, 
or even of sharing common experiences of decision-making. In this respect, political identity is 
closely related to political legitimacy. Only when Europeans think that ultimate issues should be made 
within the new polity instead of national level, can a new polity reach acceptance. Hence, the 
legitimacy issue remains open in the EU, and it is dependent on incomplete political identity. Even if 
political identity does not necessarily assume inescapable path dependence or dominance of the past 
over what we are now, political identities may benefit from historical achievements. For example the 
European war-torn past is often used when the EU is defined as a peace project89. It is important to 
notice how in the construction of political EU identity, ideational rather than material foundations 
have been benefitted. According to Risse, the specific ingredients of EU Europe are values like peace, 
human rights, rule of law, secularism and cosmopolitanism90. However, interpretation of these values, 
as well as their implementation, differs even inside the EU, which makes them tricky construction 
material for identities. The contents of political identity may matter a great deal in determining the 
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character and self-understanding of a political community91. What actually constitutes such “EU 
communalities”, around which its collective identity can be built, is a highly contested issue. 
According to Schmidt, there are at least four basic interpretations of the EU identity; the EU as a 
borderless problem-solving entity ensuring free markets and regional security, a normative discourse 
on value-based community, a principled discourse about the EU as a border-free rights-based post-
national union, and a strategic discourse about the EU as a global actor ‘doing international relations 
differently’ through multilateralism, humanitarian aid and peace keeping92. These models are partly 
overlapping and supported by different EU member states and political groups. 
 
It is also important to notice how collective identities are often created through social discourses. For 
example, key foreign policy speeches frequently contain assertions referring to subjective “we-
feelings” of a cultural group.93 There is often a scarcity of internal characteristics that could create 
strong feelings of unification. Some EU symbols, such as the flag, hymn, EU institution buildings 
and historical events exist, but these do not create strong feelings of belonging among EU citizens. 
There may also be stories, related to common past or contemporary being, which are able to create a 
sense of community, such as the story of a Common Market, Social Europe or European citizenship94. 
Even if identities are not primarily based on exclusion, they do need the distinction between ‘us’ and 
‘the others’95. According to Patomäki some kind of “othering” is inevitable in the identifying process, 
as it needs to be specified what “we” are not96. Importantly, the temporal othering could work as a 
“driver of learning” and change for the EU, because the most important other in this respect is the 
Europe’s own war-torn past97. Externally, the EU’s relations with other international actors form 
relevant sources for identity construction98. They help to reflect what the EU aims to represent in a 
wider context. According to Diez, since the 1990s the geographical and cultural othering has become 
more visible in the construction of EU identity. The geopoliticised identity discourse is problematic 
as it is prone to replicate colonial attitudes of supremacy, whilst at the same time omitting the self-
reﬂexivity exhibited in the temporal othering99. This may lead to negative representation of others, 
while the self represents something positive. The EU is seen as a supporter of international norms and 
institutions, while other actors are challengers or violators of this order and related norms.  
 
EU Role Conceptions 
 
As a foreign policy actor, with different internal characteristics and external possibilities, the EU also 
aims to take a variety of roles in different policy areas and institutional contexts. In this sense, agency 
can be seen as a precondition for the possibility of adopting a role. At the same time role analysis is 
able to deepen the understanding of EU foreign policy agency, as agency includes the performance 
of different roles. Thus, a role concept may help to explain why an actor acts in a particular manner 
                                                 
91 Castiglione 2009, 30. 
92 Schmidt 2010, 17. 
93 Aggestam 2004, 83. 
94 See Eder 2009. 
95 Cerutti 2008. 
96 Patomäki 2012b, 248. 
97 See for example Weaver 1998. 
98 Checkel and Katzenstein 2009b, 224. 
99 Diez 2004, 332-333. 
17 
 
in specific issue area. The recognition, or non-recognition, of specific roles by others is reflected in 
performance problems. The concepts of role and identity are also closely related, as identities steer 
role-taking processes and available role options. Roles are typically presented as consisting of two 
parts: of an ego-part and alter part100. The ego-part of a role refers to the self-perception of the role 
beholder. Identity is an important source for this ego side of roles, which Wendt calls role identity101 
and Holsti national role conception102. The alter-part of roles consists of external expectations of other 
actors. Hence, others may not only recognize actorness, but also more specific roles of an actor. In 
this respect, roles are always ego-alter compositions, which change and evolve over time.  
 
Role theory has remained relatively underdeveloped in IR theory103 even if there have been attempts 
to benefit from its ideas104. Role theory does not refer to a single theory, but to an approach that begins 
with the concept of role as central to social life. Role analysis gives a researcher a conceptual toolbox 
and an opportunity to synthesize various IR traditions105. Furthermore, many IR scholars have drawn 
on role theory, even if they have separated their work from it106. Originally role theory emerged in 
foreign policy analysis (FPA) in the 1970s by Kalevi Holsti’s study107 of national role conceptions. 
He borrowed the concept of role from sociology and social psychology, and applied it to analyse the 
foreign policy behaviour of states. His idea was simple; state leaders have beliefs about the identity 
of states and these beliefs shape the way states act in the international system. According to Holsti, 
also the expectations of other governments, international legal norms or even “world opinion” may 
explain many aspects in the national behaviour of states108. American role theorists, such as Stephen 
Walker, advanced more structural understanding of roles, according to which system structure, law 
and organizations are central for understanding a state’s role in the world109. According to the 
interactional approach to roles, which also this thesis follows, roles are mutually constituted in 
interaction between different actors, for example in negotiations110. The relative importance of 
domestic (ego side) and international factors (alter side) in determining roles in individual cases is a 
matter of empirical research. 
 
An actor may have numerous roles and role theorists have identified a range of roles possible for 
states. For example Holsti identified 17 major roles expressed by states including roles such as 
regional leader, anti-imperialist agent, defender of faith, bridge and faithful ally111. Such typologies 
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are likely to reflect the political environment of their time, and as such are not necessarily beneficial 
analytical frames for current EU roles. The EU can play different roles depending on its internal actor 
capabilities, external conditions but also in relation to issue areas and specific policy and institutional 
contexts. The focus on one role may be used to provide an explanation for specific foreign policy 
choices, and an actor’s behaviour in an organizational context. Bengtsson and Elgström have 
distinguished between more general meta-roles and context-specific roles. Meta-roles, such as the 
EU’s normative great power role, entail expectations of consistent role behaviour across issue areas 
and/or over time. Context-specific roles create expectations particular to a certain policy area or 
geographical region.112 How much these two role types coincide in practice depends on particular 
cases. It is also possible that an actor occupies incompatible roles, which creates contradictory action 
expectations. The idea of multiple roles is related to an actor’s capabilities, but also to role adaptation 
and change. An actor’s possibility to adopt roles is bound by its internal capabilities and by external 
factors and the behaviour of other actors. According to Harnisch, changes in roles and their enactment 
comes in two types: adaptation and learning113. The important question is what actually changes; is 
change in role conception a move to a new role, or does it merely reflect a greater emphasis of some 
other, already existing role alternative?114 As ego role conceptions are rather enduring, external 
factors are often important in explaining role changes. 
 
Previous EU role research has concentrated on the role conceptions promoted by the EU instead of 
structurally driven expectations of other actors115. This is understandable as the EU can claim roles 
and seek recognition for them only in those areas where it is able to first show actorness. When the 
EU member states act in a contradictory manner, the question of EU actorness is not relevant, and 
there is no robust EU role. This kind of intentional perspective to roles brings attention to how actors 
are involved in defining roles. Specific foreign policy roles are usually driven by some domestic 
parties116. For example decision-makers use roles in relation to both internal and external audiences. 
Hence, roles can be studied by looking at role conceptions held by national elites. Their views are 
reflected, for example, in official policy statements, leader’s speeches, and historical documents.117 
However, according to Cantir and Kaarbo, there is often substantial domestic variation regarding 
different role conceptions, and roles are not necessarily shared across elites or between elites and 
masses118. Individual interviews are one way to find out what policy-makers think more subjectively, 
and whether their perceptions on EU roles differ in relevant respects. 
 
Furthermore, claimed EU roles also need recognition from other actors; the EU cannot play roles if 
these are not accepted by external others. In this respect, an essential element of EU role analysis 
concerns how other actors perceive the EU’s role. Role recognition, or the lack of it, shapes the EU’s 
self-perception, political identity and finally, its role performance. If the EU role is recognized and 
supported by others, the EU needs to use less efforts in those policy processes related with this role, 
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and it more likely also achieves its goals. Here the notion of coherence again becomes relevant. When 
the EU promotes a collective role, consistency and coherence are important aspects of the credibility 
of roles. In order to convince other actors, the EU must show consistency/coherence in several 
respects, not least over time and between its words and action. The credible representation of roles 
influences an actor’s effectiveness and further abilities to perform a specific role. Previous studies 
have noticed how there often is a considerable gap between ego and alter role expectations119. This is 
especially the case when the EU’s more global roles are considered. The EU is a relatively novel actor 
in world politics, and many non-Europeans are not necessarily familiar with the EU’s integration 
project or voluntary sharing of state sovereignty. As a consequence, an outsider’s expectations might 
be diverse; some do not recognize the EU as a legitimate actor, while others expect too much from it. 
 
Interests, Values and Norms 
 
Interests and values are important sources for role conceptions, but role playing also serves particular 
ends. Division between interests and values is evident in the debate on the external roles of the EU. 
According to the Lisbon treaty: “in its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and 
promote both, its values and interests”120. However, Lucarelli and Manners claim that the ambitions 
of the EU as a global power are predominantly defined with reference to values rather than 
interests121. The EU’s role characterizations, such as normative power122, force for good123, good 
international citizen’124 and ethical power125, underline this value-driven image. Furthermore, the EU 
is also claimed to differ from other, more instrumental, self-interested or strategic powers. The EU’s 
proclaimed value-based, normative image has also attracted much criticism. Many scholars have 
come to the opposite conclusion; the EU primarily drives its member states’ strategic and economic 
interests126, and in this respect the EU does not differ remarkably from other actors. Other actors are 
also keen to refer to values in their policies127. It is probable that EU action includes elements of both, 
interest- and value-based logics, especially in instances where values and interests do not easily 
coexist. Hence, even if the EU can show normative performance, its behaviour is mixed and 
inconsistent on many occasions128. Interests or values may also appear more prominently in different 
policy areas. According to Manners, EU action is value-driven especially in human rights, 
environmental protection and democracy promotion, policies close to those values it holds dear129. 
 
From a constructivist perspective the entire confrontation between interests and values is exaggerated. 
Constructivists have challenged the realist, mainly material, understanding of interests. Interests are 
not given, but contingent on norms, beliefs and values. For example, Wendt underlines how interests 
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are not only shaped by material forces, but also by ideas and shared culture130. Cultural and historical 
differences impact on how interests are defined, and also institutional commitments create new 
conditions for action, limiting the scope of what is possible for actors.131 Hence, intersubjective 
arrangements are seen to constitute and constrain the advancement of (self-) interests. Inside the EU, 
the member states’ construction of interests necessitates processes of learning and socialization, or so 
called Europeanization132. Several empirical studies have traced how European institutions have 
socialized actors through recreating and redefining their interests and identities133 and, hence, shaping 
what is considered to be appropriate action in the EU context. Clearly, institutions shape interests and 
values, and also the taking of specific roles in relation to them. However, considerable scope is left 
for intentional action and role playing. Constructivists focus on how an actor’s interests are always 
rooted in identities without which they would have no direction134. In this respect the EU might not 
always pursue its interests through normative considerations but, before anything else, aims to 
establish an identity for itself. This demonstrates how action, identity, interests, values and norms are 
closely related concepts that need to be taken into account when studying EU roles.  
 
When the sharp division between interests and values is abandoned, it can be noticed that the 
promotion of interests does not exclude the promotion of wider values. Actually, it is often in the 
interests of an actor to promote externally wider values, such as human rights and democracy. Support 
and promotion of these values and related norms is central for the EU’s role as a normative power. 
This role assumes that other actors are attracted by EU values and are likely to change their action to 
better match with these ideals. Importantly, Manners’ conception of the normative power role also 
seems to stress that the EU does not act only in its own interests, but binds itself to international 
norms, whether these are in its interests or not135. This kind of interpretation suggests that EU choices 
reflect its commitment to the common good, devoid of instrumental calculation. However, as Youngs 
notes, normative values and more strategic calculations can also inform each other. The pre-eminence 
of ideational dynamics and a value-driven EU profile fails to capture the more instrumental, security-
oriented dynamics behind its action.136 Much depends on who is able to govern those institutions 
where the EU is active and set their agenda, issues that will be discussed in the next section on power.  
 
Power  
 
In order to play a significant role in the world, the EU needs to have power137. The broad definition 
of power refers to the actor’s capability to produce intended effects. However, the concept of power 
is highly contested, and there have been several attempts to redefine it. For the purposes of this thesis, 
three aspects of power discourse are especially relevant: power resources, instruments and effects of 
                                                 
130 Wendt 1999, 114-115. 
131 As historical institutionalism would suggest, see Costa & Jørgensen 2012, 4-5. 
132 Europeanization refers in general to transformation processes at the national level, which are dependent on European 
integration. More recently Europeanization literature has also taken into account that this process is not merely just a 
one dimensional ‘downloading’ process. On the other hand, it is increasingly noticed how difficult it is to separate other 
socialization processes from the European one. See for example Ladrech 2010, Börzel & Panke 2013,  
133 Risse 2004, 163. 
134 Wendt 1999, 233-237. 
135 Manners 2002, 253. 
136 Youngs 2004, 416. 
137 See Smith M. 2011a, 144. 
21 
 
power. First of all, the EU has several different power resources at its disposal. Realist accounts of 
power emphasize the material resources of actors, but power can be based on other resources as well. 
Often divisions are made between military, economic and cultural or ideological power resources. 
The EU’s civilian and normative power roles are related to ideological power and the power over 
opinion138, even if economic power also plays important role in these characterizations. Missing from 
the normative power role debate is a more hard-edged and multi-faceted interpretation of EU 
power139. Even normative power role is boosted by different resources, which are essentially 
interrelated. Furthermore, some EU member states do have significant military machinery, even if 
the EU as such lacks military power resources.  The EU’s ideological resources derive, for example, 
from its social model, values, institutions and prosperity. In general, all resource-based 
characterizations are only able to capture potential power, the actualization of which needs to be 
considered in a more specific policy-making context. What functions as a power resource in one 
policy context might be irrelevant in another.140 In many areas of EU external action, the EU has 
remarkable resources, but its ability to convert these into influence remains rather limited. In this 
respect, power resources are not necessarily the most important dimensions when analysing EU 
power. 
 
Secondly, the instruments of power are relevant as the roles of an actor often limit their use. Joseph 
Nye has made the famous division between hard and soft powers by concentrating on the instruments 
used in power projection. According to him, soft power relies on diplomacy and persuasion, while 
hard powers use “carrots and sticks” to achieve what they want.141 Even if Nye used this distinction 
to capture the influence of the US, it is also relevant in the EU case. The EU is often considered 
reluctant to use direct compulsory or coercive power against others142. However, much depends on 
how coercion is defined; for example the EU’s use of economic conditionality includes coercive 
aspects in relation to its weaker partners. Hence, it could be better to talk about command power, as 
Smith suggests. Command power may use instruments to induce, but also to coerce.143 Also Nye 
notes that the most successful actors in global politics are able to combine hard and soft power 
instruments, and can be labelled smart powers. The normative power role is based on the EU’s power 
to spread norms, and as such it is open to different, even coercive instruments. However, the use of 
coercive instruments is considered detrimental for the normative power image. When pursuing 
normative goals coercive power may not even be beneficial, as norms cannot be easily imposed on 
others. The credible defence of norms may still need the existence of convincing sanctions (potential 
hard power) against norm breakers as well as promises of benefits. The normative power role puts 
emphasis on diverse mechanisms of norm-diffusion; for example persuasion, invoking norms, 
shaping the discourse and leading through example144. Even this focus on less coercive instruments 
does not seem to be enough for the analysis of EU power. 
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The last aspect of the power debate is related to an actor’s abilities to cause effects or influence others. 
The focus on influence is highly relevant when analysing the EU’s roles. The normative power role 
suggests that the EU is able to define what passes as normal145. Clearly the previously outlined 
resources and instruments have given the EU strong potential to influence. In order to bring more 
attention to relational and more constitutive forms of power, Barnett and Duvall differentiate between 
compulsory, institutional, structural and productive forms of power146. This taxonomy may help to 
capture the different resources and instruments through which the EU may use its power. Besides 
compulsory and direct forms of power, the EU may benefit from institutional power, which refers to 
the use of power through relationships of influence in the context of international institutions. Here 
the use of power does not necessarily include overt conflict, as some actors may exploit their 
institutional position to silence dissent147. According to Barnett and Duvall, established institutions 
create winners and losers by working to the advantage of some, while disadvantaging others148. The 
EU is able to use many institutions for its own advantage149, but institutions themselves may also 
possess power mechanisms, which describe the proper roles for an actor. Institutional and structural 
powers are often seen as two sides of the same form of power, depending on how the structures are 
defined. However, while institutional power may limit the promotion of an actor’s interests, structural 
power is able to shape the interpretation of these interests. The notion of productive power is related 
to discourses through which it creates social identities and related capacities150. Productive power is 
principally based on ideational resources and in this sense becomes close to the EU’s normative power 
role characterizations. The furtherance of specific EU identities, roles and norms in discourses can be 
considered as forms of productive power151. As a conclusion, the debate on power related to the EU 
role in the world must take into account different forms of power and their interrelated nature. 
 
1.3 From Theory to Practice 
 
Case study of the EU role at the UN Human Rights Council 
 
Gerring proposes that a case study should be defined as an intensive study of a single unit for the 
purpose of understanding a larger class of units152. The event or organization is not a case in itself but 
rather different aspects of it are cases of broader, theoretically defined classes of events. According 
to Yin, the distinctive need for case studies arises out of the desire to understand complex social 
phenomena through real-life events153. One of the best qualities of the case study strategy is the depth 
of analysis it is able to offer. A researcher has to balance between what is particular to the case under 
study, and what is more general about it. Case selection needs to be carefully designed if the case is 
to advance the objectives set and avoid selection bias. Different types of case studies can be classified 
by the purposes they serve; cases can be for example most or least likely cases, deviant cases, crucial 
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cases and counterfactual cases154. The use of case study methods has become highly popular in EU 
research, which provides many possible opportunities to benefit from cases. In this research the case 
study strategy is used to understand EU action in global human rights promotion from the perspective 
of a normative power role. Focus on this particular role is justified, as this thesis aims to provide an 
explanation for specific foreign policy action and perceptions related to this role, in a particular 
organizational context of the HRC. Hence, the normative power role can be understood here as the 
more context-specific role of the EU. 
 
With the help of role theory the normative power idea can be used to critically study the EU role at 
the HRC. Role theory focuses on the interaction between the ego and alter conceptions of roles. In 
this respect, the EU role is not just the one it chooses to promote, but this role also needs recognition 
from other actors. This research serves two different purposes; it aims to describe and explain a 
particular case with theory-guided perspective, but it also aims to contribute to the development of 
the used theoretical propositions155. Human rights form the core of the EU’s assumed normative 
power, and that is why this role is an appropriate starting point for analysis. This thesis focuses on 
one single case, the EU role at the Human Rights Council (HRC), the central UN body in the field of 
human rights. One rationale for using this kind of single case study is when it represents a critical 
case in testing a well-formulated theory156. According to Larsen, the normative power of the EU 
should be studied in policy areas in which this power is most relevant157. The HRC case is crucial in 
EU human rights policy in the sense that it provides a most likely case158 for testing the EU’s 
normative power role at work on a global level. In other words, the EU is often seen to aspire to the 
role of a normative leader in global human rights governance. However, the global membership of 
the HRC means that the EU must search for recognition and legitimacy in front of a highly 
heterogeneous audience, which may also abandon its role claims. External perceptions of the EU role 
are an important addition to the EU role debate and may decide whether the EU really deserves the 
status of a normative power. External perceptions also condition the performance of EU roles. At the 
HRC, where the global dialogue on human rights norms is conducted, the use of coercive power is 
less apparent. Hence, the EU must rely on its normative and ideational resources in order to achieve 
normative effects in others. 
 
One of the main challenges of case studies has to do with how and under what conditions it is possible 
to generalize from one or a few cases. There are two different ways to generalize; empirical and 
theoretical159. This case can provide empirically relevant observations about the EU’s external human 
rights policy, and even offer material for wider generalizations about the EU role at the UN. It is 
possible that a single-case design may also expand and generalize theories160 and restricting the scope 
of an empirical analysis does not have to be done at the expense of its theoretical ambitions161. 
Theoretically, this thesis can contribute to framing the normative power idea with the help of role 
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theory. In this respect, the external perspective on the EU role is highly relevant. This particular case 
may have more general empirical relevance in informing about the dynamics, preconditions and 
challenges of the EU’s global normative agenda. However, broad generalizations based on one 
organizational context are not likely. This is because organizations and the conditions for EU 
participation are highly different in different organizational contexts. 
 
Often, single case studies emerge out of an empirical puzzle, where something in the case does not 
fit with a researcher’s expectations. A researcher, based on her previous knowledge, may have some 
hunches about what is happening, and perhaps critique against existing views on that matter.162 The 
research interests for this particular case arose from the conclusions and methods used in previous 
studies. Former studies about the EU at the UN human rights fora have necessitated mainly voting 
statistics, which are not able to capture the whole truth about the EU’s role. This is because voting 
occurs rather seldom at the HRC, and when it does, there might be other, less substance-related, 
reason for differences in opinions. Case study strategy is beneficial as it enables the inclusion of 
different evidence: documents, interviews, and observations. As such, an in-depth case study of the 
EU role at the HRC is able to provide a more comprehensive picture of the situation in the field. In 
order to notice the more informal diplomatic processes at the HRC, participant perceptions of the EU, 
collected through interviews, are important sources of information. 
 
Research Framework: National Role Conception, Role Performance and Role Prescriptions 
 
This research uses role theory concepts to study the EU’s role at the HRC. The following three 
conceptual innovations of role theory are relevant for this research;  
1) National role conception refers to an actor’s perception of his or her position vis-á-vis others. 
This conception consists of a set of norms expressing self-expected foreign policy behaviour 
and more general action orientation. When it is communicated and expressed in policy 
makers’ speeches, it points to the intentions of an actor, which set limits on politically feasible 
alternatives. Even if national role conceptions are usually highly path-dependent and stable, 
they may change due to changing environment and circumstances. 
2) Role performance refers to the actual policy behaviour of an actor in a social context. In this 
research the concept of role performance is used to study whether the EU’s action is consistent 
with its self-perception and role expectations. It needs to be noted that both ego and alter role 
expectations concern the ways in which role ought to be performed. According to Holsti, role 
performance encompasses the attitudes, decisions, and actions governments take to implement 
their national role conceptions163. However, role performance concerns the actual role 
playing, and this does not necessarily match with expectations. Hence, performance is also 
closely related to an actor’s coherence and legitimacy; if there is much incoherence between 
role claims and performance, the actor’s legitimacy decreases and may lead to 
reconsiderations of role. An actor’s role performance is conditioned and shaped by external 
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expectations as it aims to respond to them. Also other actors’ (competing) roles may contest 
the performance of roles.   
3) The concept of role prescription refers to the external environment of roles, an area often 
neglected in role research. An actor’s foreign policy, while being to a large extent driven by 
internal ideas and processes, is also shaped in response to others’ expectations. Foreign policy 
roles need recognition from others, but the extent to which these become significant in 
developing national role conceptions varies considerably. EU role conceptualizations have 
been mainly introspective, and that is why this alter side of roles is highly needed. The role 
prescriptions of others are not equally relevant; power and dependence relations are important. 
The concept of the significant other is borrowed from symbolic interactionism to refer to 
primary socializing agents, which cannot be selected randomly. In international relations 
significant others are often tied to past experiences of the role beholder.164  
The empirical part of the thesis studies the EU role at the HRC from these perspectives. Before that, 
a few important clarifications must be made. When studying national role conceptions, the EU is 
without doubt a strange case. There are various EU actors who may hold diverse conceptions of the 
EU role, and it is likely that both intra- and inter role conflicts occur more often than in the case of 
individual states. However, the assumption is that both national and EU decision makers are 
increasingly socialized to accept particular collective EU roles and act on that basis165. In human 
rights issues, where the level of EU agreement is high, it is easier to form and defend a collective 
role. However, EU elites166 may hold more homogenous and positive views about the EU than their 
national counterparts. Another important point is that this thesis focuses only on a particular EU role, 
that of normative power. Selecting this role is justified with the policy area in question; it is in human 
rights where this role carries special significance. It can be assumed that other, even competing role 
conceptions also carry relevance in the field of human rights. The EU’s role performance does not 
necessarily correspond with its role claims. Ambitious EU rhetoric has also raised expectations, which 
have grown faster than the EU’s capability to perform167. Most studies have concentrated on self-
perceptions of the EU while external perceptions have been left aside. This thesis also elevates the 
importance of role performance as a way to study EU roles.  
 
Research data and analysis 
 
Evidence for case studies may come from different sources; it is possible to use documents, archival 
records, interviews or observation. In order to receive more validity for the research, a good case 
study uses as many sources as possible. This case study relies on both documents and research 
interviews. Several rules to guide the research were formulated in order to make the data as reliable 
as possible. Speeches and statements included were delivered by leading EU figures, such as the High 
Representative and the Special Representative of Human Rights. Different documents by official EU 
institutions, EU presidency, or expert bodies, such as COHOM and DROI were used. Furthermore, 
                                                 
164 Siginificant other can be for example a state that is most often mentioned in foreign policy documents. 
165 See Aggestam 2004, 84-85. 
166 EU elites refer here to those people who work in EU institutions or in EU delegations. 
167 Capability-expectations gap was introduced by Hill (1993), Michael Smith talks about capability-aspirations gap 
(Smith M. 2011a, 155).  
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official HRC documentation, available at the HRC websites and Extranet was benefitted from168. This 
includes EU statements, EU member state statements and other actor statements delivered at the HRC 
forums. Besides these, it includes the reports of the HRC (annual and thematic reports) and reports 
delivered by its bodies and experts. Also reports and statements concerning the HRC delivered in the 
wider UN system, for example at the General Assembly, were used. 
Secondly, case studies also use informants through whom the case can be known169 and here they 
were participants of the HRC. The 63 semi-structured interviews were conducted in 2013-2014 during 
four separate field trips to Geneva and one trip to Brussels170. These interviews served two purposes; 
they provided background information and revealed the participants’ subjective understandings or 
perceptions of the EU role. One crucial matter when using expert interviews is the choice of samples. 
In order to get the best combination of informants, 23 EU interviews were conducted with member 
states human rights experts and EU delegation experts in Geneva and with EEAS staff in the Brussels 
headquarters. External interviews include 40 different EU others, such as third states, human rights 
organizations, and the HRC secretary members. Expert advice was used in the selection of 
informants171 and special attention was paid to prominent actors. However, some state 
representatives172 also refused to accept my interview request because they perceived the topic to be 
too sensitive. Despite these challenges, highly valuable data was collected, and the interviews 
represent a good sample of different HRC participants. There is no previous knowledge on how EU 
officials or external others at the HRC perceive the EU’s role. Even if the interviews followed key 
themes of the theoretical framework, interviewees had the freedom to comment on issues, and they 
were often willing to talk extensively173. Interviews were conducted under the promise of anonymity 
and that is why there are no references to names or affiliations.  
The data is analysed and interpreted with the help of qualitative content analysis (QCA), which is a 
method for systematically describing the meaning of qualitative material. Anything that is intended 
to communicate a message is usable as material for content analysis. Analysis is done by classifying 
material as instances of the categories of a coding frame. A coding frame is useful for structuring the 
collected materials by focusing on certain key dimensions or main categories of the material (see 
appendix 3). The complexity of a coding frame depends on the research question i.e. on the number 
of dimensions and hierarchical levels the research question is divided into. It is also normal to use 
some mixture of concept- and data-driven structuring.174 In this research the main categories are 
formed according to the theoretical framework (concept-driven part), and what is said about these 
topics is specified with the creation of subcategories (data-driven part). The interviews of EU officials 
                                                 
168 HRC homepage is available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/HRCIndex.aspx (includes HRC 
Extranet link) 
169 Stake 2000, 438. 
170 Interviews were conducted with ambassadors and human rights experts. The delegations themselves made the choice 
of who would be the most appropriate person to participate. 
171 The UN NGO section in Geneva listed the most active organizations at the HRC. The EU delegation staff also 
provided a listing of those organizations which most actively take part in their NGO meetings. Also human rights 
organizations themselves provided suggestions about the respondents. These choices were considered concise also by 
those human right experts who commented in the empirical chapters. 
172 For example representatives of the US, Norway, South Africa and Brazil. Often the importance of EU relations may 
explain refusals. 
173 Individual interviews lasted from half an hour to almost two hours. 
174 Schreier 2012, 89. 
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and the EU’s external others are reported in separate chapters (5 and 7). In chapter 6 on role 
performance both perceptions are necessary. In the analysis, special attention is paid to different 
aspects of the normative power role, and how EU views and external perceptions meet.  
 
Quality of the research 
 
One of the main ways to improve the quality of research is through working reflexively. The 
researcher needs to be aware that she is always a prisoner of her own worldview and location. 
Experiences in the specific research field (European Studies) influence the ways in which the subject 
is approached. The subjectivity may also impact research objects at a more basic level; the physical 
appearance, reactions, gestures, social status, and use of language tends to have an immediate impact 
on what interviewees say and leave out from their accounts175. Also the gap between theory and 
practice needs to be acknowledged. The theoretical views and concepts are likely to depart from the 
everyday reality of policy-makers. Hence, the theoretical categories cannot be found at the level of 
practice, even if there are strong links between the discourses of these two domains in the case of the 
EU176. However, a researcher always takes risks when operationalizing the main research concepts 
and theories. There is always a danger that theories guide the collection and analysis of data too 
strongly. One way to increase the quality of case studies is to send the research product to subjects of 
the study and let them comment on the results177. This research aimed to fulfil this demand at least to 
some extent178. This exercise is also a valuable way to make sure that the voices of the interviewees 
are original.  
 
Reflexivity is also needed to assessing the reliability and representativeness of the interviews. 
Analysing the perceptions of different actors includes several methodological challenges. For 
example, the interviewees could have different motives for giving the interview. Some of them may 
have a strong political agenda behind them, which affects the answers given. Respondents were also 
generally quite careful because they considered the topic rather sensitive; commenting on other 
delegations’ policies presumably includes political risks. For example, interviewees from countries 
with close political and/or economic ties with the EU could be aware of their words, avoid answering 
particular questions, or even refuse to accept the invitation to take part in this research. Giving an 
anonymous voice for these EU partners provides highly interesting and valuable insights into EU 
action. Here, good background work with official statements and knowledge about the prevailing 
political realities at the HRC can help in framing and understanding the views. However, the quality 
of the research, as well as the relevance of findings, is improved with the inclusion of different types 
of actors with varying relations with the EU. These views, even if they cannot represent the views of 
all possible actors, give important and varying perspectives to EU action at the HRC. 
 
 
                                                 
175 Leander 2008, 25. 
176 EU research is often accused of not separating enough between EU’s political agenda and academic research 
concerning it. 
177 Yin 2003, 160. 
178 Ready empirical chapters were sent to interviewees. However, most of those who replied were more interested to see 
that their names do not appear in the final version. 
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Research Contribution 
 
According to King et al. a research project should aim to satisfy two criteria: it should deal with a 
significant real-world topic and be designed to contribute to a specific scholarly literature179. After 
the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has been considered to be equipped with increased capabilities to take part 
in the decision making of international organizations (IOs). Thanks to increased EUMS cooperation, 
also presenting the common EU approach has become standard practice. However, the EU’s role 
depends on the particular context, and its ability to take into account EU ambitions. Secondly, 
domestic politics creates strong incentives but also restrictions for particular EU roles. As EU roles 
seem to vary in different organizational contexts180, it is important to acquire more detailed 
information about specific cases. This thesis provides an important contribution for understanding 
the EU role at one specific organization, the UN Human Rights Council. However, individual case 
studies can also be beneficial in covering more general contextual conditions181 for EU roles. Even if 
the thesis focuses on EU role in the UN human rights machinery, it can provide insights about the 
wider inter-organizational dynamics between the UN and the EU.  
  
This thesis contributes to a “third way” in normative theorizing on the EU by taking a critical 
approach to the normative power idea182. Previous research has considered whether the EU acts as a 
normative power in particular cases or policy areas. The normative power role is used here as a 
framework for explaining high EU objectives. Besides explaining EU positions, normative power 
research has sidelined some important questions. First of all, how widely shared this normative power 
role is among different EU actors. It is by no means evident that specific role conceptions are shared 
among the EU and member state decision-makers. Secondly, the normative power role is seen to be 
based mainly on the self-declared value-commitments of the EU. There is less knowledge on the 
external legitimation and recognition of this role. However, the EU can only be a normative power if 
its different others are ready to accept this role. Hence, the need for research on external perceptions 
of the EU’s role is evident. Only by combining internal and external perspectives to EU action183, can 
more realistic accounts of its role be achieved. The number of studies which map external perceptions 
of the EU in different geographical and issue areas is increasing. However, these studies have 
concentrated on general perceptions of the EU, and do not evaluate the EU’s more specific role as a 
normative power. The most important contribution of this thesis is the empirical data collected. 
Interviews concerning perceptions of the EU’s role at the HRC give new information on how different 
EU actors and diverse external others perceive the EU’s role. This knowledge is beneficial not only 
for some abstract theoretical perspective, but also for the more practical understanding of the EU 
presence in global multilateral settings.  
                                                 
179 King et al. 1996, 18. 
180 See for example Orsini 2014; Jørgensen & Laatikainen 2013 (eds.) Blavoukos & Bourantonis 2011(eds.). 
181 Yin 2003, 13. 
182 See Whitman 2013, 173. 
183 Larsen 2014a. 
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2 The EU Role as a Normative Power 
 
What is Europe's role in this changed world? Does Europe not, now that it is finally 
unified, have a leading role to play in a new world order, that of a power able both to 
play a stabilizing role worldwide and to point the way ahead for many countries and 
peoples?184 
 
In 2001, the European Council meeting kicked off the debate concerning the more general global role 
of the EU in the 21st century. At the time, the EU seemed to be at a crossroads both internally and 
externally. The Council conclusions asked for stronger and more present EU in the world, which 
opened new windows of opportunity. Ahead of big Eastern enlargement and the drafting of a new 
Constitution for the EU185, a lot of optimism concerning the future EU role was in the air. These 
expectations turned out to be perhaps too confident. While the EU has incrementally increased its 
global actor capabilities, opinions about its role in the world are still mixed186. The speed of European 
integration has decelerated, and the global geopolitical realities have changed. Not only has the world 
become more multipolar than ever before, but also the gravity of economic power has shifted 
considerably from the West to the East. Since 2008, the economic crisis has further accelerated the 
EU’s declining influence. These changes have had consequences for the EU’s possible roles in the 
world, and on its roleplaying more generally187. What has become obvious is that the EU is not a self-
evident example for others in the post-Western world order. As the EU is ever less a central actor, its 
effort to present a normative power in the world also faces challenges188. Other actors may be less 
willing to recognize the EU’s values and norms as valid guiding principles. At the same time the 
BRICS189 are offering alternative models for the developing world. The changing situation is evident 
at the multilateral institutions, where the EU faces these changes and aims to find an appropriate role. 
As this chapter notes, the focus should not be only on the EU’s self-perception, but also on alter 
expectations and recognition of these roles. 
 
Several characterizations of the EU have privileged a more ideational and non-neutral understanding 
of its role in the world. This chapter concentrates on examining the basic assumptions behind the EU 
role as a normative power. This kind of projection of a European model, or even utopia, to the rest of 
the world has a long history190. One of the main conceptual anchors is the idea of civilian power, 
which gained ground in the 1960s and 70s. In comparison with the two superpowers, the civilian 
power Europe presented a different type of actor. In 2002 Ian Manners’ idea of normative power 
                                                 
184 Presidency conclusions, Laeken, 14.-15. December 2001, annex I (Laeken declaration on the future of the European 
Union), p.20. See http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/background/docs/laeken_concl_en.pdf  
185 The European Council also established the Convention on the Future of Europe, a body, whose purpose was to draft 
new constitution for the EU. In 2004 the EU member states accepted the proposal of the Convention, and agreed upon a 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. However the text of the Constitution was rejected in 2005 in two 
referendums, in Netherlands and France.  
186 According to Aggestam there are two sharply different narratives; one of decline and the other that presents Europe 
as the hub of developments in a world transformed, see Aggestam 2009, 25-26. 
187 There is still controversy about the nature of the consequences of the economic crisis for the EU’s foreign policy 
conduct. See for example Kempin & Overhaus 2014 and Youngs 2011. 
188 Laïdi 2008a, 1-3; Nicolaïdis & Whitman 2013, 167. 
189 BRICS refers to Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. 
190 Nicolaïdis & Howse 2002, 767-769. 
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Europe (NPE) reoriented this debate191. The NPE concept has become a highly popular framework 
for analysing the EU’s global role192. As Whitman notes, Manners’ article and subsequent work 
stimulated “a neo-normative turn” in theorizing the EU’s international presence193. It was not only 
about what the EU represents, but what it should represent in the world. The normative power idea 
was eagerly adopted by many EU policy-makers. Here attention is paid to how this role was 
historically constructed, and how it became to reflect the EU’s self-understanding. Despite the 
popularity of the NPE idea, for example in empirical studies of the EU’s external action, the concept 
has remained rather ambiguous, which has weakened its analytical use194. Thus, one needs to be more 
precise on what the concept in each research context entails and assumes. This chapter outlines 
different aspects of the NPE role, and more particularly, how this role is interpreted in this thesis. It 
also examines the time dependence and contextual realities for playing this role. 
 
2.1 Theoretical Perspectives to EU Roles 
 
In European studies literature, role is often used as a synonym for influence, but also as an umbrella 
concept for more general patterns of EU policy behaviour195. The first refers to the EU’s power 
position, while the second aims to map more specific EU characteristics. The EU role 
characterizations have been developed within the three main IR perspectives: realism, structuralism 
and pluralism196. Their visions of the EU in the world differ remarkably. According to realists, the 
EU’s role is determined by its relative (material) power capabilities, while structural interpretations 
emphasize the relevance of the EU’s overall position in the global system. The pluralist or 
constructivist tradition combines contextual factors with the intentional role construction, and ends 
up with various, often positive, role visions. In this thesis, the emphasis is on these constructivist role 
characterizations. A narrative about Europe with an ethical or normative connotation has been strong 
ever since the creation of the Communities197. This narrative presents the EC/EU as a peace project 
in Europe, which goes beyond existing forms of political decision-making by putting values at the 
centre of policy-making. For example, Diez notes how there is a widespread belief that the EU aims 
to spread certain norms and values rather than geographical expansion or military superiority198. 
However, several scholars have also remarked that the EU’s identity, both historically and presently, 
is crucially linked to its experience with market integration199. The value-oriented EU role 
interpretation has been highly successful since the 1970s when Duchêne and Galtung established the 
normative scholarship on the EC/EU’s international role200. In the 21st century, the EU role debate 
has also experienced a “neo-normative turn” as the role the EU should play in the world has been 
widely debated in the field of European studies201. This does not mean that there are no alternatives; 
                                                 
191 Manners 2002. 
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it is likely that several role possibilities live side by side. However, the EU’s role as a normative 
power, especially as a continuum for its former civilian power role, has remained a highly successful 
starting point for EU role analysis. 
 
The EU’s role characterizations, such as civilian power, normative power, ethical power, 
transformative power and responsible power202 refer to more specific expectations concerning EU 
behaviour. They also aim to further a more idealistic understanding of the EU in a world where 
international law and norms are assumed to have great relevance. However, the more realist and 
materialist thinking about the situation and EU power203 has also gained ground. The desirability of 
the normative agenda is challenged, and the EU is demanded to take a more strategic approach to 
global affairs. The EU role debate is always closely related to policy-making. The assumption seems 
to be that internal EU developments will directly mean a more influential EU. For example, the launch 
of the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003 and the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 increased debates on 
EU roles. These idealized conceptualizations reflect only the internal and intentional side of roles, 
eagerly promoted by Europeans. For example, Gerrits notes how the debate on EU roles is heavily 
dominated by European researchers, and how it is mainly among Europeans that Europe is taken 
seriously as an international actor204. Furthermore, these role discourses are not only descriptions of 
the EU, but also normative views about what kind of actor the EU should be205. In the academic 
debate the descriptive and normative aspects of EU roles are often confused. The self-declared roles 
are not much contested, and the focus is mainly on the possible consequences of these roles for the 
EU’s actorness.206 According to Sjursen this has left researchers vulnerable to the charge of being 
unable to distinguish between their own sympathy for the European project and their academic role 
as critical analysts207. As a conclusion, different role conceptions have become political rather than 
analytical instruments.  
 
The role theory framework helps to tackle this problem. The ideational EU roles, such as the 
normative power role, can be understood as self-images of the EU. These roles, as well as their 
popularity and legitimacy among the EU or member states policy-makers, is often taken for granted. 
However, this is not necessarily the case and internal, more unofficial, perceptions of these roles may 
be diverse208. Secondly, this perspective can only reach one side of the story. Also the recognition 
and acceptance of these roles among other actors must be studied. In this way the internal and external 
side of roles can be brought together and a broader understanding of EU roles can be achieved. Studies 
mapping the external perceptions of the EU in different regional and issue-specific contexts have 
increased209. Even if these have mainly concentrated on more general perceptions of the EU, they are 
able to inform about the possible roles the EU is seen to play in the eyes of others. For example 
perceptions of the EU among the large non-European public reveal that knowledge of the EU in non-
                                                 
202 Civilian power (Duchêne 1973, Whitman 2002), normative power (Manners 2002), ethical power (Aggestam 2008), 
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203 See Hyde-Price 2008, Toje 2010. 
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European countries is not very high210. Different elite perceptions studies notice that the EU can be 
seen as a great power or even leader, but there is both regional and issue-specific variation in these 
perceptions211. In the case of the normative power role, there have been no systematic analyses of 
how this role is perceived externally. Larsen has collected some aspects of this role from other studies 
and noted how external actors identify this role but at the same time this role remains rather limited212. 
Often the EU is criticized for inconsistencies, lack of unity, a patronizing negotiation style and double 
standards213, which do not fit with this image. Relevant for the perspective of this thesis is the noted 
gap between self-perceptions and external perceptions. The EU can promote idealized self-images 
but these cannot make up its final role in international arena. Also external recognition of its roles is 
needed. 
 
2.2 The EU’s Self-image as a Normative Power 
 
Tiilikainen notes how the EU’s self-understanding is one of the most essential factors shaping the 
EU’s role in the world. The way the EU approaches other actors, as well as the way it perceives its 
own values and interests in relation to them, is based on its self-understanding.214 This self-
understanding stresses the uniqueness of the EU. Furthermore, the exceptional political form of the 
EU is also claimed to lead to exceptional behaviour215. The concept of “civilian power” was one of 
the first and most long-term attempts to conceptualize Europe’s role in the world. The attempt was to 
shape conceptions of the European Community as a trading bloc, which differed from major military 
powers216. The civilian power image presents the EU in a positive light as a carrier of universal values 
and principles, as some kind of “force for good”217. This section studies the origins of the EU’s 
normative power role, its key constituent parts, as well as ways to interpret these claims.  
 
Origins of the EU’s “Exceptionality”  
 
Debate about the EC/EU’s international role date back to 1970’s, when the atmosphere of global 
détente raised discussion about Europe’s possible potential and role in the world218. In 1973, the 
European Ministers of Foreign Affairs decided to draw up a document on the European Identity where 
they noted the need for unity as a “basic European necessity to ensure the survival of the civilization 
which they have in common”. This declaration set out basic guidelines for common EC policy 
towards third countries, and stressed that “European unification is not directed against anyone, nor is 
it inspired by a desire for power”.219 However, the definition of EU identity was made in relation to 
the US, the major EC ally. As Hazel Smith notes, the genesis of the document was the series of 
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political and economic frictions that had bedevilled EC-US relations throughout the early 1970s220. 
The 1973 EC enlargement, which finally made the UK an EC member state, also raised the 
international profile of the EC. Britain was the closest US ally in Europe, and hence its membership 
had consequences for transatlantic relations. Simultaneous changes in the international system, such 
as the oil crisis, showed the vulnerability but also interdependence of European states. The first role 
debate concerned the nature of power, and focused on the instruments that should be available for 
Europe. It created the framework and main alternatives for future EC/EU role considerations. 
 
François Duchêne called the European Community a civilian power, which preferred non-military 
means when influencing others. Duchêne never described civilian power in any precise way, but it 
included at least civilian means and ends, a sense of common responsibility, and a built-in sense of 
collective action, which expressed social values of equality, justice and tolerance221. Duchêne’s value-
laden idea of Community has been highly successful ever since. According to Orbie, the success of 
the civilian power role is because of, rather than in spite of, the imprecise description by its founding 
father222. For Duchêne, the EC appeared to be developing into an exceptional and progressive power 
entity that would stabilize the world order; 
Europe would be the first major area of the Old World where the age-old process of war 
and indirect violence could be translated into something more in tune with the twentieth 
century citizen’s notion of civilized politics. In such a context, Western Europe could in 
a sense be the first of the world’s civilian centres of power.223 
 
According to Duchêne, the EC could shape international milieu with the help of its own experiences 
in ways that went beyond mere self-interest. One of the core tasks of the EC was to domesticate the 
relations between states and introduce a new stage in political civilisation. Duchêne noted how this 
new global role of the EC would be explored through trial and error. The main idea was to see the EC 
as a “force”224 that is able to slowly change its neighbourhood and even more distant environment. 
The EC, and later on the EU, would act unlike traditional states when establishing their external 
relations on cooperation and ideas instead of brute power and security concerns. However, Duchêne 
also noted how the development in Western Europe was highly dependent on the exceptional 
circumstances of the Cold War. It was not only common regional interests that would bind Europeans 
together; external support of the US was essential for the success of the European experiment. In this 
respect, the role the EC/EU is dependent on external factors and environment. 
 
Overall, changes in the nature and distribution of power in international relations during the 1970s 
pointed to the diminution of the importance of traditional military power. For this reason, it was 
thought that Europe does not need to become a military power but rather develop its civilian image.225 
The EC launched a powerful new method of regional governance, which was seen as an attractive 
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model for others. However, during the 1980s realist power characterizations were more dominant226 
and created speculations concerning the role possibilities of the EC. The famous realist contribution 
to the discussion of Europe’s global role, Hedley Bull’s article, argued that the civilian power Europe 
idea was a contradiction in terms. According to Bull, the neo-idealist thinking of the 1970s was 
constructed on a weak foundation. The lack of military instruments would make the EC weak, and its 
influence was conditional upon a strategic environment provided by the military power of others (the 
US). Bull argued that Western Europe should be more self-sufficient in security and defence, and not 
so dependent on the United States.227 However, the possibility that the EU would acquire military 
measures was seen to threaten its civilian power self-perception and more general image228.  
 
The Idea of Normative Power Europe 
 
In 2002, Ian Manners took Hedley Bull’s argument as a starting point for his discussion of the 
international role of the EU. Manners saw that the developments of the 1990s in international relations 
and in European integration process had led to a reconsideration of both civilian and military power. 
According to him these notions shared some basic assumptions which had lost their relevance in the 
post-Cold War context.229 That is why there was a need for a new kind of role concept that could go 
beyond the state-centric perspective, and refocus on the ideations and power of norms in international 
relations. Manners’ idea was to give more attention to the EU’s ability to “shape conceptions of 
normal”, not to replace former characterizations as unimportant. In Manners’ view, normative power 
was the result of the EU’s transformative impact upon the very dynamics of international politics; the 
Europe’s transcendence of the nation-state was reproduced at the global level230. The normative 
power formulation was seen to offer a holistic, “outside-the-box” thinking about the purposes of 
agency, power and policy in this new situation. According to Manners, theorizing about the role of 
the EU needed to focus more on principles and normative deliberation about what the EU should be 
doing in the world231. Manners suggested a tripartite analysis for studying the NPE by examining the 
principles and norms the EU promotes, the actions it takes in this norm promotion, as well as the 
impact it manages to make in others.232  
 
According to Manners, the NPE idea has an ontological dimension, as the most important factor 
shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or says, but what it is233. The EU’s 
normative identity is central for understanding its role in the world. In Manners’ view, the EU’s 
particular difference derives from its historical context, hybrid polity and political-legal constitution 
which have in the post-Cold War period accelerated a commitment to place universal norms and 
principles at the centre of EU relations with its member states and the world. In this perspective, the 
EU’s normative engagement is related to its founding principles summarized in the EU Treaties, such 
as peace, liberty, human rights, rule of law, and democracy. Besides these core values Manners 
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observes four minor EU principles: social solidarity, good governance, non-discrimination (equality) 
and sustainable development.234 These values are inspired by the established international 
conventions, treaties or agreements, particularly if they are important within the UN system235. Hence, 
the promoted norms do not merely represent the EU’s own value basis, but are related to a wider 
normative context. According to Manners the EU is seen as supportive of the creation of norms at the 
global level236, and this motive is most evident in those policy areas close to the EU’s own value 
basis, such as the fight against climate change, environmental protection, and the promotion of 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law.  
 
The EU’s assumed normative identity is considered to lead to normative behaviour. According to 
Manners, the normative constitution of Europe pre-disposes the EU to act in a normative way237. 
However, there is no agreement on what actually counts as normative behaviour. It is related to non-
coerciveness and ideational justification, which involves persuasion, argumentation and the conferral 
of prestige or shame. The promotion of norms is more likely to succeed with these measures rather 
than through coercion238. According to Forsberg, normative power works by leading through 
example, persuading others, shaping the discourse and by invoking norms239. Normative behaviour 
does not refer only to norm following, as this would not make a difference between actors240. Self-
binding through international law is important and also explains why many scholars have conceived 
the EU as a normative power241. Essential for defining normative behaviour is to understand how 
mechanisms of social diffusion work in practice242. According to Manners the EU diffuses its norms 
through six different mechanisms. The first is contagion: diffusion of norms that results from 
unintentional diffusion of ideas from the EU to other political actors243. For example strong symbolic 
discourses may be considered worth imitations in other regions244. The ideas and means diffuse to 
other continents in the form of best practices. Informational diffusion is the result of the range of 
strategic communications, such as new policy initiatives by the EU, and declaratory communications, 
such as initiatives from the presidency of the EU or the president of the Commission245. Informational 
diffusion may persuade others246, but also make public EU commitments and actions in different 
policy areas. Procedural diffusion involves the institutionalization of a relationship between the EU 
and a third party. This may happen through enlargement, inter-regional co-operation or when the EU 
takes membership in an international institution247. The normative elements exist in the agreements, 
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however, norm activation is more important248. Furthermore, overt diffusion occurs as a result of the 
physical presence of the EU in third states and IOs.249 According to Manners, transference takes place 
when the EU exchanges goods, trade, aid or technical assistance with third parties through largely 
substantive or financial means. Such transference may be the result of the exportation of community 
norms or the “carrot and stickism” of financial rewards and economic sanctions250 and this can also 
be seen as a form of economic power251. The EU’s pursuit of world order is often based on 
commercial imperatives252. How coercive these forms turn out to be depend on those at the receiving 
end. The final factor shaping norm diffusion is a cultural filter that affects the impact of international 
norms and political learning in third states and organizations leading to learning, the adaptation or 
rejection of norms. The cultural filter is based on the interplay between the construction of knowledge 
and the creation of social and political identity by the subjects of norm diffusion.253  
 
According to Manners the EU is a normative power also in the sense that it has the ability to shape 
conceptions of normal in international relations254 by changing norms, standards and prescriptions of 
politics. Hence, the idea of normative power assumes that the EU really can cause changes in others, 
a claim which can also be challenged in many respects. It is quite difficult to show to what extent EU 
policies have been able to change certain actors or their choices. The EU’s ability to achieve 
normative impacts seems to be the most critical part of the argument. Here, a relevant division can be 
made between intended and unintended impacts255. Research on the EU’s normative impact has 
concluded that EU records are mixed, and that the EU is often unable to deliver intended outcomes256. 
One area of confusion is how the EU impact is actually measured and what counts as an impact. At 
least in the case of the abolition of the death penalty, Manners notes how the EU aims to raise issues 
to the international level instead of directly changing government views257. However, normative 
power works best with those countries that already share values with the EU, or hope to get 
remarkable benefits from accepting them. It faces challenges with countries such as China and Russia, 
who do not share EU values258. An international player may full-heartedly pursue normative goals 
with normative means and still fail to achieve normative results because of an unfavourable external 
environment259. Larsen has underlined the importance of discursive context for whether and how the 
EU can exert its normative power260. Normative impact does not depend on intentions only, but it is 
related to the wider recognition of the ideational legitimacy of an actor. According to Manners, 
research on normative power impact needs also a longitudinal perspective because normative power 
works like “water on stone”, not like “napalm in the morning”261.  
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2.3 Making Sense of Normative Power Role 
 
Several authors have tried to shed light on the meaning and use of the normative power concept. 
Sjursen examined the empirical relevance of conceptualisations of the EU as a normative, civilising 
or civilian power. According to her, the problem is in combining the words “normative” and “power” 
as power alludes to coercion while normative alludes to legitimacy.262 Tocci studied the criteria 
according to which any actor could earn normative power status. She claims that every 
state/organization is capable of everything and that is why it is essential to find the centre of gravity 
in their behaviour. Tocci ends up demanding all three aspects to be fulfilled by normative actors: 
normative goals, means and results.263 Aggestam suggested that the EU could be named an “ethical 
power” in order to reorient the debate towards what the EU actually does264. Gerrits and others studied 
the concept of normative power from the temporal perspective, showing how different external 
aspects have impacted the EU’s role, and how these circumstances have evolved265. Forsberg and the 
edited volume by Whitman aimed to solve the theoretical and empirical challenges of the concept266. 
In June 2013, the special issue of Conflict and Cooperation marked the first decade of scholarship on 
normative power Europe through critical engagement with the concept. Despite these efforts, the NPE 
has remained an essentially contested concept. This section clarifies the use of the normative power 
concept in this thesis by suggesting two solutions; first, the normative power Europe should be 
understood as an ideal type, which can guide EU foreign policy. Secondly, the normative power role 
claim aims to differentiate the EU by creating a unique identity and role for it. In this respect, the 
legitimacy of this role becomes a key question. 
 
Normative Power Europe as an Ideal Type 
 
The criteria suggested for normative powers are highly demanding; normative power should 
simultaneously have normative identity, normative interests, normative behaviour, normative means 
of power and normative outcomes267. The EU may fulfil some of these demands, but it is unlikely 
that the EU is able to fulfil all of them. Hence, one of the most promising ways to make sense of the 
normative power Europe (NPE) claim is to interpret it as an ideal type268, which the EU can 
approximate in more particular issue areas. This ideal type should not be confused with the actual 
performance of the EU. For example Max Weber, who is often associated with the notion of ideal 
types, notes that these types are fictional and do not seek to claim correspondence with social 
reality269. In this respect, ideal types are neither true nor false, but they can be helpful when studying 
concrete phenomena270. The empirical studies of EU foreign policy reveal that the EU can resemble 
different ideal types and play different roles, depending on particular policy areas, cases and 
contexts271. For example in peace support operations military and normative actions are closely 
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coupled272. It is also possible that from different perspectives EU actions simultaneously resemble 
different ideal types even in the same policy area or issue. Hence, these ideal types may also be used 
to study and compare the different perceptions of actors. Perceptions are always based on some 
cognitive, cultural and historical background assumptions and that is why interpretations of actors 
may come to different conclusions. When the ideal type global actors matrix (figure 1) is combined 
with role theory framework, the roles of an actor can be studied as ego-alter combinations.  
 
 
Figure 1: Ideal-type global actors273 
 
Tocci and Manners have separated four different ideal-types in global politics: normative, realpolitik, 
imperial and status quo actors. These actor types refer to both actor’s objectives and used instruments. 
An actor can be located by asking whether it promotes more self-understood or more international 
principles, and whether it engages in more or less coercive actions274. The adopted roles reflect the 
norms and orientation of the EU as an actor in more particular situations. Hence, roles may vary much 
more than these ideal-types, and reveal deliberations and contestations. According to Manners, in 
human rights policies, the EU might be closer to the suggested normative power ideal-type as the 
focus is on international principles and non-coercive action. In some other policy areas the EU can 
resemble more realpolitik, imperial or liberal internationalist or status quo (civilian power) ideal type. 
For Manners the normative power ideal-type has importance even outside these most obvious 
application areas: when the EU acts less like a normative power ideal-type, the emphasis on aspects 
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of this ideal may help to ensure that the parallel use of material incentives or physical force is utilized 
in a more justifiable manner.275 He seems to refer to the normative use of the concept, to some 
“superego of the EU”, which succeeds to influence the EU’s overall foreign policy conduct. In this 
respect, the normative ideal type can also be defined as a more general meta-role of the EU276. 
 
However, there are also many problems related to the assumed EU’s more general role as a normative 
power. First of all, the EU’s role as a normative power is often supported by referring only to those 
policy areas where its appearance is most likely, such as climate or human rights policy. According 
to Woods the EU inactions or failures as a normative power are often underestimated or overlooked 
in the literature277, even if these could provide important insights of its role enactment. In this sense, 
there is not enough evidence for claiming that the EU generally plays a normative power role. 
Secondly, the actor’s foreign policies may also vary remarkably in a longer timeframe, or depending 
on a particular case. The EU may, for example, diffuse its human rights norms more coercively when 
dealing with weaker parties, where the power relation is more asymmetrical. For example De Zutter 
makes separation between cosmopolitan, soft imperialist and despotic normative powers depending 
on the nature of norms and used instruments278. In the figure above, these forms would correspond 
with several types of actorness: the Normative power, Liberal internationalist and Realpolitik. Hence, 
much also depends on the nature of possible norm-takers, and the EU might even apply different 
instruments in the same case because the reactions of others may change. The EU could first use more 
positive diplomatic instruments, such as declarations, to point to specific human rights violations. 
However, if violations continue or get worse, more coercive instruments, such as decreasing EU aid, 
could be applied. This context dependence seems to suggest that EU roles always reflect its situated 
actorness279, where different preconditions shape more general ideal-types into concrete role-playing. 
 
The EU’s Normative Difference 
 
As Keene notes, a crucial theme of the normative power Europe thesis has been to stress the difference 
that exists between the EU and other international actors280. The normative power approach can also 
facilitate comparisons of state and non-state entities over time and space281. The claims of the EU’s 
normative difference need comparisons with other actors, which could demonstrate the difference in 
practice. The difference of the EU can be based on the difference of its policy instruments. In this 
respect, the main other for the EU’s normative power role has been the US282, even if US foreign 
policy is at least as normatively driven and infused by moral argumentation as the EU approach.283 
In the beginning of the 2000s the attempts to construct the EU’s role were closely related to the launch 
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of US National Security Strategy284, and its following foreign policy direction. For example the stress 
on “effective multilateralism” in the EU Security Strategy of 2003 could be interpreted as a direct 
response to US unilateralism during the George W. Bush administration. However, because the EU 
and the US share many goals and values285, the comparisons with the US cannot be made in an 
exclusionary manner. These differences are more likely to be found from different policy areas. 
Scheipers and Sicurelli have studied the difference between the EU and the US in the 
institutionalization of the ICC and in the agreement on the Kyoto Protocol. According to them, the 
difference is based on four features; the EU is a supporter of multilateralism while the US is unilateral 
actor, the EU defends and sponsors international law while the US is a laggard, the EU uses mainly 
diplomatic measures while the US is prone to use military power and finally, the EU sees its values 
as universal in reach and validity286. Michael Smith also notices these differences, and underlines 
how these are used to modify the self-understandings of the actors. According to him, transatlantic 
relations reflect a series of cross-cutting and intersecting differences rather than stark contrasts. Smith 
finds it more accurate to say that these models overlap and compete, as both represent different forms 
of self-exceptionalism.287 What seems to be important here is that these actors are seen as different 
even if they would not differ that much in reality. 
 
Another relevant aspect of difference is the EU’s claimed commitment to universal principles. 
Making difference between the EU and more geographically or normatively distant others is perhaps 
more concentrated on seeing these others as violators of universal principles and in need of change. 
When the EU is compared with China, India and Russia, it can be noticed that all of these powers 
have their own conceptions of normative288. Here an important difference can be made between actors 
who diffuse norms for a power’s own interests and for normative ends289. For example, China and 
Russia defend state sovereignty and do not often support acts which would threaten this290. During 
the Ukraine crisis Russia’s image as a power player has become more evident, even if it has tried to 
re-brand itself with a variety of normative arguments291. Also different histories and attitudes make 
these powers different from the EU. In the case of India and China a different history and philosophy, 
as well as experiences of colonial past, affect the processes of othering. In their case treating others 
as equals is the cardinal virtue and end in itself292. While the EU claims to prioritize compliance with 
rules through “logic of appropriateness”, China asserts the practice of interaction through the “logic 
of relationships”293. These powers are also presented as more traditional types of actors in global 
politics. China, Russia and India are all very keen to defend the principle of non-intervention and 
non-interference, even at the cost of human rights violations. The clearest difference between the EU 
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and these powers occurs when their acceptance of international law instruments are compared. 
However, also the consistency and compliance with these norms should be included in the analysis.294  
 
Finally, the difference of the EU is also often related to its own institutional and multilateral form. 
Zielonka notes how EU practices differ from the practices of the US, China and Russia because the 
EU’s governance system is different. According to him, the EU is better suited to creating institutional 
structures and setting up rules of legitimate behaviour than swift and bold power projection.295 The 
deliberative nature of the EU’s foreign policy and its own multilateral form are considered to make it 
a natural partner in multilateral practices and co-operation. However, from a more critical perspective 
the EU’s normative difference is not its own choice, but a consequence of its lack of other choices296. 
It is also essential that those third parties, for example other states and NGOs, who work with the EU, 
back up this claimed difference. Thus, in order to find out whether the EU is really different, more 
precise empirical studies in different issue areas and international institutions are needed. The 
reactions of others are the main target of normative power efforts297.  
 
2.4 The Legitimacy of the EU’s Normative Power Role 
  
According to Bickerton the debate around the idea of the EU as a normative power has crystallized 
around the question of legitimacy298. Legitimacy is related to both substantial and procedural 
matters299 in EU foreign policy. Legitimacy as a multidimensional concept refers to established rules 
(international law), moral justification of practices and expressed consent by possible norm-takers300. 
Legitimacy is always related to a specific social setting, which makes legitimacy claims meaningful. 
Internationally this setting refers to the controversial notion of international society. Resorting to the 
language of legitimacy has increased in the post-Cold War era, and the UN has been the centre of 
legitimacy talk301. At the UN it is possible to achieve approval or disapproval from a large number of 
other states. The UN has also provided an important forum for the EU to search for legitimacy for its 
foreign policies. At the international level the legitimacy of the EU is related on the one hand to 
“rightful membership” and on the other hand to “rightful conduct”302. First of all, the EU must be 
recognized as a legitimate participant. This is not simple because usually such recognition has been 
given only to sovereign states and hence, individual EU member states. Comparison to states also 
makes the EU legitimacy debate difficult, as its agency is more complex and still in the process of 
making303. Secondly, the EU must be seen as acting “rightfully”, which includes following shared 
norms with legitimate measures or instruments. 
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The Normative Power role seeks legitimacy for EU foreign policies through norms. According to 
Manners, normative power should primarily be seen as legitimate in the principles being promoted. 
This legitimacy may come from previously established international conventions, treaties, or 
agreements, particularly if they are important within the UN system.304 From the perspective of 
legitimacy, the norms the EU promotes must have universal rather than particular content. Sjursen 
notes how the idea of cosmopolitan rights could provide legitimacy for the EU’s foreign policy in the 
eyes of global audiences. However, this would require that there is a broad public debate where all 
those affected could be heard. The set of norms should be recognized as just by all the parties305. 
Achieving this kind of legitimacy for the EU norms face several difficulties. The NPE role seems to 
take for granted that the EU’s values and norms are accepted by other actors. However, those 
countries dependent on the EU’s economic support may perceive the EU’s value promotion as a new 
form of imperialism. The normative power role suffers from Europe’s colonial past and countries in 
the global South are suspicious of it. These challenges become highly visible at the UN, where the 
division between the North and South prevails. Furthermore, cultural differences, as well as 
differences in interpretations of issues make EU efforts to find legitimacy for its norms difficult.  
 
The legitimacy of normative power is also related to the practices through which the EU aims to 
diffuse norms.  For example, overt diffusion happens when the EU is physically present in different 
kinds of international institutions. In these institutions the EU delivers its statements and this may 
lead to informational diffusion of norms. From this perspective the multilateral approach is an 
essential aspect in finding legitimacy for EU policies, and that is why the EU commitment to 
“effective multilateralism” is clearly stated in the European Security Strategy (2003)306. With this 
commitment the EU refers to its aims to contribute to the development of stronger international 
society, well-functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order. Especially 
strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a 
stated EU priority.307 The most obvious examples of the EU’s multilateral dedication can be found 
from environmental and human rights governance308. In these policies, the EU has been at the 
forefront and aimed to cooperate with others by promoting dialogue. However, according to Manners 
and Diez multilateralism has not only instrumental but intrinsic value for the EU order, very much 
compatible and in congruence with the European values, self-images, and principles that arguably 
dictate the European political action at the international level309. The EU-UN partnership documents 
underline how the EU considers the UN as the most important global institution that can promote 
peace, equality, democracy, human rights and sustainable development. Even if the results are not 
always promising, the EU finds the UN important for the maintenance of debate and dialogue. Hence, 
at least the EU rhetoric is ambitious and it spends considerable efforts to find legitimacy 
internationally. The reform of the UN system in particular is considered to constitute a critical test 
for the assessment of the EU’s more principled-based multilateral credentials.  
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The last aspect of EU legitimacy is the consent of those at the receiving end of EU norm-diffusion. 
An ego-dominated role conceptualization, such as the normative power role, is characterized by the 
rejection of social obligations: the actor constructs itself as prior or above the obligations of the wider 
environment310. However, in order to achieve legitimacy for this role, one needs to take into account 
others’ opinions and the alter side of the role. As Kavalski notes, normative powers are only those 
actors who are recognized as such by others311. Other’s perceptions either support or undermine the 
general designation of the EU as a normative power. Even if the relevance of others’ perceptions for 
the NPE formulation are increasingly noticed, there has been no systematic analyses where this aspect 
would have been incorporated to the EU role debate312. The important question turns out to be, do 
“outsiders” share the EU’s self-image as a normative power, and whose perceptions should be 
investigated in the first hand? When the EU’s self-image as a normative power is used as the starting 
point for the analysis, others can be grouped by looking at power relations and normative closeness 
to EU values and principles. It is likely that those who mainly share the EU values and norms will 
support EU positions. Finding legitimacy among those others who interpret norms in a different 
manner would be far more difficult. The possible difference between the EU’s self-representation and 
outsiders’ various perceptions may partly explain the (in)effectiveness of EU policies. 
 
2.5 Normative Power Role in Temporal Perspective 
 
Roles are often related to certain time periods and historical contexts, and also the normative power 
role must be considered from a temporal perspective313. In general, civilian and normative power 
concepts characterize the EU as a positive contributor to the world order, a kind of force for good. 
However, if we consider the emergence, success and decline of these roles, it seems evident that the 
zeitgeist of a certain historical moment has much to do in explaining their success314. The EU role 
conceptions are not developed in a vacuum; they are answers to a changing external environment. 
Hence, even if specific foreign policy roles are rather stable, they might change due to role conflict, 
which occurs when the conditions and context where they were originally formulated evolves. For 
example, major changes in the environment are likely to create instability of role conceptions. Roles 
may also change if their contents, in terms of norms and objectives, are considered inconsistent.315 
This section introduces how some external and internal developments have facilitated and supported 
the normative power formulation. Furthermore, the debate about the EU role is closely related to 
wider debates in international relations theory. Originally, the need to engage with normative and 
critical social theory inspired the creation of normative power concept316. The context for such role 
claims has changed, in reality and in theory. Structural changes in the international system have 
problematized the EU’s capacities to act as a normative power. The EU does not represent the only 
example for others, and in order to be successful it needs to get rid of the Eurocentric attitudes and 
develop the capabilities to listen to others. At the theoretical level after the first decade of scholarship 
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on normative power Europe, a more critical approach and varied use of the concept has developed 
which have taken the concept beyond its original ambitions317.  
 
The NPE concept was also developed to serve the function of creating debate about what the EU 
should do in the world. Manners’ answer was clear; the EU should act to extend its norms into the 
international system318. This would serve not only the EU, but also the wider global community by 
creating stability and security. The normative power debate was launched when the EU was at its 
most successful in terms of shaping understandings in those fields central to the concept319. The 
possibilities to export EU norms to accession countries and to wider neighbourhood seemed 
tremendous. At that time the EU was regionally also highly successful in its norms diffusion efforts. 
Overall, the European integration project could be considered as a success story of realizing the 
normative ideals regionally, such as peace, democracy, rule of law, and human rights. The EU also 
received the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize because of its historical achievements in creating stability and 
peace in Europe. However, the prize was received in a critical moment; the EU’s ability to enforce 
its norms and values at home was diminished due to the economic crisis and following social 
problems. The EU model and values were not necessarily perceived as persuasive, not least because 
of its economic problems. Expanding the EU’s regional success into the global sphere looked even 
more challenging. The EU’s future power and role in the world cannot rely only on its past 
prominence320. The EU’s persuasiveness has been largely based on the economic success of its model. 
If this success is not likely, others are not necessarily eager to follow the EU. 
 
The idea of the EU as a normative power had an important legitimacy function in the EU’s external 
action. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism led to the reconsideration of the 
EU’s global status. Whitman notes how it was only after the fall of the Berlin Wall that the EU started 
to reckon with the principles it stands for, and the role it was prepared to play on the international 
stage321. According to Aggestam, the context of normative globalization enabled the EU to assume a 
more proactive international role by drawing on an international ethics largely institutionalized within 
the UN system. This emerging normative international context emphasized responsibility beyond 
borders and brought issues like human rights, humanitarian intervention, international criminal 
justice, international economic justice and democracy promotion onto the agenda of foreign policy.322 
Externally the transatlantic relationship was important for the construction of the European identity 
and role. The terrorist attacks in 2001 and the unilateral choice in US foreign policy under the George 
W. Bush administration strengthened the EU’s image as a faithful UN partner. Toje notes how the 
normative flair of the EU’s foreign policy was a response to, and function of, a unique historical 
context, namely unipolarity323. This is despite the fact that the EU opinions have been divided in 
many conflict situations and interventions. Even if the transatlantic relationship continues to be 
central for EU role visions, the historical context and circumstances have evolved. During the Obama 
administration the US has actively taken part in multilateral organizations and been more careful in 
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the conduct of controversial foreign policy “adventures”. The US does not necessarily work as the 
most obvious other for the EU any longer, if it ever did. With its current role, the US is more like a 
partner or competitor to the EU’s role claims. 
 
Favourable internal conditions324 for the development of normative power formulation should not be 
dismissed either. The EU capabilities were developed to better cope with the different crises that 
threatened EU interests and security in the 1990s. The Gulf War and the collapse of Yugoslavia 
strengthened the momentum already developing in the EC toward a common foreign, security, and 
defence policy325. The development of a common foreign and security policy from 1999 onwards 
emphasized the ambitions to develop a political union and a global force for good. The planned 
enhancements in the EU’s global actorness had great symbolic value. The debate turned into questions 
of how the EU role should be characterized. The normative power role seemed to capture well what 
EU officials aimed to achieve, and the idea was quickly adopted to EU policy discourses. In the 
decade when the EU was undergoing major changes, this formulation also received legitimacy among 
domestic audiences. In the case of Eastern enlargement, normative connotations were highly evident. 
In the 2000s when the EU struggled with Constitutional debate and referendums, the normative power 
role and increasing global presence could provide new raison de etre for the entire integration project. 
 
This short and incomplete list of different conditions shows how a favourable historical constellation 
supported a more positive role for the EU. However, the circumstances are different in the more post-
Western, multipolar world order. It is not at all evident that the EU’s role claims will be accepted by 
others, or that the EU will have the capability to shape norms in different issue areas. As Manners 
has noted, the normative power thesis was written in a different era, crystallizing the EU at the end 
of the twentieth century.326 This image fits well with the post-Cold War idealistic and liberalist 
narrative about the prospects of future global order, but the changed global setting is different. It is 
not clear what the EU should be like, or what it should do. Furthermore, if the results the EU was able 
to achieve directly after the Cold war did not reflect the efforts made, there is little hope that it will 
be more successful if the international environment is less friendly327. Also the nature of current crises 
may suggest that the EU should be more able to support its norms with stronger instruments. 
Normative concerns may be important for the EU, but there is also a need to back up these claims 
with credible means. Another noticeable element of EU’s global power is its economic resources. In 
this respect, the EU also has more norm competitors in the world, provided by the emerging states, 
which have succeeded to gain power and success without accepting the liberal values. One evident 
example is China’s growing presence and influence in Africa. Chinese aid does not contain similar 
normative conditions as EU aid, which makes China easier partner for the developing countries.  
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2.6 Chapter Conclusions  
 
Ian Manners launched the idea of normative power Europe in 2002. Ever since, the normative power 
concept has been highly influential in European Studies, and it has inspired theoretical and empirical 
work. At the same time, the concept has been criticized because of its ambiguous nature and often 
politically motivated promotion. Thus, there is a need to define the use of this concept more precisely. 
This chapter introduced how the more ideational EC/EU roles were historically constructed. This 
debate concerned not only what the EU represented, but what it should be like in the future. The 
normative power idea marked a neo-normative turn in this debate, when it was launched by Ian 
Manners. This positive vision of the EU was eagerly adopted by many EU policy-makers and it came 
to reflect the self-image of the EU. As this chapter outlined, the normative power idea relies on the 
tripartite focus on EU principles, action and impact. Because of the demanding criteria set for 
normative powers, the NPE idea was interpreted to represent an ideal type. The EU can more or less 
approximate and reflect this ideal with its more context-dependent role-playing. The normative power 
idea was also related to the EU’s efforts to construct a unique and different identity and role for itself. 
Comparisons with other actors reflect different aspects, depending on who the other is. The legitimacy 
claims of this role were also discussed, a theme that has later on become the central preoccupation of 
the concept. Clearly, the EU role as a normative power is legitimate only if other actors recognize 
and approve it. The last section noted how the normative power role is a historical construct supported 
by several internal and external factors.  
 
The idea of the EU as a normative power has been used in areas where its success and explanatory 
power is most likely. This is not necessarily dangerous, if the more comprehensive understanding of 
the EU’s more various actions in the world is simultaneously maintained. The normative power role 
can be used to explain the EU’s objectives, action and impact in more context-specific areas, such as 
in human rights policy. However, the normative power role should not be used as a confirming 
framework, but rather as a critical starting point for analysis. Such a critical approach notices that the 
focus cannot be only on the EU’s self-conceptions, but also alter expectations and recognition of this 
role needs to be taken into account. Is the EU for example perceived as a promoter of more universal 
norms, and does the EU apply non-coercive and cooperative methods in this norm promotion? In the 
following, the normative power role idea is used to study the EU’s external human rights policy, an 
area dear to the EU’s own value basis. The EU’s self-image as a normative power presents the EU as 
a supporter of universal rights and active supporter of multilateral, cooperative approaches. The 
following chapter focuses on how this kind of self-perception is pronounced and supported in the 
EU’s external human rights promotion. 
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3 The EU’s Role in the Global Governance of Human Rights 
 
The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which 
have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to 
advance in the wider world: democracy, rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of 
human rights and individual freedoms.328 
After the end of the Cold War the promotion and protection of human rights has developed into one 
of the key issues in EU foreign policy, underlining and expressing its self-image as a community of 
values. Today the EU claims that human rights are running as “the silver thread through a truly 
integrated range of external policies”329. The constructivist perspective, adopted in this thesis, 
underlines the power of ideas, the construction of identities, and the diffusion of norms in this process. 
It also focuses on the interaction between intentional and structural factors in the construction and 
shaping of EU roles and objectives. This chapter demonstrates how the EU identity and role in human 
rights has been constructed and how there have been several driving forces behind the 
institutionalization of this role. EU institutions and some member states have been in a key position 
as “role entrepreneurs”330 in the creation and implementation of a strong EU role in human rights. 
However, roles are not necessarily adopted voluntarily, and the EU may be left with little choice as 
wider international events limit and shape its possibilities. The external environment may also explain 
why acting in the name of universal human rights is not always easy. In general, the discourse and 
implementation of universal values is in a foul wind331, which has also created challenges for the 
EU’s human rights agenda. Even if the EU refers to human rights as universal values, their promotion 
is closely associated with European identity and history, while breaking these connections would be 
essential for becoming a more legitimate global human rights power332. Achieving such legitimacy 
in the eyes of the possible norm-takers is highly important from the normative power role perspective. 
In order to analyse the normative power role of the EU in human rights this chapter studies the EU 
definition of human rights and the instruments through which the EU aims to promote these rights. 
Finally, if the EU aims to be a normative power in human rights, it should also be able to make 
normative changes in others. However, the implementation of human rights faces several challenges 
in the global perspective. The final section considers these questions and their possible consequences 
for the EU’s normative power role in human rights. 
 
3.1 The Origins and Institutionalization of the EU Role in Human Rights 
 
First of all, it is important to ask why and how did the EU develop its visible role in human rights? It 
is possible to see a variety of driving forces for such a role, and often intentional and ideational 
considerations are prioritized instead of structural origins333. Clearly history can provide reasons for 
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a strong EC/EU role in human rights. The experiences of the Second World War provided an 
important impetus for building a strong regional human rights protection system in Europe, where 
the Council of Europe (CoE), founded in 1949, played a major role. Also the colonial past of some 
European states influenced the adoption and implementation of the EC/EU’s human rights role. 
Europe has been claimed to be historically responsible for many systematic human rights violations 
in former colonies334. The historical context continues to carry significance in the present EU relations 
with the non-European world, and can help to explain the challenges the EU faces in its efforts. This 
section studies how the EU role in human rights was influenced by the international, regional and 
domestic factors as well as how this role was institutionalized within the EU. 
 
The relevance of human rights concerns increased in the 1970s, but only after the end of the Cold war 
did Western states start to develop international human rights policies as part of their foreign policies. 
This often meant the adoption of human rights conditionality in agreements with third states. The 
respect for international human rights law also provided legitimacy; states that did not respect the 
rights of their citizens placed their national and international legitimacy at risk335. Regional and 
international forums provided important forums for pressuring violating states. When national human 
rights practices became subject to international scrutiny, they were seen as a matter of considerable 
embarrassment for states336. The European human rights regime developed to form the strongest 
international framework for protecting human rights. The Council of Europe (CoE) with 47 member 
states is the main human rights organization in the continent; its impact on European and domestic 
human rights law and policy overshadows that of any other international entity337. The heart of this 
system is the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms338, which covers civil and political rights, and the European Social Charter, which 
addresses economic and social rights. The European Convention was adopted in 1950, less than two 
years after the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provided its inspiration339. In both of 
these Declarations the idea was to prevent crimes against humanity and protect individuals against 
the atrocities conducted by their own states. The most notable element of the European human rights 
system is the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR),340 which is able to exercise binding 
jurisdiction, and whose decisions create binding legal obligations for states. Many European 
governments have incorporated the Convention into domestic law and the compliance with ECHR 
judgments is as effective as those of any domestic court341. All EU members have accessed the 
Council of Europe and ratified the European Convention before their EC/EU membership342. Also 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has important human rights 
functions in Europe in the area of minority protection343. This international and regional framework 
has had high relevance for the development of the EU role by both enabling and restricting it. 
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The EU’s global human rights role has also been influenced by the development of its internal 
fundamental rights protection system. Even if it is often claimed that the EU is based on values such 
as human rights, these were not explicitly mentioned in the founding treaties. The early European 
integration process prioritized economic integration, and only a limited number of rights344 were 
mentioned in the Rome Treaty. Whether the idea and spirit of human rights was already there in the 
beginning has divided scholarly opinions. For example, according to Williams, this discourse was 
deployed only retrospectively, as a foundation myth, to authenticate the integration process.345 
However, there were also practical reasons for the exclusion. The Council of Europe was already 
protecting rights, and there was no urgent need to include human rights competences for the EC 
organs. Some member states were also reluctant to include political provisions in the treaties. 
Schimmelfennig shows how the institutionalization of human rights in the EC/EU was actually the 
unintended outcome of judicial competition in Europe, rather than any result of conscious and planned 
“federalist” process of constitution making. Multiple processes of rhetorical entrapment entangled 
European constitutional courts in a system of human rights protection, which increased the venues 
open to individuals to secure their rights.346 In each of the treaty revisions the importance of human 
rights has increased347. The Amsterdam Treaty strengthened the EU’s internal human rights regime 
by explicitly making a strong commitment to democratic principles and human rights one of the 
principal characteristics of the EU. It also incorporated the Social Chapter, which allows for 
Community decision-making in areas such as improving working conditions, freedom of association, 
and the consultation of workers348. The Amsterdam Treaty also made it possible to apply negative 
measures, even the suspension of EU membership in the case of human rights violations. The most 
important internal EU document for human rights protection is the European Union Charter on 
Fundamental Rights (EUCFR), which was declared in 2000 and became legally binding through the 
Lisbon Treaty. The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), a specialized independent body of 
the EU, was created in 2007 to ensure this protection349. This internal context and different sources 
play a relevant role when the EU performs its human rights role externally.  
 
The EU role as an external human rights promoter and protector has a relatively short history, and all 
the above-mentioned levels are relevant in its gradual institutionalization. Though human rights were 
one of the first topics on the European Political Cooperation’s (EPC)350 agenda, the first formal 
common statement concerning human rights promotion was made in July 1986 by EC Foreign 
Ministers. According to this Declaration on Human Rights:  
The Twelve seek universal observance of human rights. The protection of human rights 
is the legitimate and continuous duty of the world community and of nations individually. 
                                                 
344 These rights were mainly associated with citizen’s rights as economic actors (worker’s rights including also gender 
equality). 
345 Williams 2004, 157-159; Williams 2010, 110. 
346 Schimmelfennig 2006, 1262. 
347 Wetzel 2011, 8. 
348 Smith K. 2008, 113. 
349 See http://fra.europa.eu/en  
350 European Political Cooperation was the name for EC foreign policy coordination launched in the 1970s.  It mainly 
focused on information sharing and the harmonization of member states’ positions. It was superseded by the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy in the Maastricht Treaty. 
50 
 
(…) Respect for human rights is an important element in relations between third countries 
and the Europe of the Twelve. 351 
 
The Declaration noted human rights promotion as a legitimate foreign policy concern without setting 
clear measures for such action. A more concrete step was the establishment of the Council’s Working 
Group on Human Rights (COHOM) in 1987. It took responsibility for developing a human rights 
policy, increasing cooperation, and ensuring that human rights aspects were taken into account in the 
EC’s cooperation agreements352. First the EC promoted a non-political and neutral approach, and 
using aid or trade agreements for punishing third states was not considered acceptable.353 However, 
soon this neutrality was abandoned as the human rights violations of some of the EC’s partners got 
public attention354. Especially the European Parliament was active in suggesting sanctions against 
human rights violators, and promoted political conditionality355. Karin Arts notes how the Parliament 
adopted the “role of conscience” by overseeing EC actions in other countries356. At the same time, 
the member states were reluctant to see strong collective action, as they feared that increased EU 
competencies would diminish national competencies and the freedom to manoeuvre in human rights.  
 
In the 1990s, the EC/EU followed the example of some of its member states by elevating human 
rights and democracy concerns in its bilateral relations. By introducing political conditionality, the 
EC was accompanying the international consensus on aid conditionality.357 Economic instruments 
were increasingly seen as an effective means to diffuse norms, and they formed the basis for exerting 
pressure on third countries. Adopting conditionality was also necessary because the amount of EC 
aid beneficiaries increased358. The Lomé IV agreement with ACP countries (1990-2000) marked the 
beginning of conditionality in EU development policy. In the European Council Declaration on 
human rights in 1991, the Council reaffirmed how “respecting, promoting and safeguarding human 
rights is an essential part of international relations and one of the cornerstones of European 
cooperation as well as of relations between the Community and its member states and other 
countries”359. The practice of conditionality became widespread, and in the beginning of the 1990s 
human rights clauses were already applied to most EU trade, aid and association agreements with 
third parties. A more immediate motivation for strengthening human rights role arose with the 
collapse of communism and the following desires of Central and East European countries (CEEC) to 
“re-join Europe”. The EU shifted its development priorities from the ACP countries to these transition 
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countries. Relations with the CEEC were fragile at first, and some member states were reluctant to 
take risks that could possibly endanger promising political and human rights processes in these 
countries.   
 
Democratic conditionality used in enlargement negotiations spilled over to EU external relations 
more generally. According to Sedelmeier, the case of Romania was crucial in this process. The EU 
did not want to point a finger too directly towards the Romanian government, so it decided to apply 
conditions on a more general basis360. In 1993, the European Council set accession conditions (the 
Copenhagen criteria) for Community membership, and the applicant countries came under 
considerable scrutiny. The criteria included political and economic conditions, and the acceptance of 
the Community acquis361. The EU signed 12 association agreements between 1991 and 1996, in 
which it underlined the importance of respect for human rights, democracy and rule of law as criteria 
for EU membership. The emphasis on human rights and democracy was so strong that the process of 
eastern enlargement can be considered as the driving force behind the increased EU role in human 
rights362. The promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law also formed the core of the 
EU’s policies towards its wider neighbourhood. The EC’s neighbourhood saw post-Cold war activism 
in their relations to the EU, notably in the Mediterranean area.363 The neighbouring countries were 
not considered to achieve EU membership in the near future, but they were still closely tied to similar 
conditions in their partnership and cooperation agreements.  
 
Thus, the EU’s role as an external human rights promoter developed first through its relations with 
the ACP states, then in the context of EU enlargement, and finally in relations with the EU’s wider 
neighbourhood. In these cases the EU was well positioned to have influence because of a shared 
history and its comprehensive set of instruments. Successes and failures with these partners are also 
in a key position when EU credibility as a normative power is considered. In the enlargement process, 
the EU succeeded to be an influential norm exporter but the impact in the Neighbourhood was more 
modest or weaker than expected364. By the time of the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, in December 1998, the EU could claim that the promotion of human 
rights had become a well-established foreign policy objective: 
The Union assumes its responsibility for the promotion and protection of human rights 
as a legitimate concern of the international community, while reaffirming that this 
protection and promotion remain the primary responsibility of each and every 
government.365  
 
However, while the EU became more certain of its role as a human rights defender and promoter in 
the world, scholars and human rights organizations saw the EU’s human rights policies far from 
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comprehensive366. The internal EU human rights situation, as well as the particular historical context, 
were setting a need for a new approach. The main point of criticism was that even if the EU presented 
itself as a staunch defender of human rights, it actually lacked a comprehensive and coherent policy 
on internal and external levels. The Leading by example report, criticized the EU’s human rights 
rhetoric, which did not correspond to the actual policies, splintered in several directions, lacking 
leadership and a clear profile. Hence, the new leitmotif of the EU human rights policy should be 
leading by example, following the title of the report.367  
 
In 2001, the Commission presented the Communication on the EU role in promoting human rights 
and democracy368. According to this “the EU has both influence and leverage”369 to further human 
rights and it needs to “place a higher priority on human rights and democratization in the EU’s 
relations with third countries and take a more pro-active approach”. The Communication also stressed 
the importance of coherence and consistency, and of mainstreaming human rights into all areas of the 
EU’s external relations. In 2004, the Commission published an evaluation report370 according to 
which many key goals had been realized as human rights and democratization issues were seen to 
play an important role in EU policy-making, dialogue, and co-operation with third countries. It also 
noted how engagement with civil society had improved significantly during the period371. However, 
it took almost ten years and several background papers to achieve a common EU approach. In 2012, 
the EU adopted the Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy,372 which responded to 
demands for a more strategic perspective to human rights policy373 and set out the EU's vision by 
establishing a detailed list of 97 actions. The key messages of this Strategy were: human rights 
throughout EU policy, promoting the universality of human rights, pursuing coherent objectives, 
human rights in all EU external policies, implementing EU priorities on human rights, working with 
bilateral partners, working through multilateral institutions, and the EU working together. It needs to 
be noted that 58 actions of the Action Plan have relevance mainly internally and only 14 involve 
interaction with third states.374 However, this was the first time that such a unified strategic document 
was adopted, providing a basis for a collective effort. The first EU Special Representative (EUSR) 
on Human Rights was named and he took office in September 2012375. 
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3.2 EU Definition of Human Rights 
 
The homogeneity of Europe in human rights issues is often taken as a self-evident starting point, but 
as Leino-Sandberg notes, there is no uniform tradition of rights in Europe.376 The multi-layered 
European human rights regime (the Council of Europe, ECHR, EU, EUMS) is increasingly moving 
into a closer “human rights community” with intra-systemic communication and hierarchical 
orders.377 This section studies the EU definition of human rights and shows its special characteristics 
in relation to the global human rights regime. First of all, inside the EU regime a difference must be 
made between the concepts of fundamental freedoms, fundamental rights and human rights. 
Fundamental freedoms refer to the four freedoms to move goods, persons, services and capital within 
the EU internal market. Secondly, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, (EUCFR) provides the 
internal interpretation of (fundamental) rights, while the concept of human rights refers to external 
EU policy and purposes.  
 
The Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy (2012) provides the principles, objectives 
and priorities that should guide the EU’s action. The general EU objective is to defend the universal 
nature of human rights and speak against any attempt to undermine them. Secondly, the EU aims to 
further universal human rights standards through its external action: “the EU will intensify the 
promotion of ratification and effective implementation of the key international human rights treaties, 
including regional human rights instruments”378. The more specific EU human rights guidelines 
express the shared EU priority themes in human rights promotion. In 2014, these guidelines included 
issues like the death penalty, torture, the freedom of religion and belief, LGBTI rights, human rights 
dialogues, children and armed conflicts, human rights defenders, rights of the child, violence against 
women and girls, international humanitarian law, and freedom of expression379. This list suggests that 
the EU prioritizes civil and political rights, as member states often find it easier to agree on them. 
Even if the EU has increased its emphasis on economic, social and cultural rights at least on policy 
papers, clearly coherence in this field is still lacking. According to the EU position, the enjoyment of 
economic rights is closely related to the political freedoms of individuals. That is why within the EU 
human rights promotion, additional goals concerning the functioning of the state, democracy380, good 
governance and respect for the rule of law, are often bundled together.  
  
The EU interpretation of human rights draws from the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the International Human Rights Covenants, which also provide legitimacy for it. Even if the EU 
human rights definition draws from wider universal treaties and standards, it also has more specific 
European traits. These may be used to distinguish the EU approach from the wider international 
human rights regime. There are at least five different features that can provide a basis for particularity; 
 
1) The importance of social and economic rights. This particular interpretation underlines the 
social democratic traditions of many EU member states, which has also led the EU to pay 
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greater attention to social matters381. The economic nature of the Communities laid special 
emphasis on economic and social rights382. This emphasis diverts the EU perspective from the 
US, which has always been suspicious of State intervention383. The EU has also actively aimed 
to promote labour standards and monitored their enforcement in the International Labour 
Organization (ILO)384. The EU’s emphasis on social and economic rights has been, however, 
less evident in its external human rights policy, even if their importance has been proclaimed, 
especially after the 2012 Human Rights Strategy385. The rights-based approach to 
development cooperation may also increase the EU’s focus on the implementation of 
economic and social rights.  
2) The second important feature in the EU definition of human rights is the prohibition of the 
death penalty. This is one of the issues where the EU and its member states have been most 
active in the international human rights regime386. Especially at the UN, the EU role has been 
functionally significant in the drafting of resolutions on the prohibition of the death penalty387. 
The international pursuit of the abolition of the death penalty was also considered an 
exemplary case of the EU’s normative power role by Manners388. It is also one evident 
example where the EU interpretation of human rights differs from the US approach. 
3) The limited protection of minorities. The issue of minority protection acquired an important 
role in the EU’s external relations in the 1990s towards its potential member states389. 
However, the EU’s external demands did not follow the establishment of an internal EU 
minority standard390. Here the EU reference to OSCE and Council of Europe norms has been 
the rule, as EU member states have disagreed about the substance and application of minority 
standards. Europe has a tradition of refusing any classification of citizens, which explains the 
uneasiness to face questions concerning European minorities391. For example, France has not 
ratified documents on minority protection, because it is reluctant to separate different ethnic 
minority groups. At the same time, the EU Charter is rather progressive in the case of the 
rights of sexual minorities392. This clearly marks a difference in comparison to more 
conservative and religious norm regimes. 
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4) According to Manners, the EU interpretation of human rights stresses the associative nature 
of human rights, referring to the interdependence between individual and collective rights393. 
The promise of associative rights to individuals is the most effective means of their 
empowerment in a polity. Three rights are of special importance in this respect: the right to 
petition for the redress of grievances, the right to freedom of assembly, and the right to the 
freedom of association.  
5) Secular interpretation of rights. As Larsen notes, human rights themselves are the sacred 
profane for the EU. The EU draws from the Western secularist discourse, even if some EU 
states insisted on the formal recognition of Christianity as European heritage in the treaty 
reform process.394 The importance of secularity is evident in the emphasis given for freedom 
of thought, conscience and belief in the EU human rights policy. However, it also becomes 
visible in EU attitudes towards more particular thematic issues, such as the rights of sexual 
minorities, women’s rights and family concepts. 
These characteristics may provide a more distinguished basis for the EU identity and role in human 
rights, and sets it apart from the wider Western and also from Islamic or Asian interpretations of 
human rights395. These points become evident, for example, in differences of opinion when the EU 
drives particular issues at multilateral forums. The EU interpretation of norms is not necessarily 
legitimate in the eyes of different others. At the same time these traits, such as the focus on individual 
rights, is also shared with other European or Western states, and hence, the EU particularity is not 
necessarily obvious externally.  
 
3.3 The EU’s Human Rights Instruments 
We commit ourselves to employ and to assess the impact of all of our foreign policy tools 
in order to promote and protect human rights to the greatest degree possible.396 
The EU has developed an extensive “toolbox” for its human rights promotion. From the normative 
power perspective it is essential how these instruments are applied. In this respect the most essential 
EU human rights instruments are various diplomatic measures, mainly used to persuade third 
countries to protect human rights. The EU has, for example, established human rights dialogues and 
consultations with a number of third countries and regional organizations. The EU has conducted 
dialogues regularly with more than 30 countries, including countries such as China, Iran and 
Russia397. In practice, these dialogues are held at different diplomatic levels and geographical 
destinations, depending on the country in question. The EU is also committed to include some priority 
issues on the agenda for every dialogue, such as the signing, ratification and implementation of 
international human rights instruments, cooperation with international human rights procedures and 
mechanisms, and themes prioritized in the EU human rights guidelines. The main aim of these 
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394 Larsen 2014b, 426. 
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dialogues is to find information about the human rights situation of the country concerned, express 
concerns, identify practical steps to improve the situation, and discuss questions of mutual interest 
and cooperation398. Human Rights dialogues are held on a reciprocal basis and the EU also meets 
civil society organizations alongside official negotiations. In general, EU human rights dialogues 
have been criticized as rather inefficient and even as a cover for inaction399. Human rights 
organizations have been critical towards the EU dialogues with China and Russia400. As these 
dialogues are confidential, little of them can be known publicly. The European policy-makers seem 
to believe that quiet diplomacy is more effective than public shaming401. In the literature, this EU 
attitude is called constructive engagement and it is often associated with the EU’s different attitude 
towards others402. However, EU member states may also have differing views on adopting stronger 
human rights approaches, as they aim to safeguard their other interests. Sometimes the EU uses more 
public declarations to put across its concerns or to welcome positive developments in some countries. 
In some cases, a demarche403 may be considered an even more effective instrument to raise concerns 
in relation to specific issues. The EU’s persuasive approach to human rights promotion have put it in 
a weak position in relation to strong partners, such as the BRICS countries, who have shown a 
growing normative disconnect with the EU404. However, as Karen Smith notes, also in relation to 
geographically distant minor powers, the EU’s approach based on persuasion may not always 
succeed405.   
The EU also aims to facilitate dialogue with different partners through active participation in 
multilateral human rights forums. The main multilateral forums for EU action are the Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe (CoE) and the United 
Nations (UN). The Lisbon treaty emphasizes EU commitment to a strong and effective multilateral 
human rights system, in particular in the framework of the UN. The EU not only seeks enhanced 
participation rights in the multilateral system, but also aspires to play a leading role therein. According 
to the EU Human Rights Strategy, the EU is devoted to enhancing dialogue with different partners in 
multilateral fora406. International organizations offer important avenues for searching legitimacy for 
EU human rights positions, but also for the construction of EU identity and role. In these forums the 
EU can confer prestige or shame for other participants, and raise important human rights cases to the 
public attention. Furthermore, the EU objective of fostering effective multilateralism is associated 
with strengthening the UN. Support and defense of the UN and its treaties and norms are important 
for the EU’s normative power role. At the same time the EU is well-placed to exercise its power and 
influence at the UN, and hence, the EU can also use these areas more instrumentally.  
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In its relations with third countries, the EU may use more direct rewards or sanctions in order to 
induce third countries to uphold human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. The EU uses incentives 
such as association or cooperation agreements in enlargement, neighbourhood and aid policies. The 
EU agreements with third countries include “essential elements” clauses407, which aim to promote 
the EU’s normative agenda. The essential elements clause provides the legal basis for positive 
measures, but also restrictive measures in cases of serious and persistent violations of human rights. 
However, the clause aims to provide a positive instrument and establish a framework for dialogue 
and cooperation, namely to engage rather than to isolate. The EU’s restrictive measures are 
characterized as preventive and non-punitive and they should be used only as a part of comprehensive 
policy approach408. From the normative power perspective, the EU’s reluctance to use more coercive 
measures in its human rights policy underlines the willingness to play a normative power role. Seldom 
has the EU punished its partners by using negative sanctions. The EU also mainly adopts sanctions 
imposed by the UN Security Council. However, the maintenance of the EU’s normative power image 
in relations to third countries still faces several challenges. First of all, the instruments used cannot 
be considered purely normative as the EU’s economic power plays an important role in these 
relations409. Secondly, the EU decision to implement the essential elements clause with some 
countries and not others has been accused of being based on economic and security interests. This 
diminishes EU credibility as a normative power. However, according to Døhlie Saltnes, human rights 
have rarely been an important reason for the initiation of the essential elements clause410. Thirdly, the 
essential elements clause divides opinions as some see it as an ineffective instrument and morally 
unjustifiable. The use of more coercive measures may diminish the EU’s possible normative image 
in the eyes of others. The EU has also found it difficult to measure possible human rights 
improvements in particular countries because of the lack of clear criteria. The EU's human rights 
country strategies (HRCSs) were introduced with the aim of achieving a more tailored and rational 
approach to human rights situations in third countries. They were designed to create a better 
understanding of key human rights challenges, and to focus EU action, political and financial, on key 
priorities, thus making EU action more effective. More than 140 country specific strategies have been 
drafted in cooperation with NGOs.411 
The third way to deal with human rights is more flexible, allowing the EU to work directly with non-
governmental (NGOs) and international organizations. In 1995, various funds for human rights were 
consolidated under one budget heading, the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights 
(EIDHR).  In 2006 this Initiative was replaced with the European Instrument for Democracy and 
Human Rights412 and it has funded projects addressing topics such as participatory and representative 
democracy, the freedoms of association and assembly, opinion and expression, the rule of law and 
the independence of the judiciary, and the peaceful conciliation of group interests. The EIDHR 
instrument can grant aid where no established development cooperation exists, and intervene without 
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the agreement of the governments of third countries. However, it does not support NGOs or 
opposition groups with a confrontational approach. From the normative power perspective it is 
important that the EIDHR has operated by extending grants to NGOs to carry out their projects. The 
empowering of civil society and individual human rights defenders can be considered to contribute 
to a stronger regional and international human rights system. Work with, for and through civil society 
organizations also gives the EIDHR its critical profile. However, the problem is that the EIDHR does 
not operate much in those countries with the worst human rights violations. In this respect EU action 
is still dependent on the acceptance of target countries’ governments. Every year the EU also 
organizes the EU NGO Human Rights Forum, which provides the opportunity for further dialogue 
and understanding between different actors working to protect human rights.  
3.4 Human Rights and the Normative Power Role 
 
The EU’s characterization as a normative power stems from its ambitious role claims in human rights 
and climate change413. The credibility of the EU’s normative power role is dependent on its role 
performance; how the EU promotes these norms and succeeds in practice. In order to approximate an 
ideal type of normative power in human rights, the EU should promote universal principles, act in a 
non-coercive manner, and the EU should succeed in achieving normative impacts in others. Hence, 
the first essential question is related to the nature of EU principles. The human rights norms, which 
the EU aims to export, need to be seen as universal, mainly referring to recognition at the international 
fora. As this chapter has demonstrated, the EU’s definition of human rights is closely related to wider 
European and international standards even if it has its own specialities, which set it apart from other 
geographical regions (individuality, secularity), including the wider West and particularly the US 
(importance of social and economic rights, abolition of the death penalty). At the same time, 
differentiating the EU interpretation from the wider Western tradition is difficult. The West is, for 
example, seen to prioritize civil and political rights, while the developing world is more interested in 
social, economic and cultural rights414. Another Western element is the secular and individual basis 
of rights. The West probably appears quite homogenous in the eyes of the developing World, and 
more religious and communitarian cultures. The popularity of traditional values discourse415 is only 
one example of the challenges the EU must face. The EU may also face normative competition as, 
for example, China’s insistence on the right to development is highly persuasive in the eyes of 
developing states. As Balme notes, the Chinese approach promotes a conception of human rights as 
relative, depending on culture, level of development and national situations, and civil and political 
rights are secondary to economic rights416. Thus, even if the EU sees its definition as universal, 
externally this is not necessarily the case. 
 
The second relevant question concerns the measures the EU adopts in its human rights promotion. As 
Aggestam notes, the central point of contestation in the literature on European normative power is 
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the choice of instruments used for norm-diffusion417. It is important to study how other actors perceive 
EU human rights instruments and actions; if they are considered appropriate in the eyes of the possible 
norm-takers. Here the clever use of the EU’s human rights toolbox is in a key position. As a normative 
power, the EU should apply non-coercive measures based on dialogue, cooperation and engagement 
with others. These instruments are considered normative because they lower the risk of imposing 
norms on others through brute power418. The EU claims that it prefers normative justification 
including socialization, partnership and ownership, which are most likely to occur in the context of 
international organizations419. Through showing example, shaping discourse and taking leadership in 
multilateral fora, the EU can promote its norms. In these forums the EU should facilitate open 
dialogue and help to increase the participation of non-state actors. Partnership would demand that the 
EU does not merely lecture on human rights, but is ready to engage in dialogue with different partners. 
As human rights violations are not only conducted by non-Europeans reciprocity is needed. The EU 
must take seriously the criticism others are putting forward.  
 
All this makes sense as human rights can seldom be sustainably promoted through military force or 
direct coercion. Even if the EU has preferred positive measures, this does not mean that its human 
rights promotion is purely based on ideational power. For example, the essential elements clauses 
have occupied a significant role in encouraging reforms. However, the EU has also applied sanctions 
that often support UN resolutions420. In many cases the EU has set supplementary sanctions to support 
and further the effects of UN sanctions421. It is important that EU sanctions have the acceptance of 
the UN, as it brings them legitimacy. Working autonomously may also undermine the UN system. 
The actual coerciveness of EU sanctions depends largely on the object in question; weaker partners 
may be effectively coerced, while partners who are able to resist the EU remain unmoved. Sanctions 
are often considered useless against norm violators, and they can make the life of ordinary citizens 
difficult. The EU aims to set “targeted” sanctions against particular leaders and elites, for example by 
freezing assets or setting visa bans. From a normative power perspective it is important that more 
restrictive measures are used in a balanced and legitimate manner, where the UN acceptance of 
sanctions is, for example, important. When the EU adopts a more comprehensive policy approach to 
a particular situation, the posed sanctions can be considered more legitimate. 
 
The third critical question is: has the EU attained real impacts through its human rights efforts? In 
order to be a normative power, the EU should be able to change others. Often the EU’s ability to 
cause changes is seen to apply only in its region422. However, the EU has also been at the forefront 
globally in several human rights issues and has worked in co-operation with other international and 
regional organizations and states. The EU has managed to further culturally sensitive and 
controversial human rights, such as the freedom of religion and belief, the rights of sexual minorities, 
and women’s rights. However, in international organizations it is often quite difficult to name those 
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factors and actors that succeeded to cause the changes in others. Another important point when 
evaluating EU impact is that the normative power perspective underlines the need for a long 
timeframe for expected outcomes. When the EU aims to change norms, it is likely that policy impact 
takes time. But once the EU is successful, this impact is often considered to be rather sustainable423. 
The time perspective should not be used as an excuse to explain poor EU outcomes. Often, the EU 
impact is dependent on how external others perceive it, and on what kind of EU role they are ready 
to accept. This explains the limited influence of the EU in cases where possible norm-takers have 
competing norm interpretations. 
 
One of the major problems of the EU’s possibility to present a normative power role in the area of 
human rights is the claimed inconsistency and incoherence of its approach424. A lack of consistency 
is considered to decrease EU credibility in the eyes of others. However, complete consistency should 
not be considered as the ultimate aim of human rights policies as flexibility is needed, as human rights 
situations are different425. Donnelly argues that the lack of consistency in EU action is normal; issues 
of trade-offs and inconsistency are regularly raised in discussions of international human rights 
policies426. Inconsistencies are also more likely to occur in cases where the human rights actorness is 
divided, as it is in the EU. Because of the multifaceted nature of EU policy, achieving perfect EU 
consistency is in practice simply impossible427. Thus, according to Mayer, the focus should be on the 
real effects the EU is able to produce, as these will be more relevant for its role428. In the following, 
the EU inconsistency is discussed in three areas relevant for its human rights role; between internal 
and external human rights policy, in the treatment of third countries, and between rhetoric and action. 
 
The inconsistency between the EU’s internal and external human rights policy has been a major 
concern of critics. The gap is particularly clear in the treatment of countries wishing to join the EU429. 
The EU has set demanding standards for would-be members while at the same time many EU 
members have not been able to respect these norms. At the multilateral human rights fora the EU 
concentrates on others’ human rights problems. However, the EU also receives feedback because of 
discrimination, racism and the lack of protection systems for different minorities and migrants430. The 
EU lacks competencies to address human rights violations committed within its member states431. 
Member states are also reluctant to give increased powers for the EU institutions to monitor their 
human rights situations. Another notable challenge is the inconsistent treatment of third countries. 
There is a great variation in the extent to which a third country’s respect for human rights is a defining 
factor for the EU’s relationship with that country. It is often claimed that the EU applies restrictive 
measures only against weaker states, while the strategically or economically important partners are 
never sanctioned for their human rights violations432. For example the EU has been reluctant to 
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criticize the US, and EU policy towards China and Russia has been considered “toothless”. 
Furthermore, reluctance to condemn Israel for the violations conducted in the occupied territories has 
been detrimental for the EU’s global reputation. These inconsistencies can also be exaggerated, as 
different situations often need different treatment. According to Døhlie Saltnes the EU’s sanctions 
cannot be explained by looking at interest-based explanations only433. Applying sanctions depends 
on many factors. 
 
The rhetorical inconsistency refers to the gap between EU words and actions. The EU has cultivated 
highly ambitious rhetoric, which creates expectations in others. Easily these expectations become 
“unfulfilled promises”. Already in 1993 Hill underlined the capabilities-expectations gap in EU 
action434. Over the years, the EU has adopted more focused lists of priorities in human rights, as well 
as improved the effectiveness and expediency of its instruments to cure this problem. However, it has 
been quite incapable in achieving results in its neighbourhood, which has raised doubts about the 
EU’s possibilities and motives435. For example, in the case of Turkey, the EU has been inefficient 
both in terms of monitoring and enforcing human rights reforms436. The EU response to the Arab 
uprisings has also been a disappointment to many. One option would be to develop a more realistic 
debate about what the EU can and should achieve. According to Elena Jurado, the EU should not 
develop into a proper human rights organization because other organizations are already doing the 
job. Instead, the EU should pay more attention to how it can cooperate and assist, for example, the 
Council of Europe and the UN.437 However, the inter-organizational cooperation does not necessarily 
work for the best benefit of the EU; other organizations may become EU competitors, and the EU 
must prove its relevance and added value. 
 
3.5 Chapter Conclusions 
 
This chapter has demonstrated how international, regional and domestic factors have provided the 
origins and framework for the development and institutionalization of EU role in human rights. The 
EC/EU has underlined the importance of universal standards developed within the UN system in 
order to achieve legitimacy and approval. The EU interpretation of human rights has its own 
peculiarities, which become apparent when the EU acts internationally. From the perspective of 
normative power role claims, the EU’s instruments for human rights promotion were considered to 
carry high relevance.  Even if the EU mainly prefers positive measures, this does not mean that its 
action is purely based on ideational, soft power. The EU may also apply stronger measures, and its 
conditionality clauses suggest that its economic power is often present. Hence, the normative power 
remains an ideal-type, which is not necessarily apparent in the roles the EU adopts in its external 
human rights policy. 
 
The launch of the EU Strategic Framework for human rights and democracy reflects a new, more 
collective and dedicated EU approach to human rights promotion and protection. According to this 
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Strategy, the EU aims to increase its visibility, coherence and effectiveness in international 
organizations, such as the UN. It remains to be seen how this new approach will influence the EU 
role in global human rights governance. The following empirical part of this thesis will study the EU 
role more particularly at the Human Rights Council, the key UN human rights body. The HRC 
provides an important forum for the EU to seek legitimacy for its human rights interpretations and 
positions from other states. At the HRC the EU role as a normative power must exceed its limited 
regional persuasiveness and appeal. 
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4 The European Union at the UN Human Rights Council 
 
Supporting multilateralism is one of the most clearly stated objectives of the EU. At the core of this 
commitment is EU partnership with the United Nations438. The EU and the UN are considered to have 
a reinforcing relationship in the area of human rights, where UN forums are important avenues to 
search for legitimacy for EU policies439. The EU is strong actor in the UN bodies, not least because 
of its role as the biggest financial contributor. However, the EU remains an atypical organization by 
UN standards, even if, after the Lisbon Treaty, it has tried to match its increased internal capabilities 
with wider participatory rights in IOs440. In May 2011, the Union managed to upgrade its status at the 
UN General Assembly441 but the consequences of this decision to other UN forums vary. The EU’s 
willingness to be a full member instead of permanent observer has faced opposition442, because EU 
countries are already seen to be “over-presented” in UN bodies. Also some EU member states have 
been reluctant to back down their national status for the sake of an improved EU position, because 
they view the UN as an arena for national diplomacy443. The bigger role of EU delegations in different 
UN locations444 has caused controversies, and the legitimacy of collective EU action is at times 
internally contested. Thus, it is possible to understand “EU action” at the UN in many ways, and it is 
also difficult to separate the autonomous actions of member states from action made “on behalf of 
the EU”. Here a wider perspective on EU action is adopted by taking into account both the individual 
and collective aspects, even if these may not always be symbiotic445. This is because together they 
form a more comprehensive picture of EU action and role-playing at the UN. 
 
This chapter takes the task of introducing how the EU operates at the UN Human Rights Council 
(HRC), the key UN organ in the field of human rights. According to EU statements, the EU 
acknowledges the leading role of the HRC in the UN human rights machinery, and aims to strengthen 
and support its work446. First, this chapter introduces what the HRC is and how it works. Secondly, it 
examines the framework conditions, both legal-institutional and political, affecting the EU role. 
Finally this chapter discusses the relevance of the HRC case for the EU’s assumed normative power 
role. 
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4.1 The United Nations Human Rights Council 
 
The creation of the HRC and its mandate 
 
The Human Rights Council (HRC) is an intergovernmental body within the UN responsible for 
strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights around the globe. The Council is based 
in Geneva, Switzerland, and works as a part of the wider UN human rights machinery. The UN 
General Assembly (GA) established the HRC as its subsidiary organ on the 15 March 2006447 and it 
replaced the UN Commission on Human Rights (CHR), which had existed since 1946. The problem 
with the Commission was that several countries448 with bad human rights records were its members 
and spent their energy merely in protecting their own performance from critical scrutiny. The CHR 
also failed to address many serious country-specific human rights violations449 whilst simultaneously 
giving disproportionate attention to other situations450. There were strong demands to replace the 
Commission with a new UN organ451 and the creation of the Council marked one of the most 
significant reforms of the UN human rights system. However, the possibility of the HRC to produce 
better results was a subject of animated discussion452 as radical reform proposals were rejected453.  
 
The GA resolution, which founded the Council, resolved only the more structural questions and laid 
down broad guidelines for the HRC. Many states were reluctant and suspicious of giving the Council 
new powers, and as a result, the mandate of the HRC was mainly promotional and the lack of a clear 
protection role weakened the HRC from the beginning454. According to the founding resolution “the 
Council shall be responsible for promoting universal respect for the protection of all human rights 
and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction of any kind, and in a fair and equal manner”. 
The Council should also address situations of violations of human rights and make recommendations 
thereon. Furthermore, “the HRC methods of work shall be transparent, fair and impartial and shall 
enable genuine dialogue”455. This reflected the concerns of the Global South; human rights are an 
issue of exclusive domestic jurisdiction, and cannot be used as a neo-colonial tool of oppression 
against states with limited human rights capabilities456. As a consequence, the HRC stresses ensuring 
the consent and cooperation of those states which fall under its procedures. Not all the governments 
have been cooperative with the Council457, which has limited its ability to protect individuals.  
                                                 
447 GA resolution 60/251 Human Rights Council, 15 March 2006. 
448 For example Cuba, Libya (its 2003 chair), Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Zimbabwe. 
449 Freedman mentions, for example, Sudan, Zimbabwe, and the Democratic Republic of Congo as cases where 
Commission members were successful in preventing action (see Freedman 2013, 26). 
450 During the Commission’s 60 years, one quarter of its country-specific resolutions have focused on Israel. This biased 
perspective also continued in the Council during its first years. Currently more various country situations get focus, but 
there are still many countries (China), which are not discussed in the HRC despite their serious human rights violations. 
451 Weiss 2012, 38. 
452 Spohr 2010, 171. 
453 For example, creating the new human rights body as a main body of the UN and electing highly qualified non-
governmental representatives to serve as its members. 
454 Ramcharan 2011, 17.  
455 A/RES 60/251 (15 March 2006). 
456 Freedman 2013, 60. 
457 Some states are less responsive to recommendations made during their UPR, or do not let special procedure mandate 
holders to enter the country. States have also increasingly prevented human rights defenders participation in the HRC 
sessions. 
65 
 
The HRC should also “promote the effective coordination and the mainstreaming of human rights 
within the United Nations system”458. When the Council was created, there were plans to make the 
HRC a main body of the UN to represent more visibly the third core pillar (human rights) of UN 
activities, along with security and development. However, as the Council has been beset with several 
unresolved problems and controversies, these plans have not been realized. At the same time, the 
leading status of the Council as a global human rights body is strengthened. After the creation of the 
HRC the amount of issues, meetings, and adopted resolutions have steadily increased, with obvious 
budgetary consequences. Even if human rights make up such an active and visible realm of the UN, 
its budget share in 2014-2015 is only around 3.2% of the total UN budget459. The increased expenses 
are covered by voluntary contributions from organizations and governments, which may endanger 
the independence of the HRC. When the coordination is considered, it is obvious that as a political 
body the HRC is suffering from the politicization of issues. Tomuschat notes how this problem relates 
to all political bodies of IOs. But the voices of political bodies often do carry much more weight than 
assessments made by expert bodies. Thus, some kind of optimal balance should be found between 
political support and standards of objectiveness and impartiality.460  
 
HRC Membership and institutional architecture 
 
The Human Rights Council consists of 47 UN member states elected by the General Assembly for a 
three-year period, and states can serve two consecutive terms. Allocation of seats is organized along 
regional groups: African group, Asia-Pacific group, Latin American and Caribbean group 
(GRULAC), Eastern Europe and Western Europe and Others group (WEOG) (see table 1). These 
groups are used to ensure the geographical equality of the Council and they may coordinate their 
actions on issues of common concern. However, political or religiously defined groups such as the 
Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the European Union (EU), the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM) and JUSCANZ have been more visible in the work of the HRC. The Global South 
has formed strong political alliances, perhaps owing to a far greater need for collective strength461. 
Unfortunately, these blocs have reinforced divisions by forming voting coalitions. 
 
Table 1: UN Regional group presentation in the Human Rights Council462 
UN Regional group Number of states of total 47 (%) 
Africa 13 (28%) 
Asia 13 (28%) 
Latin America 8 (17%) 
Eastern Europe 6 (13%) 
WEOG (Western Europe and Others group) 7 (15%) 
 
                                                 
458 A/RES 60/251 (15 March 2006). 
459 Security takes 24.3% and development 19.8% of the UN budget, see Universal Rights Group (2014a), Glion Human 
Rights Dialogue. 
460 Tomuschat 2008, 134. 
461 Freedman 2011, 290. 
462 Based on Smith K., 2010, 227. 
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The HRC candidate states’ contribution to the promotion and protection of human rights should be 
taken into account, as well as their voluntary pledges and commitments in this regard463. Thus, at 
least in theory, the HRC consists of states with good human rights records. However, it has not been 
able to block the membership of countries with suspicious human rights records464. This is because 
there is no genuine open contest for seats in the HRC, as most geographical groups present the same 
number of candidates as there are vacant seats. Despite formal improvements465, political, rather than 
human rights considerations have been prevalent during the elections. Human rights NGOs466 
campaign against suspicious candidates before the elections, sometimes successfully. The GA has the 
possibility to suspend the rights of any Council member that has committed gross and systematic 
violations of human rights during its term of membership. In March 2011, the General Assembly 
suspended the rights of its member, Libya467, for the first time, which was considered one of the main 
advances in the Council’s work468.  
 
The Human Rights Council is chaired by a President and four Vice-presidents, all elected for a one-
year term. The presidency is geographically rotated and the Vice-presidents are selected from each 
geographical group. Presidency is a neutral position and geographical groups are keen to maintain 
this image469. In 2015, there have been nine Presidencies, four of which have been held by EU 
member states. The Council’s work is also assisted by the Advisory Committee, which is composed 
of 18 experts acting in their personal capacity to offer expert, research-based advice on thematic 
human rights issues. The Advisory Committee expertise is used only at the Council’s request and 
under its guidance470. In the election of the Committee members, the geographical distribution of 
posts must be taken into account. All UN member states can propose candidates from their own 
region; it is possible that the persons nominated for the elections may serve the interests of their 
nominating states. This is against the Council’s rules as the resolution says: ‘individuals holding 
decision-making positions in government or in any other organization or entity which might give rise 
to a conflict of interest with the responsibilities inherent in the mandate shall be excluded’471.  
 
The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) is a separate body providing 
substantial support for the HRC work. It serves as a secretariat of the Council and supports the work 
of special procedures, special rapporteurs, independent experts, and working groups, appointed by 
the Council to monitor human rights in different countries and issues. The regular budget of the 
OHCHR has steadily increased since 2005472, allowing for the expansion of independent 
                                                 
463 A/RES 60/251 (15 March 2006). 
464 For example, the membership of Azerbaijan, China, Cuba, Pakistan, Russia and Saudi Arabia has attracted criticism. 
465 For example, secret ballots in HRC elections. 
466 Amnesty International and others have criticized this practice, see http://www.amnesty.org/en/united-nations/human-
rights-council/human-rights-council-elections. 
467 The rights of membership to the Human Rights Council of Libya were suspended by the General Assembly on 1 
March 2011 and restored on 18 November 2011. 
468 Colerick 2012, 14. 
469 For example, during the Polish HRC presidency in 2013 Polish ambassador did not take part in EU coordination 
meetings.  
470 Ramcharan 2011, 106. 
471 HRC/5/1 (18 June 2007). 
472 The amount of regular budget funding appropriated for use by OHCHR has increased while the level of voluntary 
contributions to OHCHR form member states has decreased, see 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ABOUTUS/Pages/FundingBudget.aspx  
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professionals to improve human rights monitoring. The HRC follows-up the reports of the High 
Commissioner and Secretary-general. Some states have tried to undermine the powers of the OHCHR 
and put it under the surveillance of the HRC, but at least so far these bodies have remained 
independent473. Many cases have demonstrated the interdependence of security concerns and human 
rights, which may confuse the division of work between the HRC and Security Council. After the 
Arab Spring, the UN Security Council has increasingly taken into account human rights 
considerations in its decision-making. A possible enhancement of the relationship between UNSC 
and HRC could include hearings with mandate holders of the Special procedures and briefings by the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights474.  
 
HRC working methods and agenda 
 
The Human Rights Council meets at the UN office in Geneva and its working methods and agenda 
were set in the resolution 5/1475. The Council holds three regular sessions a year, taking place in 
March, June and September, which usually last around three weeks. A High Level Segment of the 
Council is held once a year in the beginning of the main session in March. Also observers, such as 
non-member states, inter-governmental organizations, national human rights institutions, and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), may participate in an HRC session. The Council may arrange a 
Special session, at the request of a Council member with the support of one-third of the Council’s 
membership. In March 2015, the Council had held 28 regular sessions and 22 special sessions476. 
Most of the Special sessions have concerned the human rights situation of a particular country (Israel) 
and they have been called for by developing states477. Because of such selectivity, the HRC has aimed 
to diversify its instruments to evaluate country situations by introducing, for example, urgent debates. 
There are also panel debates, seminars, and round tables, all of which can provide more informal and 
flexible forums for discussion. The number of panel debates has risen from 2 in 2007 to 23 in 2014, 
meaning that they are placing a heavy burden on the Council’s programme of work478. The role of 
these additional meetings is to enhance mutual understanding, as well as bring visibility for the states 
that sponsor them. 
 
All Council activities and resolutions take place under agenda items (see table 2). The most popular 
agenda item is number three; between 2008 and 2014 more than 57% of the texts adopted in the HRC 
considered these issues. As table 2 shows, item 3 deals with more general, thematic human rights 
questions. When compared with the amount of texts (7%) adopted under item four, namely urgent 
human rights situations in specific countries, the difference is striking. Even if all the country-specific 
texts adopted under different agenda items 1, 2, 4, 5 and 10 are taken together, the Council seems to 
invest less than half of the energy on country resolutions.479 This fact further evidences the fact that 
the HRC is mainly working as a promotional forum rather than as a body decisively working to protect 
rights. Human Rights Council meetings are mainly public and can be followed through the UN 
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webcast480. This may increase public awareness and enables the participation of poorer states and 
NGOs from remote locations. Pre-recorded video messages have also become a regular feature at 
HRC meetings. The social media has created more opportunities for civil society stakeholders to take 
part in Council work481. The participation of NGOs in the HRC follows the rules of procedure 
established for the GA committees482. In general the HRC has been accused of the marginalization of 
NGO’s with strict speaking time limits and options for participation483. The downgrading of the 
ability of NGOs to be vocal is troubling484 because they are often very dedicated and innovative. 
 
Table 2: Human Rights Council Agenda items485 
Item 1 Organizational and procedural matters 
Item 2 Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the 
Secretary-General 
Item 3 Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural rights, including the right to development  
Item 4 Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention  
Item 5 Human rights bodies and mechanisms 
Item 6 Universal Periodic Review 
Item 7 Human rights situation in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories  
Item 8 Follow-up and implementation of the Vienna Declaration and Programme 
of Action  
Item 9 Racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related forms of 
intolerance, follow-up and implementation of the Durban Declaration and 
Programme of Action  
Item 10 Technical assistance and capacity-building  
 
HRC procedures: the UPR, Special procedures and Complaint procedure 
 
The key new human rights tool of the Human Rights Council is the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) 
mechanism which studies the human rights records of all UN member states in a 4.5-year cycle. The 
review is based on a report by the state under review, accompanied by other relevant stakeholder 
opinions and information from the UN entities. When preparing the reports, national governments 
are expected to consult NGOs in their countries. The UPR procedure should ensure the participation 
of all relevant stakeholders, including non-governmental organizations and national human rights 
institutions (NHRIs). The UPR reports enable the monitoring of the human rights situation in different 
countries on a regular basis, and provide concise documentation on country situations. In an open 
debate, other countries can make questions for the state under review. In the end of the process states 
receive recommendations to be implemented. The UPR process studies the human rights situation in 
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every UN member state, and it is thus a non-selective procedure. The intergovernmental nature of the 
procedure encourages countries to share best practices. The problem is that many member states with 
atrocious human rights records are treated by their peers with kid gloves486, meaning that governments 
are often reluctant to criticize their allies or neighbouring countries. However, different NGOs have 
taken an active role in briefing other states to pay attention to particular problems in countries under 
review and take up certain recommendations. In the UPR, civil society organizations are recognized 
as official actors, but they have no additional resources in the process of monitoring the 
implementation of recommendations.  
 
The problem with the UPR procedure is that it is state-driven and states themselves have the primary 
responsibility for the implementation of UPR recommendations. The state under review is free to 
accept or only note the given recommendations. If the state under review takes note of the 
recommendation, it means that there are some reasons why it considers the implementation of the 
recommendation impossible in the following 4.5 years487. The first UPR of all UN member states was 
completed in 2012. Several aspects of the UPR were deemed successful. The main reason is that all 
193 UN member states had participated in the process. During the first cycle, member states 
delegations to UPR hearings included ministerial level representatives, demonstrating the seriousness 
afforded to the process. Some states, most notably from the OIC group, have used tactical measures 
in order to attain a more positive image of themselves.488 Now the second round of the UPR489 is 
going on, and it focuses mostly on the implementation of the previous recommendations given during 
the first UPR cycle. Hence, it is not yet sure whether the UPR process can actually deliver meaningful 
results in the advancement and protection of human rights490. States are recommended to submit mid-
term reports concerning their implementation efforts, but this is not mandatory. It is argued that the 
UPR provides a more effective alternative for naming and shaming governments for gross violations 
of human rights. Effectiveness is supported by the fact that more than two-thirds of the 
recommendations made under the UPR process were actually accepted by the states under review491. 
Even more, 48 per cent of these recommendations triggered action by mid-term, meaning that 
recommendations were either fully or partially implemented only 2.5 years after the initial review492. 
Of course, the nature of recommendations may vary a lot, and the implementation of certain 
recommendations may be cosmetic, not necessarily improve the human rights situation remarkably. 
Recommendations concerning women’s and children’s rights have the highest level of 
implementation, while issues related to sexual orientation are very difficult493.  
 
The system of Special Procedures is a central element of the United Nations human rights machinery 
and covers all human rights: civil, cultural, economic, political, and social. The Human Rights 
Council can use special procedures to address specific country situations (country mandates) and 
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thematic issues (thematic mandates). For example, in January 2014 there were 36 thematic and 14 
country mandates494. Diverse activities are conducted under the name of special procedures either 
individually or by a small working group of experts495. Appointed by the HRC, the mandate-holders 
make country visits to study and analyse the situations at the national level, write letters and receive 
responses496, co-operate at different levels, and advise other actors, such as governments, NGOs and 
the HRC. The special rapporteurs are free to see and interview whoever they find appropriate in order 
to conduct their task. However, several countries have prohibited visits497 and reports are often based 
on testimony provided by witnesses who have escaped from the country. Special procedures report 
annually to the HRC and the majority of them also for the General Assembly. Thematic mandate 
periods last three years, while country mandates will be only one year. Urgent actions are an essential 
part of the work of special procedures - they concern actual and impending threats that require 
effective response.498 However, Special Procedures are quite poorly resourced, which makes their use 
less effective. 
 
The Complaint procedure of the HRC allows individuals and organizations to bring complaints on 
gross and reliably attested violations of human rights to the HRC. The complaint procedure addresses 
communications submitted by individuals, groups, or non-governmental organizations that claim to 
be victims of human rights violations or that have direct, reliable knowledge of such violations. The 
complaint procedure is confidential in order to enhance cooperation with the state concerned. There 
are certain criteria499 for cases to be accepted for examination, and the work is conducted in two 
working groups, the Working Group on Communications and the Working Group on Situations500. 
As a result, the HRC may appoint an expert to monitor the situation and report back to the HRC, or 
it may make the case public immediately. Some of the governments are not cooperative and because 
the decision to proceed is decided by vote, political blocs are apparent in this procedure. The number 
of complaints sent to the Working group of Communications compared to the small number of cases 
finally dealt with, casts doubt on the efficacy of the mechanism501. Overall, the Complaint procedure 
is considered an abandoned tool in the Council work502. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
494 Thematic mandates include themes like contemporary forms of slavery, water and sanitation, environment and 
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HRC Outcomes and Challenges  
 
The Human Rights Council has only non-binding powers but its acts can have both legal effects and 
political implications. When the Council gains consensus, the nominally non-binding powers are 
expected to be adopted across most, if not all, states owing to the countries’ participation in and 
agreement to the decision-making.503 This is because the failure to adopt HRC recommendations can 
have a major impact on their international legitimacy. The moral weight of the HRC resolutions is 
considerable. No state likes to be blamed for breaking HRC standards, and work hard to amend their 
reputation. However, there are exceptions as some states have shown indifference towards these 
standards.504 The Council’s power relies on publicly condemning countries and delivering 
information about their human rights situations. Since the HRC’s creation, 762 texts have been 
adopted (January 2015). The vast majority are resolutions reflecting the common will of the 
international community on a particular issue. The amount of HRC resolutions has steadily increased: 
the total number of adopted texts increased by 160% between its creation in 2006 and 2014505. Partly 
the increase can be explained by the desire of states and NGOs to keep their dear issues on the agenda 
of the HRC. The problem has been to keep the resolution system operating at a manageable level. 
The problem with the HRC resolutions is the difficulty in assessing how they are being implemented, 
as there is no systematic process of follow-up.  
 
Member states take responsibility for sponsoring resolutions concerning thematic and country cases, 
and currently these follow the annual voluntary calendar of resolutions. The main sponsors try to find 
lots of allies to get their resolution text adopted. At the end of each session, resolutions are either 
adopted by consensus or put under a vote. The HRC is responsible for providing advisory services, 
technical assistance, and capacity building for states. With the expansion of the number of resolutions, 
many smaller delegations find it difficult to follow the HRC work. This means that resolution texts 
are becoming longer, less focused, less coherent, and less actionable506. This may also create a basis 
for difficult negotiations, more amendments and more voting. The HRC produces many reports on 
more specific topics and country cases, which inform “international society”. The impact of the 
Council’s information sharing should not be underestimated. These expert reports are highly relevant 
in cases of human rights crises and often contribute to international agreement in response to crises. 
Over the years the functions of different mandate holders have expanded and they, for example, 
advance norm development, communicate on behalf of the victims of human rights violations and 
provide channels for victims to publicize their experiences507. Often the information delivered at the 
Council is used further in a wide range of settings at the national, regional and global levels.508 The 
EU utilizes documents delivered at the Council sessions increasingly in its bilateral relations with 
third countries. 
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The HRC Council was reviewed five years after its establishment509. This review was considered an 
important effort to improve the work of the HRC, and a good opportunity to identify good practices, 
challenges, and ways to remedy the possible gaps and shortcomings510. In October 2009, the Council 
formed an open-ended intergovernmental Working Group for the purpose511, and it came to a 
conclusion in February 2011512. The most evident modifications concerned the UPR procedure, its 
timing and modalities. Many states and NGOs were disappointed by the actual results of the review 
and judged it as a lost opportunity. According to Rathgeber the status quo was protected by focusing 
on fine tuning individual aspects of the HRC513. The preservation of the existing HRC mandate could 
be considered a victory, as there were also attempts to reduce its power514. By highlighting the 
weaknesses, the review process left a door open to further develop the Council in the future. 
According to Rosa Freedman, further reforms of the HRC should focus on the body’s composition 
and membership, politicization, regionalism, bias, and selectivity.515 However, the Arab uprising and 
Syria crisis have increased the importance of the HRC as a forum for the global human rights debate 
and decision-making. 
 
4.2 Framework Conditions for EU Participation at the HRC 
 
In order to understand the EU role at the HRC, several preconditions for its participation and 
performance at the UN need to be acknowledged. Inter-organizational research can help to frame the 
“intersecting multilateralism”516 of the EU and the HRC. Most of the international organizations were 
created in a way that did not foresee interaction between organizations517. Research concerning this 
interaction has focused on policy-oriented case studies, as no developed theoretical context for such 
research exists518. The framework conditions influencing EU role in different institutions are often 
divided into internal-external and legal-political factors519. This section suggests that the legal 
framework for EU participation, domestic EU politics, and the external context are the most relevant 
conditions that must be taken into account when studying the EU role at the HRC.  
 
Legal-institutional conditions for EU participation 
The institutional rules for participation (legal, external) have been in focus when the EU actions at 
the UN context are studied. At the HRC only UN member states can have a full participant status. 
The EU is an observer, having a right to speak, deliver statements and interventions, but no voting 
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extranet https://extranet.ohchr.org/sites/hrc/HRCReview/Pre-WorkingGroup/Pages/ReviewProcessandModalities.aspx . 
511 (HRC/RES 12/1) 1.10.2009. 
512 Report of the WG, 24.2. 2011. 
513 Rathgeber 2012, 7. 
514 Colerick 2012, 8. 
515 Freedman 2013, 297. 
516 Laatikainen & Smith 2006 
517 Ojanen 2011, 62. Koops notes how inter-organizational research in the case of the EU has flourished since the 
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rights. Thus, the EU is represented through its member states and EU agencies520. This legal setting 
has been considered to have a minor role for EU participation at the HRC521. The EU works as a bloc 
inside the HRC; when a common EU position is achieved, it is delivered by the EU delegation or by 
the rotating EU presidency. In some HRC forums only member states can speak, and then the EU 
position must be presented through an EU member who is HRC member. The High Representative, 
as well as other EU actors, is mandated to express EU positions, which occurs mainly during the 
Council’s High Level Segment in March session. Usually 7-9 EU states are members of the HRC 
representing three different UN geographical groups: Eastern Europe, Western Europe and others, 
and Asia groups522. A large number of neighbouring and other countries are supporting EU 
interventions at the UN523, which increases the EU’s overall influence. 
The formal competencies of the EU, and the division of competencies between the EU and its member 
states, also condition EU performance (legal, internal)524. Much depends on how the EU is able to 
handle its internal diversity, and whether member states are willing to delegate issues to the EU. From 
the beginning of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) member states have agreed to coordinate 
their positions in international organizations and conferences. According to the Lisbon Treaty: 
The Member States shall coordinate their action in international organizations and at 
international conferences. They shall uphold the Union's positions in such forums. The 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall organize 
this coordination. In international organizations and at international conferences where 
not all the Member States participate, those which do take part shall uphold the Union's 
positions.525  
Since 2005, the EU member states have agreed to deliver “one message with many voices” at the 
HRC, meaning that they should all intervene in debates to reinforce and reiterate the EU’s message526. 
Often the strongest factor explaining delegation to the EU deals with credible representation 
externally527. Before the Lisbon treaty, common EU positions were represented by the rotating 
Presidencies. According to my interviewees who had more long-term perspectives on EU action528, 
they considered that the cooperation has progressed a lot and the presidency has become “an empty 
shell” who only reads common statements529. The EU-delegation in Geneva has taken the 
responsibility of arranging EU coordination meetings at different diplomatic levels. This kind of 
cooperation is a relatively new phenomenon in Geneva, as, for example, the weekly head of mission 
meetings started only after 2011.530 The practices of the EU delegation have evolved on the basis of 
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previous successful presidencies531. The EU delegation has created a permanent interlocutor, which 
has, according to one interviewee, given the EU all the burden previously carried by a member state 
for a limited period of time, also creating some frustration among the members532. This is because 
previously, Presidencies brought new issues and energy to EU cooperation as their responsibility was 
only periodical. With the permanent EU Presidency, this kind of energy can be lost. The EU actively 
takes part in HRC debates and side-events, and follows all topics. The EU also does burden sharing, 
meaning that individual member states take responsibility for following certain issues533.  
Sometimes the EU cannot find a common position, and then member states usually abstain during the 
HRC voting. Member states may also proceed in smaller groups, on the condition of not undermining 
the EU’s collective objectives534. According to the Lisbon Treaty;  
The member states shall support the Union’s external and security policy actively and 
unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the Union’s 
action in this area. The member states shall work together to enhance and develop their 
mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the 
interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in 
international relations.535 
In the HRC, member states often complement statements made on behalf of the EU536. The idea is 
that these many voices support the common message and increase the EU’s visibility and weight. 
Member states are able to add something that could not be delivered as a common position. Another 
issue is how effective this “one message strategy” actually is. Not all the members have backed up 
EU positions, and the “common voice” approach can sometimes even be counterproductive for the 
EU’s influence. According to some interviewees, when the EU speaks only once, the impression of 
it is not very powerful. This message might be lost if several states deliver opposing positions.537 
However, it was also mentioned that there is no sense in repeating the message, as this makes the 
HRC some kind of theatre; the importance lies in what has been said.538  
The EU’s limited competencies slow down the internal negotiations because member states must 
always consult their capitals. One option to overcome the inertia would be to discuss divisive issues 
before they come up539. There are also tensions concerning the delegation of issues; the UK has 
reminded that external representation and internal coordination do not affect the distribution of 
competencies under the Treaties, and cannot be invoked to claim new forms of competencies by the 
EU. The only obligation that member states have is the duty of sincere cooperation, whatever it 
means.540 EU disagreements can be noticed from the wordings used in EU statements, because the 
                                                 
531 EU interview 17. 
532 EU interview 22. 
533 The EU has informal lists of responsibilities, which are based on experience, regional expertise and relations to other 
parts of the world. The idea is that member states voluntarily take responsibility for some issues. 
534 Zaru & Geurtz 2012, 56. 
535 The Lisbon Treaty, article 24. 
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537 EU interviews 3, 6.  
538 EU interview 7. 
539 EU interview 18. 
540 Council of the European Union 2011, Statements by the United Kingdom to be entered into the minutes of the 
Council session endorsing the General Arrangements (15855/11). 
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solution is to indicate, in the beginning of each statement, on whose behalf it is made. If competencies 
are shared, the preferred mode is “on behalf of the EU and its member states”. These arrangements 
are not in line with the “spirit” of the Lisbon Treaty, and risk confusing third countries even more 
regarding the allocation of EU competencies. There are also some issues where member states have 
decided, for one reason or another, not to put forward a common position541. Freedom to deliver own 
statements and sponsor resolutions in co-operation with third parties is also institutionally 
challenging. This tendency has increased with the need to work cross-regionally and find allies for 
EU positions. Sometimes individual EU states are more able to promote issues if they have special 
relations with the third country in question. This also explains why one of the strategic objectives of 
the EU542 is to strengthen the burden sharing. However, finding the optimal balance between the EU 
and EUMS is still a work in progress. The role of the EU-delegation is not clear despite the legal basis 
given in the Lisbon Treaty and rotating presidencies have a necessary role in the state-centric 
environment of the HRC. Presidencies are able to make contributions to EU action in the Council, 
but they may have a temptation to pursue issues of primarily national concern543. The increased role 
of the EU delegation has been evaluated mainly positively, internally and externally (see section 6.2). 
The EU delegation, for example, gives continuity to EU work, as the delegation is able to pick up 
permanent negotiators for a specific issue or country cases. However, the tasks of the delegation are 
not always easy, as member states may pick up popular issues, and the EU is left to deal with more 
controversial cases544. Member states do not want to be unpopular at the Council, and they also aspire 
to get the glory from successful initiatives. Meanwhile the EU institutions are willing to interpret all 
EUMS initiatives as EU action. As the EU aims to work coherently at the HRC, they back up the 
same resolutions. If a resolution is supported by 26 or 27 member states it is reasonable to ask what 
else it presents than EU position, even if not all the members are standing behind it.  
Impact of domestic politics 
Domestic politics condition EU action, irrespective of whether domestic refers to the EU or member 
state level (internal, political). The EU’s role and performance in the international fora depends on 
the willingness of its member states to advance common positions. The robustness of the EU role in 
the area of human rights is supported by the fact that the agreement among the EU member states on 
the importance of promoting human rights externally has been fairly uncontroversial. The internal 
dynamics may also explain why the EU positions are sometimes merely declaratory, even if there 
would be instruments and the need for more decisive action. Member states may have special 
relationships with other countries and regions for historical, political and economic reasons, which 
may explain their preference for individual action. More principled member states are not necessarily 
very satisfied with EU positions and ready to water down their firm commitment to promote some 
human rights questions. According to Smith, Northern states (Czech Republic, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and the UK) are usually keen on vigorous action, including the use of negative 
measures. Southern states (France, Italy, and Spain) tend to be more aware of competing interests and 
eager to engage with third countries – and less enthusiastic about prioritizing human rights.545 At 
                                                 
541 For example in the UPR process of the HRC, EU member states work individually. 
542 EU Human rights strategy 2012, action 35.   
543 Hayes 2013, 31. 
544 EU interview 18. 
545 Smith K. 2008, 123-124. 
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times, these differences challenge the mutual solidarity demanded by the treaties. Forcing a common 
position may make EU positions mere compromises that reflect the lowest common denominator 
between the member states. This does not serve the cause of promoting human rights on the ground. 
Quantitative and organizational differences impact on the EUMS contribution to EU policy-making, 
and large member states (France, UK and Germany) have major advantages over others546. However, 
in human rights policy, there are opportunities for smaller member states to act in areas of expertise. 
According to Keukeleire and Delreux the dynamics of the informal division of labour provides 
“coping mechanisms” to overcome the increase in issues and the lack of interest of some EUMS 
towards specific issues. On many issues, political steering and action are provided by an informal, 
self-selected group of member states that take the lead. The most important “role entrepreneurs” in 
human rights have been some member states, often stimulated by the European Parliament547. Inside 
the Council the most important configurations are the Foreign Affairs Council and the Human Rights 
Working Group (COHOM)548. The COHOM coordinates, prepares and sets the priorities for the EU 
human rights policy. The frequency of its meetings has increased to handle the growing amount of 
tasks549 and since 2013 there have been two COHOM compositions550. The European External Action 
service (EEAS) supports the EU action, by delivering information from the 140 EU-delegations’ so-
called focal points in human rights551. The European Parliament (EP) has always played a visible role 
in external human rights policy552. Even if it does not have direct competencies, the promotion and 
protection of human rights is among its main concerns553. The EP can produce its own initiative 
reports, resolutions, parliamentary questions and monitor human rights policy through budgetary 
measures and public hearings of experts. A high level Contact Group on Human Rights was 
established between the EP and the EEAS in April 2012 to act as a forum for regular exchanges on 
human rights issues554. The main EP committee dealing with human rights issues is the DROI555. The 
EP action is supported by the public opinion; Eurobarometer surveys556 reveal that the protection of 
human rights is the main value citizens want the Parliament to defend on a global level.  
Even if the member states are, formally and informally, committed to stand behind common EU 
objectives, for example national elections may change their appetite for cooperation. Attitudes 
towards EU coordination and delegation in Geneva often follow general patterns of member states’ 
                                                 
546 Keukeleire & Delreux 2014, 120. 
547 Balfour 2012, 15. 
548 COHOM is European Council’s Human Rights Working Group established in 1987. The COHOM consists of the 
Council’s Directors for Human Rights, national delegates, and EEAS and Commissions representatives. For agenda, see 
http://eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/workgroup/index_en.htm  
549 EU Annual Report on human rights and democracy in the world 2012, 12. 
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rights strategy (action 7a). This COHOM composition deals more with everyday human rights questions and the other 
composition with heads of national human rights units deals with strategic planning of HR policy.(Internal interview 1) 
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552 Alston & Weiler 1999, 42-45. 
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survey was established in 1973. Besides these, the Commission also makes special and flash surveys on more particular 
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attitudes towards foreign policy integration. According to Balfour and Raik, Germany, Italy and 
Sweden are most favourable to a further deepening of foreign policy integration, while France, the 
UK and the Czech Republic are more pragmatic in their approach557. According to my interviews, 
these attitudes can also be noticed in the HRC context. The UK was mentioned to drive a strong 
agenda at the HRC, which does not always necessarily serve common EU purposes. It was also 
mentioned that UK attitudes reflect their wider relations with the EU.558 The Czech Republic was 
also mentioned to drive an independent agenda, and for example its positions sometimes differ in 
voting from the EU majority559. Much also depends on the member states possibilities to act 
individually in human rights issues. At the UN, permanent members of the UNSC, France and the 
UK, have been identified in previous studies as the most willing to pursue national interests over 
European ones560. These two have both special bilateral relations to third parties due to their colonial 
past, and special issues they wish to exclude from Union processes. Countries such as the Netherlands 
and the Scandinavia group are more supportive of EU-UN cooperation561. How these heterogeneous 
preferences and attitudes are able to coalesce at the HRC to form a common EU position is an 
interesting question. At least the heavy domestic political process and internal negotiations are seen 
to decrease EU possibilities to influence other actors at the HRC. The complex situation is also messy 
for the EU’s partners, who are confused about the division of EU competencies and leadership. 
The EU has found it difficult to shape common positions, for example, in the case sexual and 
reproductive rights, as some diplomats have worried that their national governments will have 
problems in accepting the adopted EU positions562. The different domestic traditions, religion, and 
political frameworks may explain more progressive and conservative human rights positions. For 
example, the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights of migrants, François Crépeau, focused his 
country visits of 2012 to examine border control and management within the EU. He examined the 
rights of migrants in the Euro-Mediterranean region, especially in Greece and Italy. According to his 
report (May 2013) within the EU policy context, irregular migration largely remains viewed as a 
security concern, which is at odds with a human rights approach.563 For the EU officials working with 
third parties the situation is annoying, as they do not have a mandate to monitor individual EU 
member states. When third countries raise issues within the EU in bilateral or multilateral dialogues, 
the EU actors need to be in a position to give answers.564 For example, the EU Special Representative 
for Human Rights, Stavros Lambrinidis, has given attention to the EU’s internal human rights 
problems in his speeches. However, in this respect the EU’s internal human rights policy lags behind. 
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External Political Constellation  
 
The broader international political constellation is shaping and conditioning the EU’s role at the HRC 
(external, political). Previous research has underlined the role of external factors in explaining EU 
performance at the UN565. The project of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) tracked 
EU performance in human rights issues at the UN in 2008-2011566. According to its reports567, the 
EU’s role has decreased in human rights as a growing majority of anti-Western powers led by China 
and Russia have regularly blocked EU statements.568 It is true that these powers contest the validity 
of external human rights claims at the UN. EU influence may also be limited because of changing 
patterns in the international distribution of power; whereas institutions, such as the UN, have been 
dominated by a transatlantic constellation in the past, and have become more multi-polar569. However, 
this does not necessarily mean decline, but only more unpredictable negotiations and outcomes. For 
example the ECFR European Foreign Policy Scorecard570 shows how EU performance at the UN has 
improved since 2010/2011571. It is impossible to draw wide generalizations about EU performance, 
as the constellation in different UN bodies is different. For example, the decision-making model of 
an international institution may influence the EU’s possibilities. Majoritarian decision-making at the 
UN means that the EU can be outvoted by the others. Kissack notes how together Latin America, 
Western European and Other States group and Eastern Europe can mobilize 21 out of 47 votes in the 
HRC. Hence, the large majority at the HRC, African and Asian states, belong to the Global South 
with a human rights agenda based on anti-imperialism, non-intervention and questioning the 
universality of human rights.572 This means that the EU is easily on the losing side in voting573. 
Divergence between developing and developed states, under the guise of “cultural sensitivities”, has 
also been considered to undermine efforts to handle certain human rights issues.574 Governments may 
use cultural values to justify their positions when dealing with women’s rights and the rights of sexual 
minorities. The contested status of the EU may influence the ways in which it approaches 
negotiations. The EU may give up those issues in which it is likely to lose.  
The EU role in the HRC is highly dependent on what other governments decide to do. The US 
decision not to join this body when it was created had clear consequences for EU action. The US 
absence during the first years of the Council made the EU’s position difficult, and it needed to balance 
between two oppositional camps575. Even if the US joined the HRC in 2009, it often defends extreme 
positions and its stances in Middle East questions raise opposition and several states want to criticize 
the US576. However, the US is also an important EU ally and the EU has not criticized its human 
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rights violations, such as rendition and torture. The US is eager to carry the leadership role of the 
HRC, which creates role competition with the EU. The choices of other states, such as China and 
Russia, are relevant as these are regular opponents of the EU. The positions of other emerging powers, 
such as India, Brazil or South Africa do not help the EU position much either. These countries are 
eager to enhance their status at the UN and they often emphasize sovereignty over human rights and 
resist the Western agenda577. Hence, in order to understand the EU’s role and possibilities at the HRC, 
more comparative research with data from other actors’ performance would be needed.  
Costa and Jørgensen draw attention to how other international institutions influence EU policy-
making and institutions578. Other regional and political blocs affect EU policies and the role it is able 
to play. This is especially clear in the difficult relations between the EU and the Organization for 
Islamic Conference (OIC). According to Koops, crises and shocks may work as catalysts for closer 
cooperation579. After the Arab spring new actors and issues have emerged to the HRC and loosened 
bloc divisions. For example the influence of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the OIC has 
declined. The African group has internal rifts and its members vote more independently than before. 
The amount of cross-regional initiatives has increased, which also suggests that there is a willingness 
to find agreement even beyond blocs. Most often these initiatives have occurred on thematic issues580, 
but regional groups have also increasingly tackled situations in their own region. Much also depends 
also on the importance states and other actors are ready to give to the HRC. The UN may lose some 
of its importance when more informal multilateral engagements, such as the G20, prove to be more 
effective581. However, the Arab Spring and crises in Syria and Ukraine have increased the importance 
of the Security Council and the Human Rights Council. It is still too early to give any final 
assessments on the impact of these crises on the EU’s multilateral orientation towards the UN. 
However, it is important to reconsider the EU’s role, as there are clear indicators of change582. Taking 
into account the windows of opportunity provided by the changing global environment is of utmost 
importance for the EU’s role at the HRC.  
4.3 Chapter Conclusions 
 
This chapter introduced the UN Human Rights Council; its mandate, institutional architecture, 
working methods, procedures and challenges. As one of the main strategic objectives of the EU is to 
support effective multilateralism at the UN, this particular body is an important arena for the EU 
human rights policy. However, at the HRC the EU member states are recognized participants and the 
EU only has an observer status. This creates challenges for EU participation, the preconditions of 
which this chapter clarified. Special attention was given to the legal-institutional and political 
framework conditions for EU action and performance. It was claimed that research that aims to 
understand the EU’s role at the HRC needs to take into account both individual and collective aspects 
of EU actorness, as well as complex divisions of competencies. There may be different role 
entrepreneurs inside the EU, as well as reluctance to increase the collective EU role at the UN context. 
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The external political environment and the institutional rules of the UN may set even more demanding 
conditions for the EU’s ambitions and performance. External others, such as other UN member states 
and regional organizations, are not necessarily willing to accept enhanced EU status at the UN bodies.  
From the perspective of normative power, the EU’s role at the HRC is an interesting case. Here the 
EU’s strong advocacy on human rights meets a global audience and seeks acceptance. It can be 
claimed that the HRC provides the main forum for the EU to search for legitimacy for its external 
human rights policy583. As chapter two noted, this legitimacy is related to EU participation and 
‘rightful action’ based on legitimate norms and instruments. Even if the EU is internally rather well -
equipped584 to promote human rights at the UN, this is not an easy task. Agreement on universal 
norms is rather difficult to achieve between participants with highly different cultural and political 
backgrounds. Even if the EU would see itself as a promoter of universal norms, this universality is 
easily contested. Hence, according to Macaj and Koops, the HRC presents a case of “inconvenient 
multilateralism” for the EU. The EU’s ambition to further multilateral working methods can 
sometimes even work against its values.585 The EU has faced strong opposition as the external 
political environment has often been hostile towards the EU position and many HRC member states 
have defended the principle of non-interference at the cost of the universal protection of human rights. 
In such an environment, the EU’s multilateral preference seems to collide with the ambition to further 
human rights in the world. The EU role as a normative power should receive recognition and 
acceptance from others. In this respect, the HRC can provide insights on how the EU’s normative 
power role is perceived at the global level. External perceptions of the EU as a human rights power 
are likely to be rather mixed, because of differences in norm interpretations and power relations. 
However, these perceptions are crucial in understanding the challenges the EU’s human rights role 
faces in the world.    
As a conclusion, the key challenge for the EU’s assumed normative power role at the HRC is to 
influence other actors and produce outcomes. The EU may have a positive self-image and highly 
ambitious human rights objectives. It may also succeed to overcome its internal obstacles and manage 
to speak with one voice. However, these are not necessarily enough for reaching desired outcomes. 
External perceptions influence the EU’s performance and ability to play the role of a normative 
power. The following empirical chapters (5-7) will study the EU’s normative power role at the HRC 
from three different perspectives based on role theory: the EU’s self-image, its role performance, and 
external perceptions of its role. Together these three perspectives are able to provide a comprehensive 
picture of the EU role at the HRC. 
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5 The Self-perception of the EU at the HRC 
 
According to Tiilikainen, the self-understanding of the EU is one of the most essential factors shaping 
its role in world politics586. Hence, this self-perception forms the very starting point for analyzing the 
EU’s role at the Human Rights Council. By definition, the EU’s own role conception refers to a set 
of norms expressing the self-expected foreign policy behaviour and EU approaches to other actors. 
Because human rights represent core EU values, this particular policy carries important identity traits. 
As chapter two noted, the EU prefers more positive images of itself, and some EU policy-makers 
have keenly adopted the normative power role ideal. The normative power role focuses on the defence 
of universal principles with non-coercive methods, preferring dialogue and co-operation with 
different partners in multilateral institutions587. Secondly, normative powers are assumed to be able 
to influence others, for example, by leading through example. However, the consensus behind this 
kind of collective EU role is often taken for granted588. This chapter examines whether the ego side 
of the EU’s role at the HRC is coherent and supportive of such a role. 
 
The first task is to explain how collective role perceptions can be studied. It is assumed that collective 
roles are communicated through official foreign policy documents and through the more unofficial 
opinions of policy makers. This is why this chapter concentrates first on studying EU self-perception 
by examining its key human rights policy documents and statements. These include, for example, the 
Strategic Framework and Action plans on Human Rights and Democracy, and the Annual Reports on 
Human Rights. Secondly, EU documents with a specific focus on the UN human rights fora, such as 
EU priorities and statements related to HRC work are examined589. Thirdly, more issue specific HRC 
documents include EU statements delivered at the HRC by EU leaders (HR/VP, SR), EU delegation, 
Council Presidency or other member states speaking on behalf of the Union. More than 100 different 
documents were used to study the major components of the EU self-image at the HRC. These public 
statements can be considered to express the EU’s common will, as they become possible only when 
there is an agreement between the member states590. Often the actor’s role claims show a high level 
of path dependency. That is why this chapter starts with a historical perspective on EU role claims at 
the HRC and proceeds by looking at their possible continuity and change after 2012. 
 
However, EU documents and statements can only reveal the official side of the EU’s self-image. In 
order to find out the more unofficial EU role perceptions, listening to policy-makers who take part in 
the HRC proceedings is essential. The unofficial self-image of the EU at the HRC is examined 
through theme-based interviews with 23 EU and EU member states’ human rights experts conducted 
in 2013-2014591. The interviewees were working in their national delegations and in the EU 
delegation in Geneva. Some interviews were also conducted in Brussels in the EEAS. This unofficial 
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side of the EU’s self-image brings attention to how different actors are involved in defining the EU 
role592. These views are also able to go beyond the EU rhetoric and reveal possible incoherence in 
EU role perceptions. 
 
5.1 Historical Perspective to EU Role Claims 
 
The EU’s role in the establishment of the HRC 
 
In 2004-2005 the UN member states recognized the vital need to reform the UN human rights system. 
According to EU views, the institutional change should elevate the role of human rights in the UN, 
and the EU expressed its dedication to such reforms.593 The World Summit of September 2005 
decided to establish the Human Rights Council594. As the EU had expressed its strong commitment 
to multilateralism and a stronger UN595, and to human rights more generally, it was assumed to take 
an active role in the formation of the new body. However, the EU’s position was rather conservative, 
supporting merely modest changes596. According to Macaj and Koops, the EU role was constrained 
by the fact that there was no EU agreement on the assessment of the track record of the previous 
CHR, or its possible alternatives597. However, the EU position evolved, and it started to support 
considerable and rapid changes598. Towards the end of the negotiations, a more visible EU role was 
also boosted externally, as the US decided to oppose the founding of the HRC599. The EU was left 
alone to defend the Western European and Other States Group (WEOG) positions. The UN member 
states had very differing opinions about what the composition, mandate and role of the new Council 
should be. The EU underlined the need to create a more effective and efficient body, able to genuinely 
contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights600. The main, freestanding nature of the 
Human Rights Council was a fundamental part of the EU's position:  
The European Union is committed to equipping the UN with a human rights body with an 
enhanced status, which restores human rights to the central role originally given by the 
Charter. We need a human rights body…which is able to address human rights matters 
and situations more quickly, more effectively and more efficiently.601  
 
The EU saw the need for more frequent meetings of the HRC to ensure its ability to address urgent 
cases in a timely manner602. It also held firmly to the view that there should be possibilities to call 
Special sessions in between regular sessions on pressing human rights matters and situations.603 
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Although the EU highlighted the need for dialogue, cooperation and assistance, alarming human 
rights situations should be addressed even without the cooperation of the involved countries. The EU 
also insisted on developing measures for the implementation of established standards604. The EU 
aimed to gain support for creating an effective mechanism, but continued to face disagreement by a 
number of delegations605. Many developing countries opposed the founding of specific country 
mandates and demanded that these could be established only with the consent of the country in 
question. They also supported the election of the Council’s members by a simple majority of the 
General Assembly (GA) and required no membership criteria. The EU insisted that the Council 
should consist of states that can demonstrate their commitment and contribution to human rights. 
According to the EU position, 2/3 majority of the UN membership would be needed to elect the 
members of the HRC.606 
 
Because of the apparent disagreements on several issues, the EU had to make some concessions. It 
accepted a smaller size for the Council, which also meant a smaller percentage of members from the 
WEOG607. Also the Council members would be elected by a simple majority of the GA, which meant 
that human rights violators could still reach Council membership. However, several innovations were 
added to the membership criteria, such as the elimination of permanent membership by compelling 
rotation, a review of the member’s records, and the possibility to suspend membership in cases of 
human rights violations. Finally, the General Assembly resolution 60/251608, which established the 
new human rights body, provided a consensus outcome and was supported by the EU609. The EU was 
willing to take an active role in the new Council;  
The EU considers that the resolution represents a genuine effort to enhance the credibility 
and effectiveness of the multilateral human rights system as we know it today. Not 
everything the EU had aimed was reflected in the final text. However… the resolution 
meets the basic requirements which made the text acceptable as a compromise…The 
agreement on the new Human Rights Council underlines the willingness of the 
international community to strengthen the promotion and protection of human rights. The 
EU hopes this commitment will be translated into tangible improvements of the situation 
of human rights on the ground… The EU will make every effort to ensure that the Human 
Rights Council will be able to fulfil its mandate responsibly and effectively.610 
 
However, the adoption of the founding resolution was only the first step in creating a working 
Council, and disagreements concerning its more specific methods continued during the initial period 
(June 2006 – June 2007). The primary focus of the first year was to carry out the Council’s institution-
building activities in a quick and efficient manner. Eventually the institution-building package was 
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605 Wouters et al. 2008. 
606 EU Presidency Statement at UNGA – Human Rights Council, 6.2. 2006. 
607 When compared with the CHR, the percentage of WEOG members was reduced from 19% to 15% of the total HRC 
members. In practice this change has not really been critical if the amount of EU member states at the HRC is 
considered. 
608 UN General Assembly Resolution 60/251 establishing the Human Rights Council 15.3. 2006. 
609 EU Presidency Statement at UNGA - Human Rights Council, Explanation of Vote, 15.3.2006. 
610 Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the establishment of the UN Human Rights 
Council, Brussels 16.3 2006. 
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adopted in June 2007611, setting the framework for the Council’s work. The HRC formed a key 
priority for the EU in 2006-2007, as it saw the long-term impact of the first decisions for the future 
functioning of the Council612. The EU saw itself as a “key actor in all aspects of the Council’s work”, 
which, despite severe opposition and numerical minority, at least by its own assessment, could 
achieve most of its stated goals613. In general, a united and firm EU approach was considered to 
contribute to EU success most effectively.614 The EU took an active role in both the consultative 
process leading up to the establishment of the Working Group on Special Procedures and in the 
debates of the group itself, as well as in outlining the working methods of the new HRC Universal 
Periodic Review (UPR) mechanism615.  
 
From the perspective of normative power, the EU’s role claims during the establishment of the 
Council are in line with normative power role assumptions. As this section demonstrated, the EU was 
eager to defend human rights as values and elevate their status in the UN system. The EU positions 
reflect its commitment to human rights principles developed at the international level. Furthermore, 
the EU was willing to elevate the status of the HRC as a guardian of these principles. The EU seemed 
to support multilateral solutions to human rights issues, but this approach also included contradictory 
elements. On the one hand, the EU aimed to enhance dialogue, cooperation and assistance between 
states, while on the other hand the EU views reflected a willingness to create an effective mechanism 
to intervene in human rights violations in individual countries. Hence, the EU was ready to resort to 
harder measures if the country in question was not willing to cooperate, an approach that was not 
supported by many other delegations. The EU statements also showed its aspiration to be a key actor 
at the HRC. According to Bengtsson and Elgström, normative power also needs leadership, which 
may be related to its “ideational legitimacy”616. The EU’s self-image is that of a leader, but in the 
HRC establishment negotiations, the EU could not change others’ opinions, and needed to make 
compromises. However, it still managed to be an actor with clear objectives and a vision.  
 
The EU’s role at the HRC in 2007-2010 
Besides negotiations on the institution-building package, the first years of the Council (2006-2010) 
included several thematic and country-specific issues. The HRC resolutions were mainly adopted by 
consensus, underlining the “cooperative spirit” of the body. However, group dynamics dominated the 
agenda, and moderate countries were not able to challenge strong players. Western initiatives often 
faced serious objection, while Southern governments succeeded to block efficient actions taken 
against their governments. This was apparent in the Council’s inability to take decisive action with 
regard to some country-specific situations617. From the EU perspective, the credibility of the HRC 
was diminished, as it remained silent in many situations618. Furthermore, the situation in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory received excessive attention as a permanent agenda item (item 7)619 and in 
                                                 
611 UN Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1: Human Rights Council “Institution-building package” 18.6. 2007. 
612 EU Annual Report on Human Rights 2007, 7. 
613 EU Annual Report on Human Rights 2007, 63-64. 
614 EU Annual Report on Human Rights 2007, 84-85. 
615 Wouters et al. 2008, 13-17. 
616 Bentgsson & Elgström 2011, 117–118. 
617 Wouters & Meuwissen 2013, 3. 
618 EU Statement – UNGA: Report of the HRC 3.11. 2010. 
619 See HRC agenda items table 2, section 4.1. 
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Special sessions. Another dividing issue was the defamation of religions or freedom of expression. 
Thus, politicization and selectivity could not be avoided, and the membership of several states with 
suspicious human rights records diminished the credibility of the HRC. This UN “politics as usual” 
preconditioned the EU’s role possibilities.  
 
The EU’s active engagement and rhetoric during the establishment of the Council had raised high 
expectations in other actors. As the US boycotted the HRC620, the EU was seen as the most likely 
candidate to take leadership. However, as Karen Smith notes, this expectation was quite 
unreasonable621 as the absence of the US left the EU alone and rather isolated. According to Gowan 
and Brantner, in 2007-2010 the drifting away from the Western human rights positions was apparent 
at the UN622. The EU needed to balance between two fronts, as the US aimed to undercut the UN, 
and powers such as China and Russia were setting limits to human rights concerns623. The EU was 
internally united and delivered common positions in several issue areas, but unity demanded heavy 
internal EU coordination, which made EU positions inflexible. Furthermore, the EU needed to adjust 
its working practices to meet the Lisbon treaty objectives; for example, from 2010 onwards the role 
of the EU delegation in Geneva was enhanced, even if it lacked relevant resources and experience on 
how to work in the HRC environment624. However, much more detrimental was the lack of a clear 
common strategy or objectives required for a long-term planning. Several evaluations also underlined 
the urgent need to improve the EU’s outreach capabilities at the HRC.625 The EU noted the need to 
make compromises in order to gain support from other actors. However, at the same time it was 
considered to be counterproductive, if the EU was to ‘lower the bar’ too much by compromising its 
values626. Many NGOs already had criticized the EU for the moderate results achieved at the HRC627. 
The EU was also accused of adopting a rather neutral position628 in order not to break its economic 
and political ties with important parties.  Member states’ important interests were seen to hinder more 
ambitious EU aims, and led easily to the adoption of lowest common denominator positions629. A 
more remarkable defeat was the fact that the EU did not put forward many country-specific 
resolutions, as it realized that these would not gain support. The EU could not, for example, prevent 
the termination of the mandates on Belarus and Cuba, and renew the expert mandate on the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. The EU was reluctant to have open conflicts with the OIC and 
African group, who dominated the debates and were able to collect majorities in the Council.  
 
                                                 
620 The US boycotted HRC mainly because of controversies concerning its membership criteria. It took a rather passive 
stance towards the HRC reflecting its more general attitude towards other international bodies after the Cold War (see 
especially Freedman 2013, chapter 7). The US joined the HRC in 2009 as a sign of its “new era of engagement” in 
foreign policy. 
621 This is because the US had had serious difficulties with leadership already in the CHR (Smith K. 2010, 228). 
622 See Gowan & Brantner 2008a, 2009a, 2010. 
623 Gowan & Brantner 2010, 1. 
624 Laatikainen notes how the Lisbon treaty did not provide for a transition period, and the changes occurred directly 
when the treaty went into force (Laatikainen 2010, 481.). 
625 Gowan & Brantner 2008, 2009b; Smith K. 2011, 2. 
626 Smith K. 2010, 234-236. 
627 See for example Roth 2007. 
628 Freedman points out EU neutrality especially in relation to Darfur, see Freedman 2013.  
629 Smith K. 2010, 237. 
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The EU’s role at the HRC in 2007-2010 has many features of normative power, but there are also 
clear reservations for such a role630. Overall, EU efforts in 2007-2010 draw a picture of the Union as 
a strong supporter of the HRC, and a defender of the Special Procedures and the Universal Periodic 
Review process631. The EU, for example, proclaimed that it could “lead by example” with respect to 
both, being reviewed and reviewing others632. As the EU did not act collectively in the UPR, there 
were demands that it should be more prominent in this process633. Hence, the EU proclaimed that it 
would incorporate the follow-up of UPR recommendations into EU human rights dialogues and 
consultations with other countries634. The EU also continued to raise several country specific human 
rights situations at the HRC635 and was a visible actor in the HRC deliberations, resolutions and 
procedural matters when its collective efforts are taken into account636. These activities demonstrate 
how the EU aimed to keep the HRC running637, and cooperated even with the most challenging 
partners, such as the OIC, to reach this aim. The EU was also empowering NGOs to participate in the 
HRC’s work and listened to their views638. These acts underline the EU’s constructive engagement 
with the HRC, and are in line with the normative power role. However, the EU’s consensus-driven, 
defensive and reactive stance was not considered to match with the leadership expectations.639 The 
EU’s emphasis on cooperation and dialogue contradicted its strong value commitments. As a 
conclusion, playing the role of a normative power created a dilemma for the EU, as it could not decide 
which of its commitments was more important. Externally, the legitimacy of the normative power 
role would be weakened whatever the EU chose to do.  
 
EU role in the HRC review 
 
The HRC review process was conducted in 2010-2011640 and country positions in the review reflected 
the controversies that had appeared in the Council’s work already from the beginning. Many states 
were defending cooperation and dialogue as the principal methods of work, and were eager to 
maintain the HRC agenda as it is641. According to the EU, the 2011 review process “should contribute 
to improving the Council’s ability to systematically implement all aspects of its mandate, by 
addressing concrete gaps and shortcomings in any aspect of its work and functioning”.642 The EU aim 
was to achieve “a real, substantive outcome of the Review process”643 In reality the most important 
task was to prevent unwelcome changes. According to the EU’s position “the main challenge for the 
Council lays in its ability to uphold and ensure the implementation of existing international norms 
                                                 
630 Basu 2012, 98-99. 
631 See EU Statement – HRC: Item 5: General debate 8.6. 2010. 
632 Basu 2012, 95. 
633 Wouters et al. 2008, 22. 
634 EU statement – HRC: Interactive dialogue with High Commissioner for Human Rights 4.3.2010. 
635 Especially through Special sessions initiated by the EU. 
636 For details, see section 6.3 table 4 
637 Smith K. 2010, 236-237. 
638 EU Annual Report of Human Rights 2008,127 and 208. 
639 See Brantner & Gowan 2008, 96; Smith K. 2010, 232; Basu 2012, 95; Laatikainen 2010. 
640 A general introduction to the HRC review is outlined in section 4.1 
641 Especially in relation to addressing human rights situations, the NAM, the OIC, Group of African States and Russia 
were conserving the status quo, see comments made during the review from the outcome document. 
642 EU Statement – HRC: EU Contribution for the First Session of the OEWG, 7.10. 2010. 
643 Speech of HR/VP Catherine Ashton at HRC 16th session, High-Level Segment 28.2.2011. 
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and standards”644. The EU also aimed to rationalize the HRC work by, for example, merging agenda 
items, improving information sharing, and bi-annualizing resolutions. These EU views were widely 
shared among Western states and human rights organizations. According to the EU position: 
What truly matter are the outputs. The real test is whether we make a difference on the 
ground. For this reason, the EU will work hard to strengthen the Human Rights Council 
and especially its ability to address urgent situations. This is a key objective of the on-
going review process. We continue to push for an ambitious result.645 
 
From the EU perspective, mere dialogue was not enough, and more diverse tools should be developed 
to better address different situations646. According to the EU statement “not using the HRC review 
for creating new tools and methods for dealing with situations of concern would be a missed 
opportunity”. The EU supported the creation of independent trigger mechanisms for holding special 
sessions. One less politically loaded opportunity was also the convening of informal meetings by the 
HRC president based on information coming from stakeholders.647 The EU aimed to increase the role 
of human rights organizations and National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs), in delivering 
relevant information. The EU demanded that States under Review (SuRs) should provide clear, 
written answers to all the recommendations648. The EU wanted more time for discussing the UPR 
reports and suggested that the given recommendations should be mainstreamed within the UN 
system649.  
 
From the perspective of the normative power role, the EU continued to defend international principles 
and multilateral cooperation and dialogue in human rights. However, it also aimed to ensure the 
implementation of these norms and principles on the ground and searched for ways to improve human 
rights protection. Even if the EU approved the outcome document of the HRC review650, it noted that 
this did not include substantial improvements. For example, higher membership standards were not 
incorporated into the final outcome of the review, which was an EU objective. The outcome included 
some modalities for the second cycle of the Universal Periodic Review, the creation of the Office for 
the President of the Council, and enabled statements through video messages, and also broadcasting 
the HRC sessions on the internet. For the EU, this kind of outcome was minimalistic, even if it 
safeguarded features that were priorities for the EU651. Hence, instead of producing changes, the EU 
had to defend the status quo in the review. The EU was not alone with its dissatisfaction as also other 
countries, such as Mexico, Australia, Canada, the US, Chile and Japan, and civil society organizations 
expressed their disappointment652. The EU hoped that the ideas presented during negotiations could 
be considered in other occasions in the future653. As a conclusion, the main challenge of the normative 
                                                 
644 EU Statement – HRC: EU Contribution for the First Session of the OEWG, 7.10. 2010. 
645 Remarks by Catherine Ashton on the UN Human Rights Council at the European Parliament, 9.3. 2011, Strasbourg. 
646 Smith K. 2011, 30-31; see also Human Rights Watch 2010, 10-11. 
647 EU Statement – HRC: Second Session of the OEWG, 7.2. 2011. 
648 EU intervention – HRC: Second Session of the OEWG, 17.2.2011. 
649 See for example Amnesty International 2011, 21-22; Human Rights Watch 2010. 
650 See country/EU comments in HRC Report of the open-ended intergovernmental working group on the review of the 
work and functioning of the Human Rights Council 4.5.2011. 
651 EEAS 2012: Human rights and democracy in the world: Report on EU action in 2011, 121. 
652 Canada and the US also voted against the adoption of the review resolution in the GA (resolution 65/281), which 
again shows harder attitude towards the HRC. 
653 EU Explanation of vote – HRC: 16th session, adoption of the review resolution 16/21, 25.3. 2011. 
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power role was the EU’s incapability to influence outcomes. Despite the challenges, the EU’s role 
conception seemed to be rather stable during the establishment, the first years, and the review of the 
HRC. 
 
5.2 EU Role Claims at the HRC since 2012 
 
The year 2012 forms an important dividing line for the EU human rights role at the HRC for two 
reasons. First, the HRC review came to a conclusion, and several human rights crises654 started to 
reshape the HRC work and bloc formations. Secondly, the EU started to implement the Lisbon treaty 
demands and renewed its approach to an external human rights policy. According to the EU “the task 
in hand is to ensure the clarity, coherence, and effectiveness of policy, by being smarter and more 
strategic”655. As a consequence, the EU, for example, rearranged its methods of cooperation, and 
started to deliver lists of human rights priorities at the UN. This chapter focuses on three main aspects 
of the EU role reflected in official documents since 2012: a defender of universal standards, a 
supporter and contributor to the UN, and a partner for others. 
 
The EU as a defender of universal norms 
 
The commitment to universal human rights norms and their defence is the most emphasized aspect 
of the EU human rights policy expressed in different documents, speeches and websites. In her speech 
to the European Parliament on 13 December 2011, the High Representative Catherine Ashton stated 
how “the EU works to have human rights running as a silver thread through a truly integrated range 
of external policies”656. This new integrated and comprehensive approach is apparent in EU 
documents: “the EU aims to promote universal human rights standards as basis for the EU’s 
engagement with third countries and regional organizations”657. The main aim of the EU is to defend 
the universality of human rights in all EU relations: “the EU will continue to promote and defend the 
universality and indivisibility of all human rights in partnership with countries from all regions, in 
close cooperation with international and regional organizations, and with civil society”658. 
Furthermore, according to the EEAS webpage “by ensuring that human rights are the silver thread of 
external policies, the EU can act as a world leader and aim to build effective partnerships”659. This 
kind of self-image underlines the EU’s aspiration to lead through its own example, which is one of 
the norm-diffusion mechanisms used by normative powers. 
 
The EU statements also draw a picture of the EU as a contested defender of universal principles. The 
EU Action plan for the years 2015-2019 expresses that “in an increasingly challenging global 
                                                 
654 Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and Syria, see Gowan & Brantner 2011. 
655 Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Human Rights and Democracy at the heart of EU 
action – towards a more effective approach, 12.12. 2011. 
656 Catherine Ashton 2011, speech to European Parliament in the presentation of the Joint Communication to the 
European Parliament and the Council on Human Rights and Democracy at the Heart of EU External Action – Towards 
a More Effective Approach, 13.12. 2011. 
657 EU Annual Report on Human Rights 2014, (draft version) 22.6. 2015 
658 The Council of the European Union 2015, Action Plan for Human Rights and Democracy 2015-2019 20.7.2015  
659 See http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2012/060112_hr_silverthread_en.htm (accessed 12.9.2015) 
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environment, the relevance of universal standards is questioned and the EU’s endeavour to promote 
them meets with growing resistance”660. According to the EU’s Human Rights Strategy:  
The EU will resist strenuously any attempts to call into question the universal application 
of human rights and will continue to speak out in the United Nations General Assembly, 
the UN Human Rights Council and the International Labour Organisation against human 
rights violations.661 
From this perspective, human rights violations are conducted by other parties, not the EU. Also the 
EU Action plan for 2015-2019 notes how “in today's complex crises and widespread violations and 
abuses of human rights and fundamental freedoms require ever more determined efforts by the 
EU”662. This kind of self-perception underlines the EU’s role as a guardian of human rights, which 
invokes universal standards and treaty obligations. Furthermore, the EU emphasis on empowering 
civil society and local organizations in their human rights efforts underlines the EU’s commitment to 
defend human rights norms: “the EU will continue to ensure that multilateral fora remain open and 
safe spaces for human rights defenders and civil society representatives, and will speak out against 
any reprisal targeting those who cooperate with the UN human rights bodies”663. From the EU 
perspective “cultural diversity or different civilizations cannot be an alibi for not respecting and 
promoting human rights664”. These efforts are considered as a threat to universal, not only to 
European, human rights standards. According to the EEAS website “by speaking with one voice, the 
EU is a powerful force for good in the world”665. Other actors are norm challengers or breakers. 
 
The EU’s new more active approach towards economic, social and, cultural rights (ESCR), aims to 
meet the calls of the developing world. The EU willingness to work on behalf of all human rights is 
strongly underlined. The EU Human Rights Strategy declares how “the EU reaffirms its commitment 
to the promotion and protection of all human rights, whether civil and political, or economic, social 
and cultural”666. The EU’s Annual report 2014 also notes how “as an advocate of the universal, 
indivisible, interdependent and interrelated nature of all human rights, the EU considered that 
economic, social and cultural rights are part and parcel of its external policy”667. One of the aims in 
the EU action plan (action 9) is to address specific questions related to ESCR in dialogues with third 
countries. The EU sees the HRC as the EU’s focal spot for shaping the agenda on these rights:  
As a firm advocate of the universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated nature of 
all human rights, the EU will intensify its efforts to promote and protect economic, social 
and cultural rights. The EU will contribute to shaping the agenda on economic, social 
and cultural rights with specific focus on the UN Human Rights Council.668 
                                                 
660 European Commission 2015, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, Action Plan on 
Human Rights and Democracy 2015-2019, 28.4. 2015, p. 5. 
661 The Council of the European Union 2012, EU Human Rights Strategy 25.6.2012. 
662 The Council of the European Union 2015, Action Plan for Human Rights and Democracy 2015-2019 20.7.2015 
663 The Council of the European Union 2015, Council Conclusions on EU priorities at the UN human rights fora 2015, 
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666 The Council of the European Union 2012, EU Human Rights Strategy 25.6.2012. 
667 EU Annual report on Human Rights 2014, p. 19, (draft) 22.6. 2015 
668 The Council of the European Union 2014, Council Conclusions on EU priorities at the UN human rights fora 2014, 
10.2. 2014. 
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According to Wouters and Meuwissen, this aspiration has not been sufficiently materialised or when 
it has, these initiatives have been undertaken by individual EU states669. This is because member 
states’ positions differ in the ESCR670. The Action Plan for the years 2015-2019 mentions how the 
EU “emphasizes the clear recognition of the human rights dimension in areas such as social policy, 
health, education, access to food and water, or standard of living”.671  
 
The EU as a supporter and contributor to the HRC 
 
Another important aspect of the EU’s self-perception is the emphasis given to multilateral human 
rights system and the EU role therein. According to the EU view “the EU has been at the forefront in 
building strong standards and mechanisms for the promotion and protection of human rights at the 
United Nations, the Council of Europe and the OSCE”672. In this respect the EU sees itself as an 
example and model for others. An active and strong EU role is emphasized: “the EU is, and will 
remain, a vocal advocate of human rights, and lends its full support to the multilateral human rights 
system…the EU will be an active and determined participant in the UN Human Rights Council and 
the General Assembly sessions.”673 According to EU views: “the UN is a vital forum for international 
action against human rights violations and abuses”.674 On many occasions the shared objectives of 
the EU and the UN are underlined. The EU notes, for example, how “promoting and protecting human 
rights for all, without any discrimination is our shared objective. We share your aim of mainstreaming 
human rights throughout the UN system”.675 These statements draw a picture of the EU as an active 
supporter of the UN and its diverse bodies and mechanisms. Importantly, the EU describes its 
relationship with the High Commissioner as an on-going rich and fruitful dialogue676. From the EU 
perspective, this cooperation is beneficial for both parties. Furthermore, according to its own 
statements, the EU also aims to promote the ratification and implementation of key international 
human rights treaties, often originating from the UN bodies: “On a bilateral basis, most notably during 
human rights dialogues, the EU regularly encouraged third countries to ratify and effectively 
implement the UN human rights instruments, and to reconsider or withdraw reservations”677. Thus, 
the UN standards and reports are used as valid criteria and a basis for cooperation in EU relations to 
other parties. According to EU statements “The EU is firmly convinced that the special procedures 
play a key role in rendering international human rights law operative”678.  
 
                                                 
669 Wouters & Meuwissen 2013, 18. 
670 This was also mentioned in many interviews with external actors. 
671 The Council of the European Union 2015, Action Plan for Human Rights and Democracy 2015-2019 (action 17) 
20.7.2015  
672 European Commission 2015, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, Action Plan on 
Human Rights and Democracy 2015-2019, 28.4. 2015, p. 5. 
673 The Council of the European Union 2014, Council Conclusions on EU priorities at the UN human rights fora 2014, 
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674 The Council of the European Union 2015, Council Conclusions on EU priorities at the UN human rights fora 2015, 
9.2. 2015. 
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The EU’s more particular dedication to support the HRC is expressed, for example, in the Human 
Rights Strategy “the EU underlines the leading role of the Human Rights Council in addressing urgent 
cases of human rights violations and will contribute vigorously to the effective functioning of the 
Council”679. The EU’s motivation to be active in the HRC is assumed to derive from its own value-
basis. For example, according to High Representative Frederica Mogherini “the EU has been a 
staunch supporter of this Council from its inception, because it embodies the principles underlying 
the very foundation of the EU – human rights, fundamental freedoms, solidarity and justice”680 This 
basis also explains why the EU perceives itself as a natural supporter and contributor of the HRC. In 
the Council conclusions on EU priorities at the UN human rights fora, the EU’s active role in the 
HRC is also confirmed on a yearly basis “the EU is determined to continue contributing strongly to 
the important work of the HRC in cooperation with all other stakeholders [….] The EU will actively 
participate in the sessions of the HRC”.681 The HRC ability to focus on human rights crises is 
appreciated by the EU: “the European Union is pleased to note that the Council has maintained its 
leadership in addressing human rights situations”682. According to the EU Annual report 2014 the EU 
is “playing an active and pivotal role, particularly in relation to country resolutions and thematic 
issues such as freedom of religion or belief and rights of the child”683 The EU also notices the wide 
relevance of HRC recommendations: “the EU and its member states will raise the Universal Periodic 
Review recommendations made during the Council sessions… in their bilateral relations with third 
countries. The EU also notices the authority of these recommendations within its own frontiers”.684 
This self-perception as a supporter of the UN provides a continuum for the earlier EU role claims at 
the HRC. 
 
Engagement, cooperation and dialogue with partners 
The third essential element emphasized in EU documents is the focus on normative measures such as 
dialogue, cooperation, and engagement with partners. The willingness to cooperate with others is 
reflected in all EU lists of priorities at the UN human rights fora since 2012. The idea is to mobilize 
cross-regional cooperation for an effective UN human rights system685. The EU Action Plan for 
Human Rights for the years 2015-2019 notices that:  
Promoting values through exogenous action alone is often not effective. Therefore, efforts 
should be focused on supporting endogenous forces. The EU should empower 
interlocutors in third countries (governmental, parliamentary, and quasi-governmental), 
reinforce the role of the judiciary, continue to support the civil society…and promote 
enabling environments, strengthen the role and impact of regional organizations and 
mechanisms and reinforce cooperation with the UN686. 
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The EU Human rights strategy mentions how “the EU will always seek constructive engagement with 
third countries…and will continue to deepen its human rights dialogues and consultations with partner 
countries and aim to ensure that these dialogues lead to results”.  It is also noted how the EU can help 
other states in realizing human rights and encourage the right kind of development: “the EU will work 
with partner countries to identify areas where EU geographic funding instruments can be used to 
support projects which bolster human rights, including support for human rights education and 
training”.687 The EU wish to “strengthen the dialogues with third countries by listening to partners on 
respective priorities and initiatives”688 reflects the EU aim of profiling itself as a more responsive 
partner towards third countries. The EU documents since 2012 focus on locally led political reforms 
and local ownership of human rights initiatives: “human rights can only take root where there is strong 
local ownership”689. In this respect the EU argues for tailor-made approaches to different countries690 
that aim to represent EU flexibility towards different country situations. 
 
In order to mobilize cross-regional cooperation, partnership with other regional organizations is 
important. According to the EU Human Rights Strategy “the EU will work in partnership with 
regional and other organizations such as the African Union, ASEAN, SAARC, the Organization of 
American States, the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Pacific Islands 
Forum with a view to encouraging the consolidation of regional human rights mechanisms”691. The 
aim of “boosting ownership of local actors” also includes civil society organizations. According to 
the EU Human Rights Strategy “the EU places great value on its regular dialogue with civil society 
both inside and outside the EU”692. The EU relationship with NGOs is based on consultation and 
political and financial support. For example, the EU is committed to consult civil society 
organizations ahead of human rights dialogues or in relation to key policy documents. The Action 
Plan for the years 2015-2019 notices the need to improve the quality of these consultations693. Hence, 
according to its self-perception, the EU is a strong advocate for different human rights defenders and 
organizations. 
 
The three aspects of EU self-perception outlined in this section; a defender of universal principles, a 
supporter and contributor to the UN, and engagement, cooperation and dialogue with partners are in 
line with the normative power role. By supporting, mainstreaming and strengthening the UN 
principles and mechanisms, the EU sees itself as an advocate of international, not only European, 
standards. The EU is not forcing others to follow its priorities, but aims to empower them through 
finance and other means to shape the shared agenda. The EU is willing to find legitimacy for its 
positions by cooperating with different partners, such as regional and political organizations. The 
official self-image also points to the EU’s leadership based on showing an example for others in 
multilateral human rights forums. For example, the Action Plan on Human Rights mentions that: “the 
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EU must lead by example…”694. As a conclusion, the official self-perception of the EU since 2012 
shows increasing confidence to play a visible and determined role at the HRC rather than the adoption 
of more moderate objectives and role claims because of external challenges. The changing situation 
is perceived to offer better opportunities for the EU to play a normative power role.  
 
5.3 The Practitioners’ Perspective to EU Role 
 
According to the EU’s official documents, its role conception at the HRC reflects elements of the 
normative power role. This section examines the more unofficial EU self-perceptions by examining 
how the EU and member states’ officials695 working on HRC related issues perceive the EU’s role 
therein. It is based on 23 semi-structured theme interviews conducted in 2013-2014 among human 
rights experts in the Geneva delegations and at the Brussels headquarters. It brings attention to the 
fact that individual policy-makers are not passive actors, but are involved in the construction and 
shaping of roles. They have the scope for interpretation and choice, based on their experiences, 
calculations and reasoning.696 Practitioners also have important knowledge concerning the context 
and preconditions under which the EU aims to exercise its more specific roles. Hence, these more 
subjective perceptions are able to go “beyond the EU role rhetoric” and reveal different role 
expectations. Member states’ visions of the proper EU role at the HRC may differ depending on the 
size, location, history and priorities of EU member states. For example member states’ willingness to 
further the common EU approach is often related to their national priorities697. The interviews for this 
section were conducted under the promise of anonymity, and no direct references to names or 
countries are made in the text698. As it was assumed that policy-makers are not familiar with the 
normative power idea, there was a need to operationalize it. Hence, this role was examined by 
studying why the EU and member states experts saw the HRC as an important forum for the EU. 
Secondly, they had to describe what kinds of measures were appropriate for the EU in the HRC. 
Thirdly, they had to assess EU influence and its basis at the HRC. Finally, EU difference in 
comparison to other actors at the HRC was asked.  
 
The EU Role as a Normative Power? 
 
Many interviewees pointed out how the EU’s motivation to work at the HRC derives from shared 
values and a respect for human rights699. The EU member states were perceived as willing to defend 
these values700. Most of the interviewees also mentioned that the EU agreement is generally easy to 
find in most HRC related issues because of this common value basis. The EU was generally noted to 
                                                 
694 European Commission 2015, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, Action Plan on 
Human Rights and Democracy 2015-2019, 28.4. 2015, p. 5. 
695 These officials worked as human rights experts or ambassadors in their national delegations in Geneva. The 
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696 Aggestam 2006, 17-18. 
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698 For a list of participated EU member states experts, see appendix 1. 
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have “a mind for compromises”701. Secondly, the EU’s defence of values was seen as rather reliable. 
One interviewee mentioned how “the EU’s strong commitment to human rights values can always be 
taken for granted”702. According to another interviewee: “for the EU there are no excuses or 
emergencies that could make human rights only of secondary importance”703. Thirdly, human rights 
were considered to occupy a special role among the EU’s values. According to one interviewee: 
“human rights form the strongest EU policy priority”704. Another interviewee said that: “human rights 
are the best example of EU values. They are very dear and specific to EU states”705. It was reminded 
that EU cooperation in human rights issues is supported by legal agreement at the level of treaties706 
with the aim of making the EU more visible and efficient actor also at the UN. Hence, the EU/EUMS 
experts supported the view that the EU has a shared normative basis for action in human rights. 
 
Most of the interviewees mentioned that the Human Rights Council is the most important global 
forum for human rights discussion; this was also seen by many as the main reason for the EU to be 
involved and active707. One interviewee said that: “in this arena we are talking about world visions. 
In the HRC it is about how we make these values count, so it is actually a very natural aspect of EU 
action”708. The EU’s status as a representative of universal rights in the world was mentioned in many 
interviews709. However, it was also recognized by some that the EU’s main objective, the defence of 
the universality of human rights, is nowadays a highly contested issue710. This made the EU role even 
more important in the eyes of EU experts. Many interviewees, for example, thought that the EU shares 
a common task to act as a “force for good” in the Council by preventing the worst from happening711. 
In this task the EU was mentioned to oppose initiatives that are harmful for human rights, and which 
would “make the situation in the world even worse”712. Interestingly, it was also mentioned that the 
EU is not necessarily only working to fulfil its own interests. According to one interviewee: “for us 
the main thing is not that the EU is the leading actor, but that the human rights agenda is 
progressing”713. Hence, the EU was generally considered to have a special role in invoking and 
defending international norms and standards at the HRC. The EU’s objective is to remind other states 
of the common obligations, and to defend those conventions and declarations that were made in the 
past, and which must be obeyed714. In this sense, the EU is also perceived to fight against those states 
that aim to undermine the importance of common treaties. This self-image shows how EU participants 
share the view that the EU has normative intentions or objectives in the HRC context. 
 
As chapter two noted, the EU’s normative power role is closely associated with normative behaviour, 
which was related to the use of non-coercive measures in human rights promotion. The interviewees 
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noted that harder measures are not even possible at the HRC and these were seen as more related to 
the work of the UN Security Council. Thus, already the context excludes more coercive behaviour.715 
As one interviewee mentioned, “at the HRC the EU needs to be persuasive first, as the Geneva 
environment is meant only for dialogue and exchange of ideas”716. According to another, “the HRC 
can only trigger the attention of countries and offer recommendations, but it is not in its mandate to 
coerce or use sanctions”717. From the EU perspective, the use of coercive measures was not 
considered beneficial either, as these would threaten important dialogues with partners. Coercive 
action was considered to “make the EU policy totally different”718. The EU was also considered as a 
normative power in the sense that it is the biggest donor to developing countries. In this respect it was 
mentioned that: “the EU does not want to say that we cut the aid if you do not do this or that”.719  
According to another interviewee “the EU is very polite and gentle towards others; it lets those 
countries that receive 90% of its aid criticize it”720. One interviewee said that the EU does not use 
economic power or conditionality because of its ideology to further these issues for their own sake721. 
In general, the EU and member states human rights experts perceived the EU as a non-coercive 
actor722. However, many interviewees also noticed that the EU has huge economic resources that 
could be more effectively used in the promotion of human rights. It was acknowledged that the EU 
could become a harder power in the future if the political focus turned to be more concerned about 
the implementation of human rights demands723. According to one interviewee, the HRC could be 
one possible forum where different issues could become linked as the EU aims to be more efficient724. 
The EU’s perceived soft approach was not necessarily considered to be detrimental for its influence. 
Even if the EU statements represent only recommendations, they were seen to send a strong message 
to the world. Through active EU participation, for example to Special Sessions and Special 
Rapporteurs hearings, it was considered to be possible to influence diverse situations.725  
 
However, some interviewees also recognized that other actors might not perceive the EU as a soft or 
normative power. It was, for example, mentioned that the EU’s suspension of treaties and use of 
sanctions are criticized by others726. Opinions about the appropriateness of using sanctions also 
divided EU opinions. According to one interviewee: “the sanction policy is not ethical and can be 
considered coercive. That is why the EU should use it only as the last bullet after all diplomatic 
measures have been tried”727. The use of economic sanctions was also seen as difficult because it is 
almost impossible to judge whether these really work in particular cases. That is why, according to 
one interviewee, the EU should prefer targeted sanctions and offer support for NGOs.728 However, it 
was also mentioned how sanctions worked well in the case of Myanmar, and how this example could 
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be used to legitimate more sanctions in the future729. A more strategic approach to human rights and 
focus on changes and effectiveness on the ground were seen as the main reasons possibly leading to 
the adoption of harder measures730. The efficiency of EU action in multipolar constellations caused 
some concerns among the interviewees. As one interviewee said: “this is a more philosophical 
question about how much you can in the end really achieve at the HRC”731. Many EU practitioners 
thought that the EU’s internal improvements do not necessarily mean improved efficiency. 
Interestingly, according to one interviewee “it seems that we are efficient enough and we need no 
extra instruments”732. These views would reflect the fact that the EU accepts some level of 
inefficiency in international organizations such as the HRC. 
 
EU Influence - Leadership through Example? 
 
The second aspect of normative power role is related to the EU’s possibility to influence others and 
achieve outcomes. The EU interviewees mainly perceived the EU as an active and influential actor at 
the HRC, as the EU delivers opinions and positions in all HRC debates and issues733. One interviewee 
mentioned that EU influence is not only related to the amount of initiatives or mandates founded, but 
also to how successful the EU has been in maintaining different mandates734. Secondly, the EU was 
seen as an active organizer of various side events, panel debates, and informal meetings for different 
parties. In these events, the EU was seen as able to convince others and evaluate their reactions before 
formal resolution negotiations735. In this respect, the EU was seen as able to shape the discourse at 
the HRC. According to one interviewee, EU opinions clearly carry significance, as these opinions are 
reflected, for example, in the UN Special rapporteurs’ aims.736 These different examples were also 
considered to demonstrate that the EU is more influential than its (minority) position at the Council 
would suggest737. As one interviewee said: “I think the EU is achieving much more than would belong 
to it in the proportion of votes”738. Generally, the EU was considered to be stronger because of its 
size and high level of cooperation between its member states739. 
 
Whether this influence is reflected in the EU’s possible leadership at the HRC clearly divided 
opinions. There were also different interpretations of what it means to lead. Some interviewees saw 
the EU as a dominant player in the Council because it manages to speak out in every occasion and it 
succeeds in getting its initiatives accepted740. The EU’s leadership in country specific resolutions was 
underlined by many interviewees741. It was, for example, mentioned that: “only the US and the EU 
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are strong enough to run country resolutions and in this sense show leadership”742. EU leadership was 
also contested. In this respect one interviewee noted that: “the EU is not a leader in the sense that it 
would have followers”743. The EU was also considered to be able to lead only those issues, where its 
interests are high744. Despite diverging opinions concerning its possible leadership role, many EU 
practitioners thought that the EU’s influence at the HRC has improved after the difficult beginning. 
For example, one interviewee mentioned how “the EU is not a leader, but the trend is going up”745. 
Despite the positive trend, many interviewees thought that if resources are considered, the EU could 
and should be much more influential at the Council746. It was also mentioned that the EU does not 
need to lead in each and every issue747. According to one interviewee “as the EU is often in the front 
line in human rights, its strong positions do not always help in changing others’ opinions”748. Here 
the positions of individual EU member states were also seen to differ. According to one interviewee 
the principled and aggressive positions of the Nordic countries are “too much for the world”749. It 
was noted how some issues, such as the rights of sexual minorities, are not strongly supported by 
others at the HRC. In these cases the EU should be more sensitive and not make itself unpopular.750 
As one interviewee said “silence does not mean giving up”751. Many interviewees noted that the EU 
must find a balance between “megaphone” diplomacy and finding the most appropriate ways to tackle 
difficult cases.752 
 
The possible EU leadership was also seen to be restricted by many HRC “hard-liners”753. According 
to one interviewee “we are seen as champions, so we are challenged because of that, not because of 
issues. Whatever we pose, other countries resist it”754. The EU role remains rather limited in those 
questions where countries from the South are opposing its positions. The colonial past of some EU 
member states was seen to decrease the value of its example in the eyes of others755. The EU’s major 
interest to drive political and civil rights was noticed in many interviews. In these issues, the EU 
member states were assumed to enjoy respect from others, mainly because of the highly developed 
human rights institutions and practices756. However, at the same time, this example was considered 
to be problematic as “other countries do not see us as a shining example of how things should look, 
just the contrary, they don’t want to get our level of rights and freedoms”757. One interviewee also 
noted that: “other countries want to have their own values. They do not want the EU to tell them what 
they should like”758. Several examples were given where the EU interpretation of rights is in conflict 
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with some others’ views759. In this respect, it was noted that: “the EU should take initiatives that are 
more friendly and constructive for other countries, particularly to the South”760. Here the EU’s lesser 
focus on economic and social rights was seen to be the main problem. As one interviewee mentioned: 
“We are seen as somebody from the West, somebody rich, who is not that ready to give what is 
requested. We are not seen as very receptive to the grievances of developing countries”.761 The main 
reason mentioned in several interviews is the EU inability to reach an agreement on their approach to 
economic and social rights. According to a few interviewees, a more proactive attitude in this area 
could show that the EU cares about these rights762. 
 
The EU’s possible leadership was also considered to be related to its coherence and credibility at the 
HRC. This coherence was associated with the unity of EU member states, which was seen as an 
important political aim763. It was also noted how some external actors aim to cause divisions between 
EU member states and weaken its collective power764. However, also coherence between the internal 
and external human rights policy was seen to be a highly important issue, as it directly influences EU 
credibility at the HRC765. According to one interviewee “we are very well aware of the credibility 
gaps and…several EU actions address the lack of coherence. We have tried to be more sober in our 
statements, and not so self-congratulating”766. It was also generally thought that the EU way to deal 
with criticism is very good. For example, according to one interviewee “the EU takes seriously NGO 
reports and tries to make improvements”767. It was also mentioned how EU Special Representative 
Stavros Lambrinidis has taken up the EU’s internal human rights problems in his speeches, and also 
underlines that the EU is not a perfect actor768. The EU’s internal human rights problems were not 
considered to decrease its image seriously at the HRC. According to one interviewee: “the EU 
problems are usually pointed at by those actors who have far more problematic situations, and only 
because the EU has criticized them. That is why this criticism cannot be considered as a real concern 
for the EU situation”769. The EU incoherencies in dealing with third states’ human rights situations 
were considered to be part of political reality. According to one interviewee, “there are some countries 
where you can have impact and outcomes. With some other countries you have to be realistic, as there 
is not much we can do”770. Another interviewee mentioned how “we are selective and do not 
necessarily point the worst ones. We should be fair about why we pick some countries and not others. 
However, this is based on certain realism, as there are actors we cannot oppose”771. Hence, full 
coherence was not even considered to be possible in each and every case. 
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EU Difference   
 
An important dimension of normative power role is the assumed EU difference in comparison to other 
actors. That is why the EU practitioners were also asked to compare the EU’s role at the HRC to other 
actors’ roles. Generally the EU’s own multilateral basis was seen to differentiate it from other actors. 
As one interviewee said “the EU is an exceptional actor because it is supranational”772. Many 
interviewees mentioned how the EU is able to contribute to all the HRC debates because it consists 
of several states, and it will be present all the time773. Secondly, some interviewees suggested that it 
is the firm commitment to human rights values that differentiates the EU from other actors774. It was, 
for example, mentioned that “the fact that human rights must be taken into account in all EU work is 
uniquely European. Other actors do not have this kind of obligation”.775 Some interviewees also said 
that other actors know that they can count on the EU position, even if its internal processes take 
time.776 Several interviewees pointed out that, for example, China and India have not shown much 
interest of being active at the HRC777. The EU’s possible difference was also related to its 
comprehensive approach to human rights. According to one interviewee, the EU is “engaging broadly 
on different human rights issues, not just pointing at specific countries”778. The EU was also 
mentioned to be “always one step further from others” as it prepares its positions well in advance779. 
According to one interviewee, the EU role is in “providing constructive positions, when others are 
more radical”780. Such cooperative approach was seen to have both positive and negative 
consequences for EU objectives. 
 
Most EU interviewees noted some differences between the roles of the EU and the US at the HRC. 
Since its membership (2009), the US was considered as able to contribute a lot to the HRC work781. 
As the EU and the US often agree and share positions, the US presence was also considered to help 
the EU to work in the Council.782 One interviewee mentioned how “the situation was like a nightmare 
for the EU before the US became a member of the HRC”783. Hence, the special role of the US as an 
important EU ally was underlined in many interviews. At the same time, the EU was seen to carry a 
mediator role in the Council because the US positions are so strong and inflexible784.  According to 
one interviewee “the EU aims to be more responsive to others’ views and cares about the impacts of 
it policies”785. Another interviewee said that: “the US does not apologise”786. This led some to 
conclude that the US is not as engaged in the work of the Council787. In general, the EU and the US 
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were considered to apply different approaches to human rights promotion. It was, for example, 
mentioned that the EU does not want to coerce others in a similar manner than the US788. Furthermore, 
when voting occurs on controversial issues, the EU usually abstains, while the US votes against789. 
When the importance of these two actors was compared, opinions were more divided. The US was 
often seen as more effective in lobbying and working with cross-regional partners790. According to 
one interviewee “I have great respect towards their diplomacy, I have to say we lack behind”791. The 
US was seen to have clear views and very concrete aims at the HRC792. It was also mentioned that 
the US is able to win difficult cases, as it does not care if it loses its position793. However, it was also 
mentioned that the US relates other issues to HRC work, which explains its efficiency794. In this 
respect, one interviewee underlined how the EU has better relations to many countries795. Another 
interviewee thought that the EU positions should be clearly distinct from the US positions, as there 
are relevant differences796. Even if the US was considered to be a huge player at the HRC, some EU 
diplomats still perceived it as less influential than the EU797. 
 
5.4 Chapter Conclusions 
 
This chapter studied the EU’s own official and unofficial role perceptions at the HRC through 
different EU documents and participant interviews. The historical part demonstrated the EU’s role 
claims in the founding of the HRC, during the first years of its operation, and in the HRC review 
2010-2011. After 2012, the EU’s self-perception shows considerable path dependence rather than 
change. Through the EU documents, the main features of this self-image were captured: the EU as a 
defender of universal values, the EU as a contributor and supporter of the UN, and the EU as a partner 
for different third parties. Secondly, the more unofficial side of the EU’s self-image was studied with 
the help of interviews with EU and member states human rights experts. According to these EU 
participants, the EU works as a “force for good” at the HRC by fighting against those actors who aim 
to undermine the respect for universal human rights. The EU was, for example, seen as a 
representative of universal principles in the world. The EU was mainly seen to work through soft 
measures, as it is not willing to coerce others. However, the possibility to use stronger measures in 
the future to achieve better efficiency were also noted. The EU’s self-image also underlined norm-
diffusion by leading through example and model for other actors. According to the EU self-
perceptions it is able to show an example by acting in the forefront of human rights through its highly 
developed institutions and mechanisms. Secondly, the EU example was also related to providing help 
and empowering others to take part in the Council’s work.  
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However, even if the EU was perceived as an influential actor at the HRC, its capabilities to change 
others were seen limited. For example, the EU was not seen as a leader with many followers. The 
EU’s possibility to lead was seen to be restricted, for example, by the topic, external environment and 
by many HRC hard-liners. One important aspect that was seen to decrease EU possibilities to 
influence others at the Council was the EU’s incoherence. Interestingly, important differences were 
drawn between the EU and other powers, most notably the US. The EU and the US were seen as 
important allies, who may still differ in many respects. Such differences would be central for the EU’s 
image as a normative power. As a conclusion, the unofficial EU self-image seemed to majorly support 
the official image expressed in EU documents. Despite the rather positive self-image of the EU at the 
HRC, interviewees also underlined realistic expectations of what really can be achieved at the HRC. 
The EU’s developed human rights culture might not be particularly attractive to those countries with 
poorly developed human rights cultures798 or to more distant geographical areas with different norm 
interpretations and without possible EU membership promises799. Hence, the EU’s abilities to shape 
the international human rights norms as a normative power were considered to be limited. 
 
As a conclusion, the EU’s self-perception at the HRC seems to be rather coherent and reflect different 
aspects of the normative power role. Even if the EU’s role concept would confirm the normative 
power image at least in some respects, this role also needs recognition from other actors. As 
Bengtsson and Elgström note, not all attempts at normative power projection will necessarily succeed; 
not all actors that want to be normative powers are seen as such by others800. The next two chapters 
aim to go beyond this self-perception by looking at the actual EU role performance at the HRC 
(chapter 6). Furthermore, the alter side of the EU’s role is studied in chapter 7 with the help of 
interviews among non-EU HRC participants. These aspects are able to bring important insights 
concerning the EU role at the HRC. These may also possibly shape the EU’s self-perception in the 
future. 
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6 The EU Role Performance at the UN Human Rights Council 
 
The concept of role performance refers to the policy behaviour of an actor in a particular context. 
Measurements of EU performance have become more prominent in EU studies, as scholars and 
politicians are increasingly interested in finding out how the EU has succeeded in different policy 
areas801. Role performance is a key factor in legitimating role claims, because the behaviour of an 
actor is assumed to reflect its role ambitions. However, role perceptions (ego and alter) do not 
necessarily correlate with role performance. This chapter studies EU performance at the HRC in light 
of its self-perception as a normative power. Despite high rhetoric and ambitions, the EU has had quite 
mixed performance records at different UN forums802. The EU’s performance also influences external 
perceptions and expectations. This chapter starts by discussing the concept of performance and its 
different elements. After that the EU’s performance at the HRC is examined by looking at its 
relevance, effectiveness, resource viability, and efficiency. The chapter concludes by assessing the 
EU’s performance from the perspective of its normative power self-image. 
 
Before the EU’s role performance can be evaluated, some clarifications are necessary. Performance 
assessments may have high political relevance, but at the same time it is difficult to make them. The 
EU’s performance at the HRC is preconditioned by UN rules and practices, as section 4.2 noted. The 
EU is not a full member of the UN, and as a consequence, both the EU delegation and EU member 
states are active in various HRC forums depending on who is allowed to speak. This chapter 
concentrates on evaluating “collective EU agency and output” at the HRC. Hence, it includes both 
EU activities, and the activities of EU member states. Assessing such a combination is not without 
its problems. As Blavoukos and Bourantonis mention, the relationship between the EU and its 
member states is not always symbiotic and national contributions may sometimes function potentially 
in an antagonistic way to those of the  EU803. The representational questions have created tensions 
and the EU is not self-evidently able to represent and negotiate on behalf of the member states. This 
observation is relevant in the case of the Human Rights Council, where despite a high level of EU 
unity, member states also use their individual voices to promote national priorities and objectives. 
Even if cooperation is working well, there are some uncertainties in this relationship. Special attention 
is paid to those cases where the EU has not been able to agree on promoting a unified message.  
 
6.1 How to Evaluate EU Performance? 
 
The good performance of an organization is growingly considered as a path to its legitimacy, 
especially in the sense that the organization produces favourable or optimal outcomes in the eyes of 
its main stakeholders. So far, there is little consensus as to what constitutes a valid set of criteria for 
measuring performance. The EU actions are often one-sidedly considered to be either successes or 
                                                 
801 Previous studies have mainly assessed EU performance within single issue areas and across a wide spectrum of 
different organizations, see Jørgensen & Laatikainen (eds.) 2013, Oberthür et al. (eds.) 2013. 
802 As the UN consists of several diverse bodies, it is impossible to generalize organ- and issue-specific findings, see 
Blavoukos & Bourantonis 2011c, 732. 
803 Blavoukos & Bourantonis 2011a, 4. 
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failures in particular institutional contexts or policy areas804. However, in politics the concept of 
success is slippery and multidimensional. Most often it refers to goal attainment, but the analysis 
should also include, for example, possible costs to the policy-maker and for the targets of these 
policies. Secondly, not all goals have equal value.805 On some occasions it can be rather easy to be 
successful, while in others even the achievement of minor goals might mean great success. 
Importantly, performance evaluations are highly dependent on who makes them. Actors themselves 
are keen to represent their successes and generally promote more positive self-evaluations. All this 
suggests that there needs to be more explicit criteria for evaluating EU performance at the HRC.  
 
When EU performance in international organizations (IOs) is considered, Jørgensen underlines the 
difference between questions concerning EU being and doing806. The EU is increasingly present and 
an active player in many IOs, even if it has been difficult for the EU to convince third parties to give 
support for the EU’s enhanced status or participation rights. The EU’s participation is also challenged 
internally as member states are not always willing to give their powers to the EU. From the 
perspective of performance, it is important to evaluate EU being, because one of the major aims of 
the Lisbon treaty was to increase EU visibility and presence in global forums. Hence, a growing EU 
presence in international organizations and negotiations can already be considered a sign of good 
performance. Being also refers to a less instrumental attitude towards international institutions, and 
that is why it is a relevant aspect of EU role performance as a normative power. The EU would not 
only support IOs because of its own interests, but it would notice the internal value of multilateral 
working methods. Secondly, the normative power role underlines being as a passive form of norm 
diffusion; the mere physical presence of the EU in third states or in different institutions may cause 
norm changes in others807. Hence, analysing EU being at the HRC through the concept of relevance 
is important for the purposes of this thesis. 
 
Another important distinction can be made between evaluating diplomatic processes and following 
outcomes. Performance evaluations often point predominantly at goal achievement, which can also 
prove the effectiveness of an actor. However, this may lead to distorted conclusions; goal 
achievement may be an inappropriate measure, for example, when the concrete goals are not known 
or consist of multiple different aims. According to Gutner and Thompson, the more process-related 
aspects of performance, such as the effort, efficiency, and skill by which goals are pursued, should 
be better taken into account in the analysis of performance808. In multilateral negotiations the direct 
outcomes are seldom the most interesting achievements, as there may be other important aims during 
the process. It may also be difficult to determine what the more precise achievements of particular 
negotiations are, or demonstrate causal links between specific actors and outcomes, as multilateral 
negotiations often end up with package deals. Even if goal achievement is related to successful 
processes, process performance does not always translate into outcome performance.809 Sometimes 
the actor may have too unrealistic objectives for the given framework. Negotiation processes and 
                                                 
804 One illustrative and even provocative example is FIIA report 2010/23 titled Why the EU fails? Learning from past 
experiences to succeed better next time. 
805 Baldwin 2000, 172–174. 
806 Jørgensen 2009, 4 and Jørgensen 2013, 88. 
807 Manners 2006d, 76. 
808 Gutner & Thompson 2013, 58. 
809 Gutner & Thompson 2013, 62-63. 
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informal meetings can serve also other important functions, such as informing other actors, 
converging views or building bridges. In a similar sense, goals may also be too easy to achieve, and 
the actor may perform well even if its efforts are only moderate. Furthermore, short-term gains should 
not be exaggerated. As the normative power is assumed to work “like water on stone, not like napalm 
in the morning”810 the focus should be on the longer-term effects of EU action. Quite easily the more 
distant objectives are excluded from the performance analysis811. From the normative power 
perspective, EU goals may also be related to assisting different institutions to work properly.  
 
In the following, EU performance is studied by concentrating on four elements identified by 
Jørgensen, Oberthür and Shahin: 
1) relevance: the ability of an organization to meet the needs and gain the support of its priority 
stakeholders in the past, present and future 
2) effectiveness: the extent to which an organization is able to fulfil its goals 
3) financial or resource viability: the ability of an organization to raise the funds, personnel etc. 
required to meet its functional requirements in the short, medium and long term 
4) efficiency: a ratio reflecting a comparison of outputs accomplished to the costs incurred 
therefor.812 
This framework is beneficial as it enables the evaluation of both EU being and doing. If these four 
aspects are considered, it can be noticed that effectiveness is more concerned about outcomes, while 
the other three elements focus more precisely on the policy processes. First, relevance points to the 
recognition of the EU as an actor at the HRC. The EU must be first recognized to carry relevance 
before it can adopt more specific roles. Achieving relevance at the HRC is by no means self-evident 
in the case of the EU. This arena is primarily created for individual states. That is why this first focus 
on EU relevance is essential for this thesis. Secondly, EU effectiveness as goal achievement is 
important as it is often related to the EU’s output legitimacy. In other words, the EU may legitimize 
itself by producing good or beneficial outcomes. Thirdly, the EU ability to raise funds or personnel 
in relation to HRC functions is an important aspect of its performance and may also tell how serious 
the EU is with the HRC. Finally, the efficiency of the EU is something that the new EU approach to 
human rights is underlining; the EU aspires to become a more efficient actor, especially in multilateral 
fora. In this respect efficiency at the HRC has major importance for the EU’s aims. 
 
6.2 The Relevance of the EU 
 
A precondition for EU performance is its relevance for different stakeholders; the EU needs to be 
recognized as a relevant performing organization. If the EU is not seen as a relevant participant in the 
HRC context, it is not even possible to talk about EU performance. EU relevance is related to its 
unity, representation and delegation, as well as to coordination of EU positions. As these aspects are 
important EU objectives, the role of relevance needs to be raised in performance evaluations 
alongside considerations of its effectiveness813. As the EU is variably noticed in different IOs, its 
relevance can by no means be taken for granted. Whether the EU is considered relevant by its main 
                                                 
810 Manners 2009c. 
811 Jørgensen 2013, 92. 
812 Jørgensen et al 2011, 603. 
813 Jørgensen et al. 2011, 601. 
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stakeholders, the EU member states, and its external partners needs to be studied. Division can be 
made between internal and external EU relevance. If the EU aims to be relevant for its member states, 
the coordinated EU position must have some added value that motivates member states to work 
collectively. As there is high level of agreement on human rights issues, member states have agreed 
to work together, and EU cooperation has a legal basis. However, behind the unified façade, the 
relevance of the EU dimension varies, as well as perceptions of how legitimate actors EU institutions 
and leaders are. Furthermore, the EU also needs recognition from several external actors, such as 
states and organizations working with it. This section evaluates the internal and external relevance of 
the EU with the help of participant interviews814. Evaluations of internal EU relevance are based on 
23 interviews conducted among EU member states and EU delegation members, which were 
described in more detail in chapter five. External relevance of the EU is outlined through 40 
interviews with several non-EU interviewees, such as other HRC member states delegates, 
representatives of human rights organizations, and persons working at the UN secretariat (HRC 
relevant sections)815. The focus is on three main aspects of relevance; overall relevance of the EU 
dimension at the HRC (EU presence), the more particular relevance of the EU delegation vis-á-vis 
member states, and on the substantial relevance of the EU message. 
 
Internal relevance 
 
The EU member states are the most evident stakeholders of common EU positions. Apart from EU 
member states, there are several other possible internal parties816 for whom the EU dimension has 
relevance. However, the focus is on EU member states (governments) and EU representatives’ 
perceptions of EU relevance. According to previous studies, the overall relevance of the EU for its 
member states in international organizations has increased over the past two decades817. EU unity is 
a political objective and this unity is easier to achieve in human rights issues, where member states 
are highly united818. The collective EU action seldom contests important national priorities, but adds 
to the work of EUMS819. However, it is also likely that the relevance of the EU dimension varies for 
its member states in the UN context. For example, France and the UK already have a strong status at 
the UN as permanent members of the Security Council, and this fact is reflected in their more reserved 
attitudes towards collective EU action820. Some EU countries have close relations to their former 
colonies, which affect their willingness and abilities to influence outside the EU framework. Thirdly, 
for some EU members, the promotion of human rights forms an important foreign policy goal, and 
they may have strong domestic pressures to work individually in particular issues. Some EU states 
without any specific ambitions at the HRC may be quite happy going with the “EU flow”821. In 
general, much depends on the issues at stake, and how EU coordination works.  
                                                 
814 For lists of interviews, see appendices 1 and 2. 
815 The non-EU interviewees are better introduced in sections 7.2 and 7.3.  
816 For example, different interest groups, civil society organizations and parties who are not represented in government. 
817 Jørgensen et al 2011, 599. 
818 Outlined in EU human rights strategy 2012. 
819 In the SC, the relevance of the EU for its member states is much more limited, because important national interests 
are in question Blavoukos & Bourantonis 2011c. 
820 The more individual approach of the UK at the HRC was mentioned in many EU interviews (3, 6, 8, 11, 13, 14, 21). 
On the other hand, the more general critical British attitude towards the EU also has relevance here. 
821 Some interviewees said that particular EUMS have taken more passive role and lean too much on the work of EU 
delegation (EU interviews 3, 15).  
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The first important question considering internal relevance is how internal stakeholders perceive EU 
cooperation; do they see the EU dimension as necessary and able to answer to their needs and 
objectives? Generally, member states perceive the UN as a forum for both EU and national 
diplomacy. However, the EU dimension is considered relevant by all the interviewees. This is because 
the influence of the EU at the HRC is seen to depend on active EU cooperation. Collectively, the EU 
is seen to have a huge amount of expertise, relations and resources822, which makes the EU an 
important actor. Also, formal and informal information exchanges and burden sharing are mentioned 
to be beneficial823. After the Lisbon treaty, EU coordination has been strengthened and streamlined 
in Geneva, and member states seem to accept the EU’s working culture and the rule of 
compromises824. However, it was also mentioned how EU unity is at times almost an obsession for 
some parties. According to some interviewees, it would not be too serious to have diverging EU 
opinions, as other actors also deliver less unified messages at the HRC.825 The need for EU unity 
could be questioned if common positions are objected to by only one EU member, or if they represent 
mere watered down positions towards specific human rights questions826. The relevance of the EU 
dimension could also decrease if it constrains the promotion of stronger EUMS human rights 
positions827. Despite unity, the EUMS also aspire to maintain their national profiles and objectives at 
the HRC. Hence, EU relevance also depends on how well the EU succeeds in supporting and 
uploading member states’ priorities into its collective positions. One obvious problem in this respect 
is that member states are not considered to be equal in EU coordination by some member states. Big 
member states were mentioned in many interviews as predominant players with better resources and 
abilities to make initiatives and burden share. This makes them privileged inside the EU cooperation 
and in relation to the EU-delegation.828 Their status also increases because some external actors prefer 
to approach the EU through the ambassadors of big EU member states829. It was also noted how the 
position of EUMS is dependent on its HRC priority list, resources, and own ambition to work on 
specific issues830. One interviewee mentioned how the division of power between the EU-delegation 
and national interest is a practical issue where pragmatism wins831. The balance between member 
states was also considered to be guaranteed because common positions must be acceptable for all 
EUMS and even smaller members are able to bloc them832.  
 
The second important issue when considering EU relevance is how member states perceive the role 
and relevance of the new EU-delegation in Geneva. The status and work of the EU delegation clearly 
divided opinions among the interviewees. The smaller member states found its work highly beneficial 
and it was applauded for following all issues, preparing statements, and providing help for missions 
with limited capacities.833 The EU delegation was also considered to be the possible driving force 
                                                 
822 EU interviews 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 20, 21. 
823 EU interviews 5, 6, 9, 12, 14, 20, 22, 23. 
824 EU interviews 3, 4, 7, 9, 13, 18. 
825 EU interviews 12, 15, 19. 
826 EU interviews 3, 6, 13, 15, 17, 19. 
827 EU interviews 1, 2, 3, 10. 
828 EU interviews 3, 5, 10, 11, 13, 16, 20. 
829 EU interviews 3, 12. 
830 EU interviews 4, 8, 11, 13, 20. 
831 EU interview 20. 
832 EU interviews 3, 4, 5, 8. 
833 EU interviews 5, 7, 9, 12, 20, 21. 
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behind EU action in Geneva, as it can more easily take the initiative on sensitive issues, which MS 
are reluctant to drive forward834. The permanent presidency of the EU delegation was also considered 
to create stability and institutional memory, which was seen as a clear advantage when compared 
with the former system835. However, some representatives thought that the delegation brings less to 
the HRC than individual member states. According to these views, the EU would be more influential 
if it would work mainly through member states836. Much was considered to depend on the personal 
capacities of EU diplomats and their ability to earn their position837. The crucial question was how 
the EEAS personnel conceived their role in Geneva; do they assist member states or do they serve an 
independent Brussels agenda838? It was also mentioned that the EU delegation is a rather new actor 
in the Geneva context. This means that the EU personnel do not necessarily have as much experience 
of multilateral human rights settings.839 Despite criticism, one interviewee mentioned how difficult a 
position the EU delegation has; member states, Brussels and external actors want to criticize them840. 
This is related to contradictory EEAS mandates; it is expected to coordinate, provide leadership, and 
develop new ideas and policy entrepreneurship841. The relevance of the EU-delegation, but also the 
relevance of other EU actors who may visit Geneva842, for individual member states seems to depend 
on their more general attitudes; how well the EU agenda fits their national objectives, how important 
they find human rights questions in foreign policy, as well as how good resources they have in 
Geneva.  
 
Thirdly, the substantial relevance of the EU message was considered to be high among EU actors. 
The EU was perceived as a relevant defender of the universality of human rights and different human 
rights principles against those actors who aim to undermine them843. EU action was seen as important, 
for example, in balancing attempts to promote so called traditional values and related narrow family 
concepts844. The substantial relevance of the EU message was seen to be high especially in the case 
of political and civil rights, and in specific country cases845. However, several interviewees 
acknowledged that the EU message does not necessarily carry relevance for the majority in the 
Council. According to one interviewee, the EU is always seen as part of the rich West and it is not 
seen to care about the grievances of the developing world846. According to some interviewees, the 
EU message would be more relevant if it could better accommodate questions of economic, social 
and cultural rights, and rapidly take into account changes in the external environment847. 
                                                 
834 EU interviews 7, 8, 18, 21. 
835 EU interviews 2, 4, 10, 11. 
836 EU interviews 3, 12, 14, 15. 
837 EU interviews 3, 4, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 21. 
838 EU interviews 3, 12, 16, 20. 
839 EU interviews 11, 12, 15, 17, 22. It was also mentioned to be an important goal to learn the skills and methods of 
previous successful presidencies and adopt them to the working culture of the EU-delegation (EU interviews 17,18).   
840 EU interview 12. 
841 Balfour & Raik 2013, 13. 
842 For example EU High Representative and EU Special Representative for Human Rights. Three interviewees 
criticized that human rights have not been a priority for the High Representative (EU interviews 3, 6, 15). On the 
contrary the role of the Special Representative was positively evaluated in some interviews (EU interviews 9, 11).  
843 EU interviews 2, 4, 7, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 20, 21, 23. 
844 EU interviews 2, 4, 7, 14. 
845 Country cases mentioned were Myanmar, DRC and Syria. EU interviews 2, 5, 9, 11, 23. 
846 EU interview 3. 
847 EU interviews 3, 4, 6, 10, 12, 20. 
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External relevance 
 
Studying the external relevance of the EU is also highly important. In the HRC there are different 
types of possible external stakeholders, and for some of them the EU might be more relevant for 
specific reasons, while others may not consider the EU as a relevant performing organization at all. 
It should be acknowledged that external stakeholders may look at EU relevance in different terms and 
ask different questions than EU member states848. The EU relevance for other states, human rights 
organizations, regional actors and the UN secretary is evaluated on the basis of 40 interviews 
conducted in Geneva849. Here the focus is on three different aspects of relevance. First, for external 
others EU relevance is closely related to its presence; is the EU generally considered a visible and 
active participant in HRC debates? Secondly, how is EU representation perceived externally? What 
is the role of EU-delegation vis-á-vis member states; does it merely reflect the accumulated views of 
(some of) its members? Relevance is also related to EU authority (or legal personality) to conduct 
negotiations and sign agreements with third parties. The last interesting aspect of relevance is 
associated with the relevance of the EU message; does the EU really have something to say at the 
HRC? 
 
In general, external others recognize the EU as a relevant and visible actor at the HRC. It was 
mentioned how the EU is an active participant in all debates850. In the eyes of others, EU relevance 
is based on its collective voice and active cooperation. In the HRC there is an EU seat and nameplate, 
it is possible to study EU positions in advance, and they have alignment procedures for partners851. 
The EU is also relevant because it forms a big bloc of countries, which third parties are willing to get 
on board852. The EU’s internal structure was also mentioned to be a clear advantage for the EU, as 
the amount of work in the HRC has steadily increased. One delegation is unable to deal with all issues, 
and the EU can share responsibilities and always be present through its members853. However, EU 
relevance was also questioned, because the EU lacks voting rights, and its members have only 7-9 
votes in total854. It was also noted that the EU has authority to act only when member states agree; 
without internal agreement, there is no EU dimension855. UK, France and Germany were mentioned 
in many interviews as active EU leaders, mainly because of their Security Council membership, 
economic resources and special relations with many countries856. However, these countries were also 
seen as political players, whose human rights interests are often mixed with economic and political 
concerns857. Bigger EU countries were also seen to endanger the internal EU democracy by 
dominating the agenda858. The human rights policies of some EU countries, such as the Nordic 
                                                 
848 Jørgensen 2013, 94. 
849 See appendix 2 for states and organizations interviewed for this thesis. 
850 External interviews 10, 17, 18, 26, 31, 34, 35, 40. 
851 External interviews 27, 30. 
852 External interviews 4, 19, 37. 
853 External interview 29. 
854 External interviews 14, 15, 22, 25, 32. When compared with other blocs, such as the OIC (with 52 members), this 
amount is relatively small. 
855 External interviews 10, 19, 28, 39. 
856 External interviews 7, 9, 12, 13, 17, 20, 26, 35. 
857 External interviews 7, 16, 21. 
858 External interviews 28, 29.  
109 
 
countries, the Netherlands, Ireland and Austria were mentioned to be constructive and dialogical859. 
As a conclusion, both the EU and EUMS seem to have high external relevance in the HRC. 
 
Most of the EU’s others perceived the EU as a united actor in the HRC. The relevance of the EU-
delegation and individual EU member states (also in the role of rotating EU presidencies) for external 
actors were studied. The relevance of the EU-delegation appeared to be issue-dependent, related to 
the question under work. Most of the interviewees worked with both and noticed the importance of 
taking into account both. However, for smaller states, former colonies and human rights 
organizations, individual member states were more relevant partners than the EU-delegation860. For 
some, it is still more natural to work through member states’ ambassadors because of personal ties861. 
External actors find it difficult to understand the EU’s burden-sharing practices, and they are often 
confused about multiple EU actors and voices at the HRC862. Some interviewees also mentioned how 
they seek contact with big EUMS ambassadors when they really want to influence the EU, or 
safeguard their important interests863. However, important EU partners864 were increasingly working 
with the EU-delegation rather than with individual members865. The increased role of the EU-
delegation was noted by many interviewees, and this change was considered meaningful and 
positive866. Previous rotating EU presidencies had varied a lot in their capacities and visibility867. The 
EU delegation was seen to bring continuity and stability to EU representation868. It was also seen as 
a constructive and less coercive negotiation partner that listens to others869. The EU delegation can 
present clear positions and mediate between member state positions870. The external relevance of the 
EU-delegation is also high because it invites different partners871 to cooperation meetings and informs 
about EU priorities872. This suggests that the external relevance of the EU varies depending, for 
example, on specific issues, history and bilateral relations. 
 
When the relevance of EU message is considered, opinions are diverse. Even if the EU was mainly 
considered influential because of its common voice, it was also noted that this view often presents 
the lowest common denominator between the member states873. The demands of EU unity may work 
against the cause of human rights, as EU statements might not have much to say. One interviewee 
                                                 
859 External interviews 3, 6, 9, 12, 16, 20, 28, 34. Sometimes I believe that interviewees did not really see Norway as a 
non-EU country, even if it drives strong and individual policy at the HRC. 
860 External interviews 8, 10, 12, 13, 16, 19, 22, 24, 35, 39. 
861 External interview 13. 
862 External interviews 7, 9, 14, 17, 18, 21, 25, 36. 
863 External interviews 24, 27. 
864 The actor’s importance is related here, for example, to status as a EU ally is some important issue, to regional 
relevance, EU candidacy/neighbourhood status or just to close or newly created relations. 
865 External interviews 6, 9, 18, 27, 30. 
866 External interviews 8, 15, 16, 20, 21, 23, 26, 27, 30, 38. 
867 External interviews 7, 9, 12, 18, 21, 24, 26. 
868 External interview 9. 
869 External interviews 4, 38. 
870 External interviews 6, 20, 25. 
871 Individual countries, strategic partners, neighbourhood countries, regional organizations, human rights organizations, 
external interviews 23, 28, 31, 32, 34, 39. 
872 Even if some civil society partners complained that these meetings merely consist of reading the priority lists of 
parties without any real discussion.   
873 External interviews 7, 8, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 24, 27, 28. 
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wondered why the EU even has to stand up if it really has nothing to say874. Many human rights 
organizations criticized the EU because of its uninspiring positions. This is also why outsiders did 
not understand the EU obsession with unity. In the eyes of others, acting through several individual 
voices could present a more successful strategy for the EU at the HRC875. United EU positions were 
also considered to make the EU a less flexible partner876. It was mentioned that EU positions are 
always well prepared, and the EU takes care of justifying its positions and policy consequences for 
others877. The EU message was seen to carry relevance as it strongly points to human rights 
violations878. Not surprisingly, the relevance of the EU message was more positively evaluated among 
those countries and organizations, which mainly share EU values, while EU opponents had far more 
negative views of it. A more detailed perception of the relevance of the EU message will be provided 
in chapter seven, which studies the external perceptions of the EU role at the HRC.  
 
6.3 EU Effectiveness in the HRC 
 
EU effectiveness deals with the EU’s ability to achieve its outcomes at the HRC. There are various 
ways to approach actor effectiveness879. First of all, the EU’s internal effectiveness refers to the EU’s 
ability to stay united and deliver common EU positions. Internal effectiveness is closely related to 
internal relevance; when the EU member states find the EU dimension relevant, they are also likely 
to act in unity. Secondly, the external effectiveness of the EU, namely the EU’s ability to reach its 
objectives and influence other HRC participants, is often seen as being related to its internal 
effectiveness. A third, and more general feature of effectiveness is the EU’s ability to contribute to 
the effectiveness of the HRC. According to the EU’s self-image, the EU is an important defender and 
contributor to the UN. The EU’s focus on effective multilateralism also suggests that an important 
EU objective is to improve the working of international institutions. This section will evaluate these 
three aspects of EU effectiveness by using various measures suggested by the author. 
 
The Internal Effectiveness of the EU 
 
Important aspect of EU actor capability is the existence of commonly accepted goals and the ability 
to mobilize instruments to meet these goals. Already from the 1990s, EU member states have agreed 
to speak with one voice at the UN human rights fora, and nowadays EU coordination is a normal way 
to proceed. Hence, the EU is generally perceived to be an internally highly effective actor in this 
particular UN body. The internal effectiveness of the EU can be evaluated by looking at different 
indicators; first of all the amount of common EU statements and interventions delivered at the HRC 
demonstrates the EU presence. Secondly, common EU priorities at the HRC can be promoted through 
resolutions, driven by EU-delegation or by the rotating presidency. EU unity during the voting is the 
third possible way to evaluate internal effectiveness. These three indicators, as well as their use and 
relevance for evaluating EU performance, are studied separately. 
                                                 
874 External interview 27. 
875 External interviews 5, 18, 21, 33, 37, 38, 40. 
876 External interviews 5, 9, 14, 28, 36, 37. 
877 External interview 37. 
878 External interviews 30, 32. 
879 Laatikainen and Smith have described four different aspects to effectiveness in EU-UN relations. My views closely 
follow their classification, see Laatikainen & Smith 2006, 9-10. 
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Table 3: EU statements and interventions during general sessions of the HRC (statements made 
on behalf of the EU by EU-delegation or by rotating presidency) 
year/ 
session number 
2006
/1-3 
2007/
4-6 
2008
/7-9 
2009/
10-12 
2010/
13-15 
2011/
16-18 
2012/
19-21 
2013/
22-24 
2014/
25-27 
EU statements/ 
interventions  
55 70 96 80 74 73 80 81 91 
Information collected from the HRC extranet and from the EU-delegation’s homepage. 
 
Table three shows the number of EU statements and interventions delivered at the HRC during its 
first 27 regular sessions. Even without making comparisons to other actors, this table demonstrates 
that the EU is a present and relevant player at the HRC, actively taking actively in its work. The EU 
output regarding common statements has also steadily increased, which can be explained by the 
increased number of issues and resolution discussed at the HRC. However, the overall “EU 
contribution”, also including statements made by the individual EU states, would look pretty 
different. One example can illustrate this point; during the 27th session of the HRC, EU member states 
delivered 215 oral statements individually880. Compared to 27 statements delivered on behalf of the 
EU in this particular session, the number is almost tenfold. It further supports the image of the EU as 
a visible and present voice at the HRC. This is because the EU states are committed to delivering 
“one message with many voices” and according to EU rules, the EU speaks first and only after that 
individual EUMS by adding their own comments if necessary. The message remains the same, 
irrespective who speaks, and all EU speakers further increase its relevance. Originally, the idea was 
to give the EU position certain leverage, but member states have not truly followed this practice. It 
has even been claimed that the one voice approach has caused some loss of EU influence. 
  
What makes the evaluation of EU output even more challenging is the option to use the voices of 
individual EU member states to decrease the bloc mentality in the HRC. Hence, a decrease in the 
level of collective EU efforts would not necessarily mean decreasing output; it would just mean 
delivering it through different means. It is also very difficult to assess how much EU cooperation can 
actually be found behind EUMS activities. Even if the EU states most often support each other’s 
resolutions, these are not always the result of collective diplomatic processes881. What needs to be 
noted as well is that EU states may build external coalitions. For example, the Nordic countries have 
reactivated themselves in the Council by delivering common speeches. Here the cooperation includes 
EU states, but also non-EU parties (Norway & Iceland).882 This is also the case in other speeches or 
resolutions promoted by EU states on behalf of larger group of states883. A few EU states can work 
together to build cross-regional alliances around some resolution. These examples raise interesting 
questions about how the EU output should be evaluated. If we define EU output strictly by referring 
                                                 
880 Here the collective EU statements and statements made on behalf of the EU are excluded. Speeches were counted 
from the HRC extranet archives. 
881 Smith K. 2010, 232. 
882 See for example 27th regular session, 21st meeting, Denmark speaks on behalf of Nordic countries. 
883 See for example 27th regular session, 10th meeting, Germany speaks on behalf of Austria, Brazil, Germany, 
Liechtenstein, Mexico, Norway and Switzerland.  
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only to those occasions where cooperation includes all EU states but only EU states, these cases must 
be excluded. In a similar sense, statements without one or two EUMS would not count as EU outputs. 
This is despite the fact that the resulting resolutions would still clearly be a result of a collective 
diplomatic process, even if it, in the end, could not be delivered on behalf of the entire EU.  
 
Table 4: Human Rights Council resolutions 2006-2014, EU/EUMS sponsored resolutions 
Year/session adopted 
resolutions  
votings EU 
resolutions 
EUMS resolutions 
2014/27 (September) 32  8 0 14 
26 (June) 32 9 1 12 
25 (March) 38 15 4 11 
2013/24 (September) 35  7 0 22 
23 (June) 26 7 1 7 
22 (March) 34 15 3 9 
2012/21 (September) 33  8 0 8 
20 (June) 22 4 1 5 
19 (March) 39 14 6 13 
2011/18 (September) 28  7 0 8 
17 (June) 25 8 0 8 
16 (March) 36 13 5 8 
2010/15 (September) 28  8 0 8 
14 (June) 16 3 1 4 
13 (March) 27 8 3 6 
2009/12 (September) 28  5 - - 
11 (June) 12 3 1 5 
10 (March) 33 13 1 12 
2008/9 (September) 19   3 0 
8 (June) 14  1 7 
7 (March) 36  2 8 
2007/6 (September) 37  2 15 
5 (June) 2  0 1 
4 (March) 10  2 1 
2006/3 (September) 4   2 0 
2 (June) 5  5 3 
1 (March) 5  0 2 
Collected from the HRC extranet archives and from the EU annual reports on human rights. 
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The EU member states also have the responsibility for carrying many resolutions, because of history, 
colonial ties, or because their interest to work on specific themes. Table four shows the number of 
EU and member states sponsored resolutions at the HRC. The EU member states have been sponsors 
in around a third of all HRC resolutions. However, the resolutions may have cross-regional 
sponsorship, which makes the evaluation of EU output challenging. The EU has sponsored fairly few 
resolutions collectively and EUMS resolutions are far more common. When compared with other 
regional and political groups, for example, the African group has been more active in this respect, 
sponsoring 14 resolutions in 2014 and 16 in 2013884. The EU has collectively sponsored resolutions 
on Belarus, North Korea, Myanmar and freedom of religion/belief (FoRB). The resolution on the 
rights of the child is traditionally sponsored together with Latin American countries.885  
 
Hence, the collective EU resolutions deal with specific countries, even if previous studies have 
claimed that the EU avoids country cases because they may face intense opposition886. This may also 
explain why these resolutions are promoted collectively. The EU has also increasingly worked in 
cooperation with other HRC members. For example, the resolution on North Korea is sponsored 
together with Japan. Table 4 demonstrates how the number of adopted resolutions has increased; in 
2007 the total amount of adopted resolution was 49, while in 2014 it was already 102. After 2011, it 
has become more common to table broad, cross-regional resolutions887, as these are more likely to 
succeed. The leadership of the resolutions has also been more diversified as new countries have 
shown increased interest towards HRC work. For example, Arab and African countries have taken 
leadership in many initiatives concerning countries in their own regions. Formerly country-specific 
resolutions were mainly initiated by the West, and principally rejected by the South888. Resolutions 
can be sponsored in varying ways. The main sponsorship is the most relevant as they submit 
resolutions and take responsibility for leading negotiations. Countries can also co-sponsor resolutions 
and the main sponsors aim to achieve as many co-sponsors as possible. However, the main sponsor 
can also block any attempts to redefine the resolution by collecting many supporters for the original 
draft. The third possibility is to work as an additional sponsor for a resolution, which means that the 
country can later on confirm its support for a particular resolution. The EU always aims to support or 
oppose resolutions consistently as a group.  
 
Table four also demonstrates how many times the voting procedure has been used in the adoption of 
resolutions. The majority of HRC resolutions are accepted without voting, as the idea is to work in 
consensus. Unsuccessful initiatives are often withdrawn already before the voting if they do not 
receive enough support. Because of this, it is interesting to speculate why the HRC ends up voting in 
a specific case. In general, it seems that the composition of the Council influences voting, as some of 
its members are always adopting “hardliner” positions889. Few countries also consistently object to 
                                                 
884 African group sponsored resolutions in the following way in 2014; 25th session 5 resolutions, 26th session 3 
resolutions (1 withdrawn) and 27th session 6 resolutions. In 2013 the figures were; 22nd session 4, 23rd session 5 and 24th 
session 7. 
885 The sponsorship of resolutions on behalf of a larger group has to do with topics under consideration, but it may also 
reveal wider political (dis)agreements and the diminishing ability to form coalitions. For example, the Organization for 
Islamic Cooperation (OIC) has been able to sponsor only resolutions condemning Israel after the Arab Spring. 
886 Smith K. 2010, 238 and 232. 
887 Rathgeber 2013, 5. 
888 Wouters & Meuwissen 2013, 12. 
889 For example the US. 
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the initiatives of Western states on the basis of political reasons890. The EU has also blocked many 
initiatives promoted by particular states. This is, for example, the case if EU revisions to the draft 
resolutions are not accepted. In those cases the voting procedure can be used as a threat towards the 
main sponsor of the resolution891. Much also depends on issues that are on the table; some issues and 
country resolutions are more controversial on cultural grounds than others. As resolutions are mainly 
run following the voluntary annual calendar of resolutions after the 2011 review, particular 
resolutions are always considered in specific sessions to balance the work of the HRC. Thus this also 
explains the increased amount of voting in the end of March sessions; more controversial resolutions 
are under work then892. Hence, whether the EU sponsored resolutions end up being voted on, depends 
on their topic and the EU’s ability to sell the issue for others. For example, the EU country resolutions 
are often put under vote (North Korea, Belarus, Iran), while some thematic issues can be easier (rights 
of the child). In general, the EU is willing to avoid voting and works in advance to negotiate 
acceptable outcomes. This is highly rational in the sense that the EU countries are not likely to win 
votes from their minority position. According to one EU interviewee, voting can already be 
considered a sign of EU failure. A real sign of success is how few times the EU has had to vote against 
some text.893  
 
In the Human Rights Council, the EU member states aim to vote in a cohesive manner, even if this is 
not compulsory. It needs to be noted that only those EU member states (usually 7-9 states) who serve 
as members of the HRC are able to vote. Wider EU disagreement is not necessarily apparent at the 
time of voting, because not all EU member states can express their opinions through this procedure. 
If there is no EU agreement on a particular issue, member states usually abstain in the voting process. 
The EU’s internal effectiveness and also its relevance are considered as being reflected in its voting 
records. In this respect, the EU has been internally highly united and effective, much more united 
than in the previous CHR894. Table 5 shows the EU split votes in 2006-2014 in adopted HRC 
resolutions, and reveals the topics where EU splits have occurred. The table also demonstrates that in 
the cases of splits, there are most often only one or two member states that do not follow the EU 
majority. However, even in these cases, member states do not often promote opposing positions, but 
either choose to be in favour or against while others abstain, or abstain when the EU majority adopts 
a stronger position. From the perspective of internal unity, the most difficult cases are those where 
member states adopt contrary positions during the voting (see for example resolutions 25/22, 13/9 
and 14/1 in table 5). Splits reflect the right of member states to follow their national positions, and it 
remains disputed how the occurring splits influence the EU image. Often EU unity is perceived to be 
an important precondition for increased effectiveness. Externally the question is not as clear, as EU 
diversity may also be perceived positively. Of course, if the EU rule is to work together, it is not fair 
to break the consistency. In the longer run, this kind of behaviour could also be detrimental for the 
atmosphere in EU cooperation meetings. However, Gowan and Brantner notice that if there have been 
                                                 
890 For example Cuba, Venezuela and Russia. 
891 EU interview 14. 
892 See HRC voluntary annual calendar for thematic resolutions 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session24/Documents/CalendarHRCThematicResolutions.
pdf  
893 EU interview 14. 
894 For example in 1990 and in 1997 the percentage of split votes was more than 40%, see Smith K. 2006a, 124. 
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European splits on individual crises, these have often been resolved rather quickly895. This fact 
supports the view that EU member states are internally highly effective and willing to cooperate and 
coordinate at the HRC. 
 
If the topics of EU disagreement are considered, table 5 shows more particular resolutions and their 
topics. It demonstrates how disagreements have been related mainly to the Israel-Palestine conflict 
(item 7) in the past. This finding is supported by previous research and by the interviews with EU 
experts. It is difficult to give any general explanations for these EU divisions, as there are several, 
even contradicting, explanations. Disagreements may be, for example, related to particular 
resolutions and their wordings, national preferences, and to the overall political atmosphere within 
the EU cooperation. For example, in the case of the Middle East, the EU member states have 
traditionally held different opinions towards the conflict and also their transatlantic relations have 
influenced the positions adopted. These two factors may explain to some extent the occurring 
differences. Only after 2012 have there been visible EU divisions in other issues as well. These 
include, for example, the right to development and peace, the rights of peasants, anti-terrorist 
measures, and the effects of the foreign debt on the enjoyment of human rights. These later EU 
differences may reflect the differing perspectives of EU member states towards the realization of 
economic and social rights, as some of them are more reluctant to adopt binding decisions with 
economic consequences. The EU member states may also disagree whether a particular initiative is 
properly prepared or includes relevant guidelines and measures in order to be supported896. However, 
there may also be other reasons for EU splits.  
 
One possible way of studying the reasons for EU disagreements is to look at the EU’s and member 
states’ explanations of votes delivered at the HRC. These statements reveal, for example, how some 
EU member states perceive particular human rights issues more as security concerns, and hence, 
better related to the UN Security Council agenda897. For example, in the case of the use of remotely 
piloted aircraft or armed drones (see 25/22 in table 5), the UK and France argued that this issue could 
not be discussed under the mandate of the HRC, whereas Ireland was supportive of such debate and 
further analysis on the question898. The EU majority abstained in the voting process. The EU splits in 
the case of action against racism are interesting. Most often different EU statements related to racism, 
xenophobia and all kinds of discrimination express a high degree of commitment and respect for the 
topic, and the legal basis of the EU to fight racism. However, the resolution on this topic (24/26) 
caused an EU split. The EU’s explanation of the vote in this case does not give any reason for such 
behaviour, as it only expresses EU agreement on this issue and its member states’ choice of abstention 
during the voting899. Hence, the vote against the resolution by the Czech Republic seemed to have 
been a surprise for the EU as well.   
 
 
                                                 
895 Gowan & Brantner 2011, 9. 
896 EU explanation of vote: Rights of peasants, HRC 26th session, 19.6. 2014. 
897 Especially France and the UK, who also have better possibilities to influence at the SC. 
898 UK Explanation of vote, Irish Explanation of vote: The use of remotely piloted aircraft or armed drones, HRC 25th 
session, 28.3. 2014. 
899 EU explanation of position: From rhetoric to reality: a global call for concrete action against racism, racial 
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, HRC 24th session, 19.9.2013. 
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Table 5: EU split votes in adopted resolutions at the HRC 2006-2014 
Year/HRC 
sessions 
EU splits/ 
voting 
times 
topic of resolution (resolution 
number) 
EU difference (majority/split) 
2014/25-27 5/32 effects of foreign debt on the 
enjoyment of human rights 
(27/30) 
right to peace (27/17) 
 
right to development (27/2) 
rights of peasants (26/26) 
 
use of remotely piloted aircraft 
in anti-terrorist attacks (25/22) 
Abstention/Czech,Germany 
against 
 
Against/Ireland,Italy, Romania 
abstaining  
In favour/UK abstaining 
Abstention/Czechs, Romania, 
UK against 
Abstention/France,UK against, 
Ireland in favour 
2013/22-24 3/28 action against racism (24/26) 
right to peace (23/16) 
report on Gaza Conflict (22/25) 
Abstention/Czechs against 
4 against/4abstaining 
In favour/Czechs abstaining  
2012/19-21 1/28 Israeli settlements (19/17) Abstention/Austria, Belgium 
in favour 
2011/16-18 3/26 Humanitarian flotilla in Israel 
(17/10) 
Gaza conflict (16/32) 
 
Humanitarian flotilla in Israel 
(16/20) 
In favour/Slovakia, Poland, 
Hungary abstaining 
Abstention/Slovakia,UK 
against 
In favour/Slovakia, Poland, 
Hungary abstaining  
2010/13-15 3/20 Israeli attacks on hum. boat 
convoy (14/1) 
 
Gaza conflict (13/9) 
 
 
HR violations by Israel (13/8) 
Abstention, Slovenia in 
favour/Italy and Netherlands 
against 
Against, Slovenia in favour/ 
UK, France, Belgium 
abstaining 
Against, Slovenia abstaining 
2009/10-12 1/25 HR violations in Gaza by Israel 
(10/19) 
Abstention/Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands against 
2006-
2008/1-9 
no splits   
Information collected from the Annual reports of the HRC and HRC Extranet. 
 
The EU’s External Effectiveness 
 
External effectiveness refers to an actor’s ability to achieve its objectives and influence other actors. 
Essential here is how much support the EU is capable of achieving, and to what extent it can be seen 
as able to shape the discourse at the HRC. In order to evaluate the EU’s external effectiveness, more 
117 
 
precise EU objectives need to be outlined. However, it is not always easy to see what the concrete 
goals of the EU are in a specific organization. The EU’s commitment to effective multilateralism and 
to the strengthening of the UN set the wider framework for the EU’s objectives in the HRC. More 
specific EU priorities in the UN human rights fora are stated by the Council annually900, a practice 
which was started in 2012. Table 6 introduces the main priorities of the EU at the UN human rights 
fora in 2012-2014, collected from the Council Conclusions. These topics are closely related to the 
EU’s more general external human rights policy goals. As the table shows, the number of country 
cases is well balanced with the number of thematic issues. The EU drives its objectives through HRC 
resolution initiatives, and in more informal side events. The EU’s success in achieving its goals is 
evaluated before and after each HRC session in internal EU meetings. Generally, the presented EU 
resolutions have always been accepted at the HRC, which shows high external effectiveness.   
 
Table 6: EU Priorities at the UN human rights fora 2012-2014 
Country cases Thematic issues 
Belarus 
Central African Republic 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
Eritrea 
Iran 
Libya 
Mali 
Myanmar/Burma 
North Korea 
South Sudan 
Sri Lanka 
Sudan 
Syria 
 
death penalty 
freedom of religion and belief 
rights of the child 
women’s rights 
gender equality 
freedom of opinion and expression 
(internet, journalists/bloggers) 
freedom of association and assembly 
civil society space 
torture 
LGBTI rights 
racism 
indigenous peoples 
persons with disabilities 
business and human rights 
economic, social and cultural rights 
democratic governance 
UN Special procedures, Universal Periodic 
Review, Treaty Body system 
private military and security companies 
Priorities are collected from the Council Conclusions on EU priorities 2012-2014. 
 
When these country cases are considered, it can be noticed that the EU mainly points to human rights 
situations in African and Asian countries, and most of them deal with serious human rights crises. 
The EU does not take up dubious human rights records of some other countries, such as Saudi Arabia 
and Bahrain, as these countries may have economic and strategic importance for the EU member 
states. The EU has also been incapable of dealing with some country cases, such as Egypt, Libya and 
                                                 
900 Council Conclusions on EU priorities at the UN Human Rights Fora 2014 (10.2.2014), 2013 (18.2.2013), 2012 
(27.2.2012). 
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Bahrain because of internal EU member state disagreements901. Secondly, for example Syria, Iran 
and North Korea are not exceptional in any way as these countries have been the concern of the global 
community for some time already. In the cases of Syria, Iran and Sri Lanka the sponsorship of country 
resolutions is shared with several countries, and individual EU member states are more active in the 
process902. Belarus seems to be the only “exceptional” country case on the EU list903. Only resolutions 
on Myanmar and Belarus remain solely in the hands of the EU. Overall, the EU list can be considered 
rather selective, as there are no country cases that would point to powerful countries, such as China, 
Russia, South Africa or the US. This would suggest that the EU sponsors only those resolutions that 
have a high probability of becoming accepted. 
 
The most urgent country cases are usually considered at the HRC Special sessions in which the EU 
has played an active role. In July 2015, there had been 23 special sessions, and the EU/EUMS had 
initiated eight of them904. It needs to be noted that individual EU states have been among co-initiators 
in fifteen special sessions, which again makes some difference. However, EU success in these 
sessions has varied if their outcomes are evaluated. The most problematic for the EU have been 
special sessions dealing with the Middle East conflict, which has been the topic of almost one third 
of these sessions905. The EU has expressed its wish to move the entire item 7 (Israel-Palestine conflict) 
into item 4, which considers country cases that demand the HRC’s attention. According to EU 
positions, this move would show that all human rights violations, regardless of the offending party, 
should be subjected to scrutiny and investigated in accordance with international standards906. The 
major problem is that many special sessions have been initiated by countries and organizations, and 
they have agendas and objectives highly different from the EU907. EU success in Special sessions has 
varied. Especially the 8th special session on the Democratic Republic of Congo and the 11th special 
session on Sri Lanka have been considered as EU failures, as the EU needed to compromise on the 
end results908.  
 
When the EU’s success in thematic issues is considered, the evaluation becomes more difficult. This 
is because in thematic issues the EU member states have more often taken the initiative, and it is not 
easy to see when they act solely in their national capacity. One recent example could be Ireland’s 
sponsorship of civil society space resolution909. Even if the topic is on the EU list of priorities, it is 
promoted as a national Irish initiative910. The problem also seems to be that there is no interest of 
                                                 
901 These cases were often mentioned in the interviews, for example in external interviews 8, 16, 31, 32. 
902 For example Sweden in the case of Iran. 
903 The EU sponsored this country resolution already in the previous CHR, but it was lost during its final years. 
904 EU initiated session on Darfur, Myanmar, Congo, Sri Lanka, Libya and three sessions on Syria. In the 19th special 
session on Syria there were also other initiators. 
905 Special sessions 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, 12 and 21 have considered the human rights situation in Gaza, Palestine, Israel and 
Lebanon. Initiators of the sessions include, for example, Tunisia, Group of Arab states, the OIC, Egypt, Pakistan, the 
African group, NAM, and Cuba. 
906 See for example EU Intervention: Interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights 
in the Palestine territories occupied since 1967, HRC 28th session, 23.3. 2015. 
907 Including for example Tunisia, Group of Arab states, the OIC, Egypt, Pakistan, the African group, the NAM, and 
Cuba. 
908 Basu 2012, 94-95.  
909 HRC 27th session, resolution 27/31. 
910 See the webpages of Ireland’s Department of foreign affairs and trade: https://www.dfa.ie/our-role-
policies/international-priorities/human-rights/ireland-and-the-human-rights-council/  
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promoting some good ideas as EU initiatives. According to an interviewee, sometimes member states 
want to “collect the points” and let the EU to take care of the more difficult cases911. Several human 
rights resolutions are run by individual EU countries on topics which cannot be found on the EU list. 
One example is the resolution concerning the right to safe drinking water and sanitation promoted by 
Germany and Spain. Usually, these member states’ initiatives are supported by other EU member 
states. For example, this resolution is supported by 27 EUMS, only excluding the UK. Hence, there 
is cooperation between the member states, even when internal agreement and hence, a common EU 
position, cannot be reached in each and every question. Individual EU member states also drive issues 
together with non-EU partners from other regions. This is because achieving cross-regional support 
for resolutions in the case of divisive or controversial resolutions is extremely important. Individual 
member states may also have more experience for taking the initiative in some country cases912.  
 
Sometimes, EU initiatives can be handed over to other regions for promotion, as it is considered 
important to diversify HRC sponsorships913. The EU may also be a strong actor in specific thematic 
questions, but sometimes it may refuse to promote them if success is unsure914. This is because it 
takes time to bring the lost initiatives back to the Council debate. For example, in the case of lesbian, 
gay, bisexual and transgender rights the issue was first brought up by a group of European 
countries915. However, it was considered beneficial if the main sponsorship could be given to other 
regions. Hence, the topic was handed to South Africa, which withdrew during the process. The 
resolution on human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity run by Brazil, Chile, Colombia and 
Uruguay was adopted during the 27th session in September 2014916. This also reveals how internal 
EU splits on thematic issues may have to do with religion or conservative ideology. Those issues 
where the EU has had challenges include the right to development, the right to food, and the right to 
water. These difficulties reflect the different prioritization of rights between the EU and the 
developing world.917 As the implementation of these rights would demand economic contributions, 
the EU is reluctant to take further steps. The EU has increased its focus on economic and social rights, 
for example, in the human rights strategy and the following action plans in 2012 and 2015. However, 
the EU priority lists still seem to prioritize political and civil rights. Another important, but 
controversial, thematic issue added to the EU priority lists is racism. The EU has had difficulties in 
dealing with racism or racial discrimination in the context of the Durban Review Conference918, 
organized in Geneva in April 2009. The EU’s poor performance in this Conference919, but also more 
generally its behaviour in issues related to racism at the HRC, have diminished EU credibility as a 
human rights power in the eyes of the developing world.  
                                                 
911 EU interview 18. 
912 For example, the UK in the case of Libya was mentioned in external interview 38.  
913 This also came out in my interviews with African countries. Some of them mentioned how resolutions promoted by 
the African group or countries are initially made by the EU or the US. 
914 EU interview 23. 
915 The first ever resolution on LGBTI rights was made in 17th regular session June 2011 (resolution 19). This resolution 
was sponsored by Greece, Ireland, France, Norway, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, and Switzerland. 23 countries 
voted in favour of the resolution, while 19 countries voted against. Three countries abstained during the voting.  
916 Excluding only Malta and Romania. 
917 Macaj & Koops 2011, 76. 
918 This conference was organized to review the implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action 
produced by the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance in 
2001. 
919 Some EU member states boycotted this conference and even undermined EU preparations for the event. 
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Despite a high degree of internal effectiveness, the EU’s external effectiveness has been claimed to 
be only moderate920. One of the main reasons for EU’s disgrace, mentioned in previous studies, is the 
heavy internal negotiation processes, which consume lot of time921. However, the general outcomes 
of the HRC, as well as EU success, is highly dependent on changing political variables922. The 
influence of the African group and the Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) on particular 
questions often explains the EU’s positions. These political divisions are most apparent when the 
HRC votes. In order to win a vote, the ability to form a majority is essential. For the EU this is 
demanding as it represents only 15% of states serving in the Council. The Western European and 
Other States group and the Eastern Europe group make only 28% of the total membership of the 
HRC, and not all states in these groups align with EU positions. States from the South make up 63% 
of the HRC, and the EU has often been on the losing side when Asian and African countries (56%) 
disagree with it. Latin American countries have often prioritized human rights questions instead of 
South-South solidarity923. Even if the EU could attract many Latin American countries, their amount 
(7%) is not conclusive. In the past, countries voted by following their political groups, not just the 
regional division. However, after 2009, coalition forming has gone through some turbulence maybe 
due to re-engagement of the US, but also because of changes in global politics, like the Arab uprisings. 
For example, during the 16th session of the HRC many politically sensitive resolutions could be 
adopted with the help of unforeseen coalitions. Many countries from Asia and Africa voted more 
independently and the influence of the OIC decreased924. However, coalitions in the HRC are often 
based on various factors and it is impossible to foresee what happens in the future. 
 
The EU’s external success can be evaluated by looking more closely at the HRC voting processes 
and the EU’s positions in them. Figure 2 shows the EU’s positions in the adopted resolutions and 
decisions, which have demanded voting during regular sessions. Especially those cases where the EU 
has voted against an adopted resolution would demonstrate the EU’s failure to influence the 
outcome925. According to Smith, who has studied the voting records during the first 12 regular session 
of the HRC, the EU was in a minority position in 78.5% of the cases where voting was used926. 
However, if we look at the EU’s position after 2008, there has been a notable change. As figure 2 
shows, in 2009-2011 the EU objected to only half of the resolutions adopted by voting, and in 2012-
2014 less than third of them. This could suggest that the EU has been able to change the draft 
resolution texts already during the negotiations, and in the end there has not been a need to object to 
them. Furthermore, it also needs to be reminded that most HRC resolutions are adopted by consensus, 
without voting. Hence, if the EU losses (EU voting against) are compared to the total number of 
accepted resolutions, it can be noted, that in 2014 the total amount of adopted resolutions was 102 
(see table 4), and the EU voted against only in nine cases. Hence, the HRC has worked against EU 
positions in less than 10% of resolutions927.  
                                                 
920 Gowan & Brantner 2008a, 2009a, 2009b, 2010 & Smith K. 2006a, 2008, 2010 
921 Smith 2008, Gowan & Brantner 2008a. 
922 Wouters & Meuwissen 2013, 20; Rathgeber 2012, 9. 
923 Kissack 2010, 50. 
924 See Rathgeber 2012. 
925 This perspective was introduced by one EU interviewee. According to him, this is how the real success of the EU 
can be measured (EU interview 14). 
926 Her way to calculate this may be somehow different than mine, see Smith K. 2010, 234. 
927 In 2013 these figures were 95:7 and in 2012 94:8. 
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Figure 2: EU positions in HRC Resolutions adopted by voting 2009-2011 and 2012-2014928 
 
Information collected from the Annual reports of the HRC. 
 
An important question is when the HRC ends up voting. Voting does not necessarily reflect only 
disagreement about issues, but it can be related to a late or weak drafting of the resolution. For 
example, according to the EU explanation of the vote, the resolution concerning the right to 
development was not supported by all EU countries, because the tabled resolution had not 
accommodated all the concerns mentioned during the process, and the EU noted fundamental 
differences in opinion, for example, about indicators and appropriate instruments for development.929 
Thus, voting may tell about the failed negotiation processes and also explain the number of EU 
abstentions in the voting processes. Here the EU has adopted a different strategy when compared with 
the US. Figure 3 shows how the US has adopted hard-liner positions and often voted against the 
adopted resolutions. However, there is also a considerable change after 2011; in 2009-2011 the US 
voted in favour of adopting resolution only in six cases, while in 2012-2014 it voted in favour in 27 
cases. It needs to be noted that the causal relationship between voting behaviour and the success of 
an actor is not self-evident. Much can be explained by looking at the substance and initiators of those 
resolutions that end up being voted for. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
928 These votes have been counted by giving the value of 1,0 to each voting choice, and when there has been a EU split, 
both options have received the value of 0,5. In 2009-2011 there were 68 voting and in 2012-2014 87. 
929 In this case there was an EU split as well, see the EU’s explanation of the vote concerning the right to development, 
session 27. 
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Figure 3: US Positions in HRC resolutions adopted by voting in 2009-2014930 
 
Information collected from the Annual reports of the HRC. 
 
Voting behaviour must be considered in relation to the ambitiousness of objectives at the HRC. As it 
was already noted, not all goals have an equal value. Some of them may include high costs for the 
policy-maker and even minor achievements would mean great success.  In order to evaluate the EU’s 
real effectiveness, the nature of the EU objectives should be more critically studied. Previous research 
has claimed that the EU has taken a low-key defensive approach in the Council by aiming to build 
consensus and avoiding difficult issues931. This kind of EU attitude was also mentioned in many of 
the external interviews with human rights organizations932. According to critics, the EU should not 
compromise its progressive human rights positions because of the objection of some countries and 
organizations. One of the interviewees mentioned how the EU’s compromising attitude is utilized by 
other countries; they know that the EU will not force them to adopt specific positions or sanction 
them for breaking promises. If the EU would adopt harder positions, it could be more respected by 
others.933 This seems to include a dilemma for EU action at the HRC. Either it accepts lower ambitions 
and ends up being more popular and helps the HRC to work better, or it adopts strong positions and 
creates sharper confrontations between HRC participants and more bloc thinking. 
 
It needs to be noted, that the EU has also succeeded on some tough and controversial issues, where 
the case of defamation of religion is illustrative. The EU always opposed this resolution run by the 
OIC because it was considered to decrease the right to criticize religions and was seen as related to 
the restriction of the freedom of speech and expression. Gradually support for this OIC sponsored 
                                                 
930 The US became a member of the Council 19 June 2009 and was re-elected for another three-year term in 2012. The 
US term will expire by the end of 2015, and it needs to have at least a one-year break. Here I have counted those regular 
sessions (12-27) where the US has been a voting HRC member.  
931 Smith K. 2010, 236. 
932 For example external interviews 7, 16, 34. 
933 External interview 38 
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resolution decreased, and in March 2011 it was replaced by two resolutions concerning freedom of 
religion or belief, introduced by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the EU. The EU 
resolution on freedom of religion and belief (FoRB)934 has been adopted by consensus in the HRC in 
each March session after that935. In this particular case, there was no other option for the EU than to 
aim towards creating dialogue and proceeding slowly, as the majority of the HRC members held 
differing opinions. It is clear that the EU must acknowledge the realities of the Council and set 
realistic objectives. The EU must also be active in those issues other actors find less controversial and 
important, such as ESC-rights936. However, this should not rule out the promotion of other EU 
priorities. In general, the EU seems to be ambitious in those issues it finds important, where there 
already is internal EU agreement, and where the EU notices its opportunity to succeed.  
 
Can the EU contribute to the effectiveness of the HRC? 
 
The last aspect of effectiveness is related to the abilities of the EU to contribute to the effectiveness 
of the HRC.  This is an important goal in light of the EU’s normative power role claims and self-
declared commitment to “effective multilateralism” and the UN. According to the EU’s self-
perception outlined in chapter five, it is an important EU priority to support the HRC, and its 
mechanisms (Universal Periodic Review and Special procedures)937. More generally, according to 
EU documents, the Union shares the same values and aims with the UN, and this relationship 
empowers both actors. It is also assumed that the cooperation between these two actors will increase 
in the future938. Furthermore, the EU documents present the EU as a disinterested “global public 
service” which can be differentiated from the US and its version of multilateralism. This distinction, 
which considers the US as a more instrumental user of international institutions, is also reproduced 
in the reflections on EU practices.939 In light of these statements, it could be assumed that the EU is 
willing to work in order to make the HRC a more effective global body. However, it is still possible 
that EU action, however benign the intentions may be, can do harm to those institutions it aims to 
assist.940 That is why the EU’s contribution to achieving the main goals of the HRC, such as 
responding to urgent human rights violations, promoting and protecting human rights and enhancing 
cooperation and dialogue between participants, should be evaluated in a more detailed manner. 
 
The evaluations of internal and external effectiveness of the EU have demonstrated how the EU and 
its member states have been active in delivering statements and sponsoring resolutions. The number 
of EU and its member states’ sponsored resolutions (more than one third) suggests that it has made a 
remarkable contribution to the HRC in general. In this respect, the outcomes of the HRC would look 
quite different without an EU output. Through its interventions and priorities the EU has also raised 
several thematic and country specific issues to HRC attention. The EU’s focus on human rights crises 
                                                 
934 See also Council of the European Union (2013): EU Guidelines on the promotion and protection of freedom of 
religion or belief, 24.6.2013. 
935 During the 16th, 19th, 22nd, and 25th regular sessions of the HRC. 
936 That is why the EU is developing its agenda and instruments in this area (EU interview 18). 
937 See EU priorities at the UN human rights fora 12.2.2014. 
938 See The EU-UN Partnership report 2014, Saving and improving lives online version available at 
http://report2014.unbrussels.org/index.html (accessed 15.9. 2015). 
939 Jørgensen 2009, 5. 
940 Kissack 2010, 3. 
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in specific countries makes its contribution highly relevant. The EU has also organized many informal 
meetings and side events alone or in cooperation with third parties to create more debate on important 
themes. Here the HRC participants can more freely search for a common understanding on difficult 
and controversial questions before official resolutions are tabled941. Hence, the value of these 
gatherings should be taken into account when the EU’s contribution to the effectiveness of the HRC 
is assessed. The EU has also increasingly built cross-regional initiatives with others, and aimed to 
widen the participation in the Council by empowering its weaker partners through delivering financial 
support and education942. The EU also aims to increase the effectiveness of the HRC by empowering 
civil society organizations to take part in its work. 
 
There are also EU practices that do not serve the Human Rights Council’s effectiveness in an optimal 
manner. For example, the fostering of EU unity does not necessarily serve the cause of human rights. 
When internal EU disagreements occur, member states with more ambitious human rights objectives 
may end up going with the more moderate EU majority. This is not the best possible option, as the 
HRC would also clearly need strong and courageous initiatives. EU cooperation and unity may also 
create more bloc mentality in the Council943. Other political groups find it necessary to unite their 
forces to balance the EU’s collective power and presence. If this kind of bloc thinking increases, the 
HRC becomes less effective and less able to produce outcomes. Hence, the EU should consider on a 
case-by-case basis whether its strategy of unity serves the HRC effectiveness in the best possible 
manner. According to some of my informants, the EU could help to erode bloc politics by being less 
united and more open to other actors944. This is also supported by previous research945. Also the EU 
way to mainly criticize others and be less willing to talk about its own human rights problems does 
not provide the best conditions for further dialogue and partnership, which would increase the 
effectiveness of the HRC. This is related to the consistency and coherence of EU action. If the EU 
sets particular demands for others, it should also make sure that its own action is in congruence with 
them. For example, the EU and several non-governmental organizations946 have criticized other 
regional groups for not having competitive candidate lists for HRC elections. Genuinely open 
elections could have an important impact on the functioning of the Council as a whole by improving 
the quality of membership947. However, the EU has also promoted less competitive elections in its 
own group (WEOG) by nominating only as many candidates as there are seats948. Macaj and Koops 
also mention the lack of competition to ensure and engineer the election of the US949. In order to be 
more credible, the EU’s regional groups should use competitive lists as a standard practice. 
 
                                                 
941 These informal negotiations were considered to ease tensions and deliver knowledge for those missions that do not 
have enough resources to follow all issues (EU interview 23). 
942 This was brought up by many interviewees from poorer countries. 
943 Few interviewees said that it originally were the EC/EU countries, which started the bloc thinking in the HRC. Other 
actors have merely followed this example. External interviews 5, 6, 25. 
944 EU interviews 12 and 15. 
945 See Macaj 2014. 
946 The following of HRC elections is for example one of the priorities of Amnesty International, see 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/united-nations/human-rights-council/priorities. 
947 Wouters & Meuwissen 2013, 21. 
948 In 2013 France and the UK, in 2014 the Netherlands and Portugal (in WEOG group). 
949 Macaj & Koops 2011, 79. 
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The most serious concern is, however, related to those issues the EU prioritizes. As the EU’s efforts 
are mainly focused on civil and political rights, it seems difficult to find a common ground with the 
developing world. Clearly, the EU has acknowledged this problem and increased the attention paid 
to the realization of economic, social and cultural (ESC) rights in its Human Rights Strategy and 
following Action Plans. The EU also keeps repeating its commitment to those concerns, such as 
racism and discrimination, which the Global South consider highly important. However, the problem 
is more acutely related to the question of who should hold the responsibility in economic and social 
questions. From the EU perspective, individual countries have the primary obligation to answer to 
these needs, while the developing world would like to see more international responsibility950. This 
issue is evident in the case of the effects of foreign debt and the financial obligations of states on the 
enjoyment of human rights. According to the EU, the HRC is not the “correct forum for discussing 
financial issues relating to government resources for the realisation of States’ human rights 
obligations” and this debate only “duplicates the work done in other international organizations”951.  
 
In practice, the implementation of economic and social rights would mean increasing the economic 
burdens for Western states, a consequence they are not necessarily willing to see. The EU has also 
criticized other’s initiatives for the use of vague and arbitrary language, which forces the EU to call 
for a vote. For example, in the case of international solidarity the EU refused to support the initiative 
because of the lack of clear criteria of rights holders and duty bearers. According to the EU, because 
of the vague content of such claims, these efforts cannot lead to legal implementation. Without legal 
content such a principle would be meaningless for people on the ground.952 Also in the case of the 
mandate of an independent expert on the promotion of democratic and equitable international order, 
the EU statement notices to how the elements of the mandate were selected arbitrarily and despite the 
expressed EU concerns, no changes were made953. In the case of the right to peace, according to the 
EU opinion, such a right has no legal base in international law, and it is impossible to find a consensus 
on this right954. In all of these cases the EU expresses its full commitment to the issues as such, but 
rejects the way and forum in which they are promoted.  
 
There are also other human rights questions where the different perspectives of the EU and other 
HRC members are wide and the possibility to move forward effectively is not a likely option. The 
EU’s new Action Plan for the years 2015-2019 notices eight “human rights challenges”955, where 
reaching an agreement with others is difficult. Of these topics the protection of the freedom of opinion 
and expression, promoting the freedom of religion or belief, gender equality, women’s rights, and 
non-discrimination are likely to remain rather challenging topics at the multilateral level. In order to 
increase the effectiveness of the HRC, the EU should be able to promote these issues in a way that 
does not create too anxious an atmosphere. Differences in interpreting human rights concerns and 
                                                 
950 EU explanation of vote, Right to development HRC 27th session, 17.9. 2014. 
951 EU explanation of vote: The effects of foreign debt and other international financial obligations of States on the full 
enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights, HRC 23rd session, 6.6. 2013. 
952 EU intervention at the 29th HRC session: Interactive dialogue with SR on the rights to education and the Independent 
expert on international solidarity, 18.6. 2015 and EU explanation of vote: International Solidarity, HRC 23rd session, 
6.6. 2013. 
953 EU explanation of vote, Promotion of democratic and equitable international order HRC 27th session, 18.9. 2014. 
954 EU explanation of vote, Promotion of the right to peace, HRC 23rd session, 6.6. 2013. 
955 European Commission 2015, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, Action Plan on 
Human Rights and Democracy 2015-2019, 28.4. 2015. 
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finding a common ground with others sometimes decrease the effectiveness of the HRC. As a big 
bloc of countries, with highly developed internal human rights standards and practices, the EU has 
all the potential to positively further the HRC mandate and effectiveness. For the performance 
evaluations the essential question is what kind of status the EU eventually decides to take in its 
relation with the HRC. By working with different others, the EU may have to compromise more and 
its control over the contents of resolutions will diminish. Will the EU be satisfied with decreased 
control, or will it aim to promote these issues more directly through bilateral relations? Much depends 
on how effective a HRC the EU is ready to accept and support. 
 
6.4 The Resource Viability of the EU 
 
Resource viability refers to the EU’s ability to raise the resources required to meet its objectives in 
the respective institution in the short, medium or long term. Resources may include financial means 
and personnel, but possibly also other resources such as external expertise and knowledge. Evaluating 
the EU’s resources in the HRC is a challenge, especially as this study takes into account both the 
EU’s and its member states’ levels of action. Furthermore, resource viability should always be 
considered in the light of policy objectives and perceptions of EU relevance vis-à-vis international 
institutions956. As section 6.2 noted, EU relevance for its member states varies in the HRC context, 
which leads to different expectations and needs among its members. Some EU member states may 
have high ambitions concerning the HRC work, while other members may not have particular 
interests related to it. Often member states’ expectations towards the actions of the EEAS are high, 
and the EU is used as a scapegoat when collective efforts are not successful. At the same time member 
states may be rather unwilling to give the EU-delegation more power, responsibilities and resources. 
The EU can also blame member states for their disengagement from common initiatives. The member 
states can outsource human rights issues to the EU delegation and concentrate on other issues957. 
Hence, evaluations of resource viability should acknowledge these two different perspectives. The 
external others represent the third perspective; what do they expect from the EU? If these expectations 
are high, the EU should also have resources to meet these expectations. Otherwise, the gap between 
EU capabilities and expectations becomes wide. This section analyses EU resources on the more 
general level, and draws some conclusions on the EU’s ability to meet the expectations.  
 
Collectively, the EU has more financial resources and instruments at its disposal than any other HRC 
participant. The EU is the largest contributor to the UN system, the total EU contribution to UN 
activities in 2013 being 1 630 million euros958. However, even if there is a slight increase in funding, 
only 3% of the UN budget is used for human rights. Approximately 40% of the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) funding comes from the United Nation’s regular budget, 
and the rest from voluntary contributions of member states. The biggest voluntary contributions to 
the OHCHR in 2014 were made by Sweden, Netherlands, Germany, the UK and Denmark. The 
voluntary contribution of the European Commission was also considerable, more than 7,5 million 
                                                 
956 Jørgensen et al. 2011, 610. 
957 This was mentioned in the research interviews. 
958 Saving and Improving Lives: Partnership between the United Nations and the European Union in 2013, October 
2014. 
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dollars.959 These figures suggest that both the EU and its member states individually, consider the UN 
human rights fora highly relevant, and are willing to finance its activities. The EU’s increasing 
presence at the HRC is also seen as an important objective. The self-perception of the EU suggests 
that it aims to show an example for others by taking an active or even leading role at the HRC. 
However, such an objective demands high resources and it is closely related to the discussion about 
the key tasks of the HRC. According to the interviewed UN representatives, the EU is keen to finance 
its own initiatives and priorities. It clearly wants to decide how and on what purposes the HRC 
resources are used.960 Hence, the EU’s financial resources are closely tied to what added value the 
HRC as an institution can bring for the EU and its member states. If the HRC turns out to be too 
challenging a forum for the EU to promote human rights, it may invest its energy and resources 
elsewhere. 
 
The economic crisis may also create pressures over a longer period of time. Especially the voluntary 
contributions of the member states for the HRC activities are vulnerable to cuts. According to my 
interviewees the economic crisis seems not to have directly affected the readiness of the EU to 
distribute resources in human rights issues. However, a few of them mentioned how the crises may, 
in the long run, diminish the resources of some member state missions in Geneva and lead to 
increasing burden-sharing, and more responsibility for the EU-delegation and larger member 
states.961 It was also noted that the economic crisis does influence how much states are able to 
contribute to the UN, and more particularly to some expensive HRC mandates and country 
operations962. This could lead to more selectivity and bias in the EU’s approach. However, in light of 
my interviews, this is not the case yet. The economic crisis can also affect how economic interests 
and human rights issues get mixed in EU foreign policy; economic interests might weigh more than 
human rights concerns in particular cases. According to one interviewee this has already been 
apparent in relations with particular countries, such as Russia, Kazakhstan and China963. In these 
cases, also individual member states may be less willing to take the risk of deteriorating their relations 
with important economic partners. 
 
The number of diplomatic staff for human rights promotion in the EU machinery is noteworthy. The 
EU-delegation in Geneva has around 5 experts solely working on human rights issues, and they are 
often assisted by interns. Also the Brussels headquarters and its human rights specialized staff assist 
the EU-delegation in several thematic and country cases. The wider global network of human rights 
focal points in EU-delegations around the world can contribute to specific issue preparations at the 
HRC by providing relevant local information and assisting human rights defenders who want to 
cooperate with the HRC.964 The number of human rights experts in EU member state missions varies, 
and, for example, during the rotating presidency their number increases. This is also the case when 
the EU state serves as a member of the HRC. However, there is much variation depending on national 
resources and objectives; member states may have from four to more than ten human rights experts 
                                                 
959 OHCHR Report 2014, May 2015. 
960 External interviews 15, 25. 
961 These issues were mentioned in EU interviews 2, 3, 9, 12. 
962 EU interviews 13, 14, 15. 
963 EU interview 10. 
964 EU interview 17. 
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in their Geneva delegation. There are also often many assisting persons working in the capitals of 
member states. Thus, it is very difficult to measure how many experts are working for human rights 
or solely for HRC issues. According to my estimation, together the EU-delegation and member states 
probably have more than 200 human rights experts working on HRC-related issues. Compared to 
other EU policy areas, such as trade and security, this amount might be moderate, but in comparison 
to any other actor at the HRC, these EU personnel capacities are considerable. Through the EU’s 
burden-sharing activities, this number of people can make a real difference. What needs to be noted 
is that the EU’s open attitude towards human rights defenders and organizations brings it additional 
expertise and knowledge, which is beneficial when the EU is preparing different thematic and country 
resolutions.  
 
More relevant than the number of experts is, of course, their individual capacities, such as negotiation 
skills, particular expertise areas, and personalities. Many of my interviewees underlined the important 
role of individuals in Geneva negotiations. Usually human rights experts965 spend only three years in 
Geneva, which means that there is not so much continuity in their work. It was also noted that new 
experts and delegations tend to be quite conservative and careful in the beginning of their term966. 
There are also exceptions to the general short-term stay; some experts spend years or return to Geneva 
after a break, and have a longer time-perspective towards the Council work. Many of them may also 
have relevant UN experience from New York or from other UN locations. These experts are used to 
working in the UN environment and can also promote challenging and sensitive issues often 
demanding highly qualified negotiators. Human rights experts can have very different profiles and 
expertise, which is of crucial importance when driving some thematic or country cases. The EU 
benefit in comparison to other actors is that it can use the vast expertise of its member states. There 
is always someone who is familiar with the issues or country case. One important change after the 
Lisbon treaty has been the increased role of the EU delegation in Geneva. According to my 
interviewees the delegation is considered to be effective, but its role is dependent on the personalities 
and abilities to cooperate with member states’ diplomats967. The EU-delegation is also dependent on 
how good national diplomats are sent to the EEAS posts. Furthermore, when the EU-delegation is 
compared with some bigger EU member states or the US, its resources are scarce; it is more like 
another middle-sized EU member state. This has also caused concerns among the member states. 
From the Brussels perspective, the Geneva delegation to the UN is relatively well resourced968. As 
this comparison shows, the evaluation depends on perspective. Much also depends on the 
expectations the EU is considered to fulfil in the HRC context. If it is seen only to support and 
facilitate member states, serve as some kind of secretariat, it probably is quite well resourced. 
However, if the EU delegation is assumed to take leadership in several issue areas, it can be 
considered severely under-resourced. Hence, the additional staff members from the rotating 
presidencies are highly needed to promote collective EU positions. The former rotating presidencies 
often had differing resources to carry the responsibilities of representing the EU, also depending on 
their HRC membership and national priorities. The six months Presidency period is quite demanding 
                                                 
965 There are different kinds of contracts, but most often three-year term is the normal length of term in both EU-
delegation and in EUMS missions. 
966 EU interview 15. 
967 EU interviews 13, 16. 
968 EU interviews 17, 18. 
129 
 
to work effectively, especially during the HRC spring term when the main session is organized. The 
problem is also to find qualified personnel to work only temporarily in Geneva. Working in the 
Geneva environment demands special knowledge of the UN mechanisms and expertise and 
experience from multilateral negotiations. 
 
The last, but not least, aspect is the EU’s ideological resources and possibility to benefit from its 
positive image. Externally, the European human rights regime is considered to have progressed, and 
it does carry respect among third parties. European human rights institutions and standards are able 
to present a model and example for other states and regions. However, this normative example refers 
to wider Europe and it is not necessarily coincident with the EU regime. The interview material shows 
that, for example, Norway and Switzerland have highly positive images in the HRC, and as a 
consequence they have succeeded in presenting important resolutions and gain allies. One important 
precondition for a positive image is the EU willingness to empower and fund others actor’s activities 
and priorities. Here the EU has been active in relation to some UN member states and human rights 
organizations. In general, the EU’s image and ideological resources may not be as attractive as it 
assumes. The EU is part of the West, and its human rights interpretations are not shared by the 
majority of HRC members. Much depends on what issues the EU will drive, and how it aims to 
promote them. A positive image would need dialogue, not just monologue. The EU’s image would 
also be improved with coherence between words and action, as well as between internal and external 
policies. Interestingly, there is still quite a big difference between the perceptions of the EU and the 
US as ideological powers, noted in previous research969 as well as by the interviewees970. The US is 
perceived as a strong player who mainly follows its own interests and is less willing to take into 
account others’ views. The pro-Israeli attitudes of the US also make it less attractive partner in the 
eyes of many Muslim countries. According to the interviewees, the EU is mainly seen as a softer and 
more cooperative actor at the HRC, even if its human rights positions do not differ much from the US 
views. Such a “normative difference” could be a beneficial ideological resource for the EU to be used 
at the HRC.   
 
6.5 EU Efficiency at the HRC 
 
The EU’s efficiency is closely related to its resource viability as it refers to the relationship between 
achieved goals and incurred costs. After the Lisbon treaty, the EU has aimed to improve its efficiency 
with institutional changes and by adopting a more strategic approach to human rights questions at the 
UN. As the previous section on resource viability noticed, the EU has vast financial and personnel 
resources when the EU and its member states are taken together. This section asks how efficient the 
EU has been in activating these resources to meet the aims set for EU action in the HRC. Efficiency 
is a demanding objective for the EU. As a hybrid organization, the EU is bound to be at least to some 
extent inefficient because of its heavy internal coordination processes. Due to this internal 
complexity, Jørgensen et al. notice how the EU seems to accept relatively low efficiency971. The 
complexity of the EU as an institution makes it challenging to measure the EU’s efficiency or compare 
                                                 
969 Kissack 2010, 145. 
970 This difference is studied in more detail in chapter 7. 
971 Jørgensen et al. 2011, 611. 
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it with other actors at the HRC. But is the EU’s efficiency improving with the new approach and 
wider responsibilities of the EU-delegation? How could the EU use its resources more efficiently? 
 
Many of the EU interviewees thought that the EU is not using its vast resources and various 
instruments in the best possible manner at the HRC. Efficiency problems were often related to the 
EU’s internal dynamics. For example, difficulties in finding the best possible organizational 
efficiency were mentioned972. Interviewees had different views concerning the efficiency of EU unity 
or diversity. Unity demands heavy internal negotiations and takes valuable time from EU outreach to 
other partners. As one interviewee said “if you want to achieve something for human rights then 
insisting on the unity of 27 is not the best way forward”973. However, EU unity is seen as a 
precondition for the enhanced role974. Better cooperation already in Brussels was seen by many 
interviewees to be the main way to improve efficiency as member states have less need for internal 
coordination in Geneva and they can concentrate on finding allies from other regions975. Those 
interviewees who had spent a longer time in Geneva thought that the co-operation processes at the 
HRC have developed much over the years976. One of the interviewees even said that she was 
impressed with the efficiency of EU negotiations when she arrived in Geneva977. Another interviewee 
noted that the efficiency of the EU or member states does not depend on their personnel at Geneva, 
but on the capital level978. Hence, generally the EU’s multilevel and complex diplomacy and 
coordination problems mean that the EU efficiency does not look as good as it could at the HRC. 
There is much more potential with such a vast amount of resources. As one interviewee put it: “the 
EU must develop better outreach, become more talented in sharing the knowledge faster and reacting 
in a more rapid way”979. 
 
The new approach to human rights and wider responsibilities of the EU-delegation was mainly 
evaluated positively among the EU interviewees. The enhanced role of the EU delegation was seen 
to have potential for more efficiency. However, the interviewees disagreed about the real 
consequences of this change so far. Some thought that the EU delegation is less efficient than its role 
suggests980. Many also reminded that this process is still taking its first steps, and it is difficult to say 
how it will influence in the future981. The more strategic approach may also include a more efficient 
use of different, even coercive instruments. Efficiency is often related to the use of ‘carrot and sticks’ 
in foreign policy. Here the member states’ opinions clearly differed, as some of them were more 
willing to take a stronger approach and, for example, set stricter conditions for EU aid. In general, 
several member states still seem rather reluctant to use such measures with “more teeth” towards 
other states even if this would make the EU a more efficient actor. However, mainstreaming human 
rights and combining different issues, for example, when conducting bilateral negotiations were 
                                                 
972 EU interviews 15, 20, 22, 23. 
973 EU interview 19. 
974 EU interviews 8, 11. 
975 EU interviews 2, 3, 6, 11, 12, 20, 21. 
976 EU interviews 11, 18, 22.  
977 EU interview 21. 
978 EU interview 15. 
979 EU interview 6. 
980 EU interviews 3, 13, 15, 16. 
981 EU interviews 5, 10, 11, 12, 16. 
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suggested in many interviews as ways to improve efficiency982. This would mean more focused 
attention on particular problems and locations, and the use of measures that would go beyond the 
Geneva environment. Hence, there is no easy answer to the question of how the EU could be a more 
efficient actor at the HRC. It must be noted that the efficiency of the EU’s human rights policy is 
largely dependent on the external environment and how other non-EU actors perceive the EU role. If 
other actors see the EU as a relevant and reliable partner, it is much easier for the EU to drive its 
objectives and attain goals. When the EU is considered attractive, there is less need for stronger 
measures. The EU rhetoric and argumentation capacities are in a key position to improving its 
efficiency. As Kissack notes, for example the successful drafting of the death penalty moratorium 
resolution shows how clearly articulating the reasons for supporting a given policy and deflecting 
criticism with well-reasoned arguments is an important skill at the UN983. However, it is also likely 
that some other states and blocs are not willing to see stronger and more efficient EU at the HRC. 
They may compete with the EU and aim to provide alternatives for its human rights interpretations. 
In such cases mere argumentation will not be enough. These actors create the biggest challenges for 
an efficient EU performance. 
 
6.6 EU Performance in Light of its Normative Power Role 
 
Performance focuses on the behaviour and impact of the EU in practice, and it can support or detract 
the EU’s role ambitions. The EU’s self-perception underlines the EU’s role as a supporter and 
contributor to the UN, and as an example and partner for others, all features consistent with the 
normative power role. This section evaluates the EU’s performance more particularly in light of its 
normative power role claims. The EU’s increasing presence and relevance for its stakeholders at the 
HRC can be considered to reflect its emphasis on being at the multilateral fora. It was noted how the 
mere presence of the EU at the HRC can cause overt norm-diffusion in others984. Furthermore, also 
being present when it does not serve EU interests directly would contribute to the normative power 
image and draw a picture of the EU’s less instrumental attitude towards international institutions. 
Clearly the EU has been committed to the HRC from the beginning, even if this commitment has 
sometimes worked against EU interests. The EU has also succeeded in providing one message with 
considerable EU unity, which has strengthened its consistency in the eyes of others. The EU appears 
as the most united bloc with common, well-prepared positions. The EU-delegation has a generally 
good reputation and it is recognized as an actor in the HRC. However, this unity may also have 
adverse effects if common positions reflect only lowest common denominator between the member 
states. The relevance of the EU message is sometimes lost when it tries to compromise its positions 
too much. This would not match with the normative power role and a strong defence of values.  
 
The normative power role self-image also underlines the EU’s contributions to the UN and the HRC. 
The EU and its member states have clearly been active participants at the HRC by contributing to its 
sessions and debates in several issue areas. Collectively the EU has been the most active contributor 
to the HRC and without a doubt, the HRC would look quite different without the EU’s presence and 
output. The EU’s external effectiveness also seems to be rather high; it has succeeded to influence 
                                                 
982 EU interviews 1, 3, 6, 7, 18.  
983 Kissack 2010, 182. 
984 For different norm-diffusion mechanisms of normative power, see section 2.2 
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others in the cases it has promoted. However, as this chapter noted, mere goal attainment does not 
tell much about the substance of these goals. The list of EU country cases was noted to be rather 
selective, avoiding focus on major powers, such as the US or China. The EU merely points to weaker 
countries in Africa or Asia, and often follows international agreements on these cases. This would 
not match with the normative power image, as several other human rights violations would need 
urgent attention. The EU should be more coherent in pointing to country situations, even if this would 
create opposition in others. This would make the EU a more credible normative power. 
 
The EU has also been accused of dealing merely with easy questions at the HRC. However, even if 
the EU’s more compromise-seeking behaviour can be criticized, from the normative power 
perspective such behaviour is not necessarily disapproved. Most essential would be to find a balance 
between the principled promotion of values and finding common ground with other actors. The EU’s 
decreasing opposition against the adopted HRC resolutions could suggest that the EU has managed 
to use its diplomatic networks and shaped the final texts of the resolutions together with different 
partners. Hence, this could also be a sign of increased cooperation with others. The EU has also been 
successful in some controversial questions and has succeeded in building bridges even to the most 
difficult parties. This raises the question how normative action should be defined in this particular 
context. Is the defence of principles more important than the development of cooperative practices or 
vice versa? It is clear that the EU must set realistic objectives and be active in those issues which 
other actors find important, such as economic and social rights. This would also mean that the EU is 
better partner for others and sustains dialogue instead of forcing its own opinions on others. 
 
The EU has also shown an example by supporting the HRC and its procedures, and by invoking the 
norms and standards developed in this forum. Especially relevant is the way in which the EU has 
empowered other states and non-governmental organizations in the HRC context. From the normative 
power perspective, contributing to the effectiveness of the HRC is important, as this role assumes 
commitment to international law and institutions as well as to a well-functioning multilateral system. 
Here the normative power role clearly meets its major challenges. Even if the EU has been able to 
support the HRC, it was also noted that some of the EU’s procedures do not really support HRC 
effectiveness. First of all, strong united EU positions may create opposition in others and increase 
bloc mentality at the HRC. The EU’s internal negotiations may exclude important allies and make 
the forming of cross-regional initiatives more difficult. Secondly, the EU must maintain coherence 
between external demands and internal human rights reality. The EU is keen to criticize others for 
their human rights problems, but less willing to talk about its own challenges in this area.  This clearly 
decreases the credibility of its normative power role in the eyes of others. Thirdly, the EU’s focus on 
some controversial human rights questions may freeze the atmosphere in the Council. Hence, the EU 
does not necessarily improve the effectiveness of the HRC by pointing at these questions. However, 
as a normative power the EU should raise its voice in the defence of universal principles, even if they 
are not supported by other actors. 
 
The last thing is EU impact at the HRC; how well has the EU succeeded in changing the norms of 
others and shaping the discourse? If the EU is not able to influence others, it cannot play a normative 
power role. This chapter shows that the EU is a much more influential player at the HRC than 
previously thought. The EU and its member states have worked as initiators of relatively many 
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successful resolutions, and seldom objected the adopted HRC resolutions. These would clearly 
support the EU’s normative power self-perception at the HRC. Furthermore, the EU has seldom 
objected to the adopted resolutions and in this respect there is a notable difference, for example, 
between the EU and the US. However, the NPE assumption that other actors would be eager to follow 
EU norms is not evident in the HRC context. The EU’s norm promotion is easiest when there is 
already some agreement on the norms promoted among HRC members. Attracting others in 
controversial issues is far more difficult, if not impossible. Hence, the impact of the EU is closely 
related to its external acceptance, which cannot be studied merely by looking at the EU’s actions. The 
next chapter goes beyond this internal perspective by studying the external perceptions of the EU at 
the HRC among different participants.  
 
6.7 Chapter Conclusions 
 
This chapter has offered an overview of the EU’s performance in the UN Human Rights Council by 
considering EU relevance for its stakeholders, internal and external effectiveness, the EU’s resource 
viability and efficiency. As a conclusion, the picture of EU performance is rather mixed and 
dependent on what aspect we are stressing. If EU performance is more related to its being, it seems 
that EU relevance, internally and externally, is considerably high. The EU is recognized as a 
legitimate participant, and the EU dimension has relevance. However, the relevance of the EU 
message, depends on its ability to find internal agreement, which does not just reflect the lowest 
common denominator between the EUMS. EU relevance for member states is also reflected in its 
internal effectiveness and unity. The EU’s external effectiveness is more closely related to its doing 
and concrete achievements in diverse subject areas. The EU has been successful, for example, by 
reaching its stated objectives. Importantly, less and less resolutions are adopted against the EU’s 
acceptance. In this respect, there is also a difference between the EU and the US. Of course, it needs 
to be remembered that this kind of success does not tell much about the substance of resolutions. The 
EU has also been able to activate a lot of resources relevant for the HRC context. However, when 
these resources and achieved outcomes are compared, it seems that the EU is still not realizing its full 
potential. In other words, the EU could do much more at the HRC, if its ambitions as a normative 
power are considered.  
 
The framework conditions for EU action can be used to explain EU performance at the HRC. The 
EU has been able to develop its internal coordination to the extent that legal-institutional limitations 
do not severely hinder its performance. The EU member states have also shown considerable 
commitment to common positions, maybe boosted by the fact that collectively member states can 
achieve a louder voice and visibility. This chapter noted how a lower EU profile and active member 
state action might also lead to better performance. This is due to the challenging external political 
constellation. The EU has noted the need to find allies and co-sponsors for resolutions in order to 
avoid claims of regional bias and politicization. As a conclusion, the EU’s external effectiveness and 
efficiency are clearly limited by external conditions, which deserve more attention. How others see 
the EU and its role ambitions influences EU possibilities to perform well. Interestingly, the external 
image of the EU remains the least investigated aspect of the EU’s possible normative power role. The 
next chapter will examine how the EU’s role is perceived by other HRC participants. 
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7 External Perceptions of the EU Role at the HRC  
 
Studies concerning the global role of the EU have concentrated largely on examining how the EU 
envisions its role around the world with different partners. At the same time, only limited attention 
has been given to the external environment and non-EU perceptions of this role. However, according 
to role theory, an actor’s roles are determined not only by the actor’s own role conceptions but also 
remarkably by the role expectations of other actors985. Hence, when the EU’s role in the world is 
studied, one must take into account how different external others perceive the EU and its actions. 
Since the early 2000s there has been a growing interest in studying the perception of the EU by 
outsiders, in different geographical locations and institutional contexts986. These studies can provide 
an important “reality check” for the EU’s self-images and global ambitions. First of all, external 
perceptions can inform EU policy-makers about the legitimacy and relevance of the EU’s presence987 
and policy objectives. Secondly, others’ views help to shape the EU’s global identity and role. 
Thirdly, external perceptions are closely related to EU foreign policy effectiveness988 and hence, how 
others see the EU influences the ways in which the Union is able to conduct foreign policies. 
 
There is often a considerable gap between an actor’s self-representation and how it is externally 
perceived. This is important in the case of the normative power role, which has set out a rather inward-
looking but ambitious foreign policy ideal. The normative power role was developed by European 
scholars, adopted by EU policy-makers, and mainly debated inside the EU989. Thus, studying the alter 
side of this role is highly relevant. The external perception of this particular role has not been much 
studied. However, the early (2002-2008) external perception studies reported a rather attractive image 
of the EU, where its outreach in normative power terms (as a promoter of democracy and human 
rights) was evident. Many studies have also recognized the EU as a possible counterbalance to the 
US.990 This kind of image has also been contested in several studies991. Such variation suggests that 
external perceptions are issue-, location- and time-specific, which makes it difficult to generalize 
between policy areas or institutional contexts. The temporal dimension in studying external 
perceptions may also have considerable consequences on the results achieved992. The actor’s 
incoherence over time, disunity or unwillingness to invest resources may lead to the loss of 
credibility993. For example, perceptions of the EU’s leadership role in the international climate policy 
have varied due to its mixed success in international negotiations994. This chapter studies how the 
                                                 
985 Elgström & Smith 2006a, 5. 
986 See Lucarelli 2013; Chaban & Holland (eds.) 2014a; Bachmann & Müller (eds.) 2015; Chaban & Holland 2015. List 
of publications of one of these projects is also available at http://www.euperceptions.canterbury.ac.nz (accessed 
14.7.2015).  
987 The external relevance of the EU at the HRC was discussed in section 6.2. Input legitimacy refers to rightful 
membership or involvement of an actor in particular policy areas (see Elgström 2015, 3). 
988 Even if Torney suggests that the correlation between positive external perceptions and policy effectiveness should be 
interpreted with caution, see Torney 2014, 1359. 
989 Mayer & Zielonka 2012, 5. 
990 See Elgström 2007, Chaban & Holland 2014b, 5.  
991 See for example Lucarelli 2007, 84; Lucarelli 2010; Lucarelli 2013, 236; Elgström 2006.  
992 Chaban and Holland note how most of the findings in this research field are made on the level of micro histoire, and 
as such, cannot provide any ‘big picture’ of the perceptions (Chaban & Holland 2014b, 4). 
993 Elgström 2015, 3-4. 
994 See Kilian & Elgström 2010; Bäckstrand & Elgström 2013. 
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EU’s assumed normative power role is perceived at the UN Human Rights Council among different 
non-EU others.  
 
Role expectations held by other actors may vary in the case of corporate actors such as the EU995. 
That is why perceptions of the EU held by its “others”, such as other UN member states, regional 
organizations, human rights organizations and the HRC secretary, may be rather different996. This 
chapter is based on 40 expert interviews conducted during the time period of April 2013 to December 
2014 in Geneva. The interviews were theme-based expert interviews, and they were conducted under 
the promise of anonymity. Snowball sampling and expert advice was used for the selection of states 
and organizations997. The hypothesis is that perceptions of the EU’s role will differ among the 
interviewees, based on their normative closeness to the EU, historical experiences, power relations, 
and voting behaviour. The perceptions of others are reported in six different categories by 
concentrating on three main aspects of the normative power role; first, is the EU perceived as a 
promoter of universal values, working mainly by attracting rather than coercing others? Secondly, 
does the EU provide an example and leadership in the Council by acting in a coherent and credible 
manner? Thirdly, does the EU represent something different in comparison to other HRC participants, 
most notably the US? 
 
7.1 Why Study the Alter Side of the Story? 
 
There are several reasons to study what non-EU actors think about the EU’s global role. First of all, 
external perception studies are able to inform us about the views of other actors, and help to form a 
more realistic and comprehensive understanding of the EU’s role in the world. For example, Mayer 
and Zielonka underline the need for a new definition of the EU’s role in world affairs that would 
reflect external perceptions and respond to them998. Definitions of the EU’s global role have been 
largely based on its own self-representations. External perception studies can help to overcome such 
Eurocentrism999. Most importantly, external reactions may increase or diminish the legitimacy of 
specific roles, depending on how appropriate they are in the eyes of others. Legitimacy is important 
as it forms a source of social influence related to an actor’s soft power1000. If an actor’s role is 
considered to be legitimate, it is easier to find allies and followers for policies that implement this 
role. The EU’s claims to a normative power role with universal ambitions require external recognition 
and ideational legitimacy from other actors1001. If this role is accepted, the EU is more able to shape 
conceptions of normal. 
 
Secondly, external perceptions are relevant in the construction of EU identity as identities are formed 
in the interaction between the self and others. External perceptions are often most influential when 
                                                 
995 Harnisch 2011, 8. 
996 Interview themes and list of interviews can be found from the appendix 2. 
997 Snowball sampling is defined as a technique for gathering research subjects through the identification of an initial 
subject who is used to provide the names of other actors. These actors may themselves open possibilities for an 
expanding web of contact and inquiry. 
998 Mayer & Zielonka 2012, 5. 
999 Bachmann & Müller 2015, 6. 
1000 Elgström & Chaban 2015, 21. 
1001 Aggestam 2013, 465. 
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the identity of an actor is not yet mature, as in the case of the EU1002. According to Lucarelli, others 
serve three important functions in an actor’s identity formation: they are those with respect to whom 
we claim distinctiveness, they provide recognition for our identity, and they provide external 
identification of our groups with a label and a geo-social space1003. External perceptions can give 
essential feedback and the EU’s responses to them may reconstitute the EU as a global actor1004. Thus 
far, there has not been much research concerning the influence of external perceptions on the EU’s 
identity/role dynamic. A precondition for such a dynamic is the EU’s readiness to listen to what it’s 
different others are saying. An actors’ self-perceptions are often positive and they assume that others 
also view them as such1005. Europeans easily conceive themselves as normative leaders and models 
for other regions1006. This kind of identity construction is quite common in the case of collective 
identities as they aim to build consensus inside, rather than be directed externally1007. However, there 
is often a considerable gap between an actor’s self-representations and how it is externally perceived, 
which in the long run can diminish the credibility of an actor. One obvious reason for more pessimistic 
external EU perceptions is the EU’s ambitious role rhetoric, which creates expectations in external 
audiences. If the EU is not able to answer to these expectations, the gap between capabilities and 
expectations starts to shape external perceptions. Hill noticed already in the 1990s how the 
expectations of other actors towards the EU increased more rapidly than its actual foreign policy 
capabilities, due to the EU’s high-flying rhetoric.1008 Also other scholars have suggested that the EU 
should use more realistic and less Eurocentric rhetoric1009. For example, Mayer notes how the ever 
more ambitious rhetoric about the EU’s global role may divert us from realistically assessing the 
requirements of EU foreign policy in the twenty-first century1010. In this sense, external perceptions 
may serve as ‘early warning systems’ for the EU1011. Too high expectations quickly become a license 
for cynicism towards the EU’s values or begin to highlight European weakness1012. This cynicism 
can be reflected through ‘expectations deficits’ concerning EU activities. This relates to situations 
where outsiders do not believe that the EU could contribute much. The EU’s credibility would be 
diminished, not only because of the limited availability of resources and means, but also because of 
EU inaction. Those countries with the highest needs may sometimes have rather pessimistic opinions 
concerning the EU’s capability and willingness to help them. Hence, through ambitious rhetoric, the 
EU might actually increase frustration among its others and underline occurring weaknesses. 
 
The third important reason to study external perceptions is related to their high relevance for EU 
policy performance and impact. As Lucarelli and Fioramonti note, what the world thinks of the EU 
is an important factor in facilitating or opposing the achievements of EU-sponsored policies1013. 
Positive external images are assumed to correlate with EU policy effectiveness. For example, 
                                                 
1002 Breuning 2011. 
1003 Lucarelli 2011, 149. 
1004 Manners 2012, 198. 
1005 Jervis 1976. 
1006 Mayer 2013, 7. 
1007 Della Sala 2013. 
1008 Hill 1993; 1998, 36-37. 
1009 Mayer & Vogt 2006; Mayer 2008.  
1010 Mayer 2013a, 7. 
1011 Lucarelli & Fioramonti 2010, 2. 
1012 Dennison & Dworkin 2010, 11. 
1013 Lucarelli & Fioramonti 2010, 2. 
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Elgström notes how the tendency to follow the EU increases if its policies are considered consistent 
and legitimate, and the Union can base its support on normative consent.1014 Also negative external 
images of the EU can complicate EU efforts and negotiations with third parties. In multilateral 
settings external perceptions have direct policy relevance1015 and these are reflected in the EU’s role 
performance. It is important that the EU is perceived as a relevant participant that is invited to 
important negotiations and coalitions. However, Torney has challenged the assumption that the 
external effectiveness of an actor could be drawn from external perceptions. This is because the 
dynamics of particular policy spheres, as well as broader changes in the context of world politics 
matter too. Hence, according to him, the findings of perception studies need to be contextualized 
before drawing conclusions from them.1016 At the HRC, the relative significance of external 
perceptions is rather high, as this body is mainly based on dialogue and the search for mutual 
understanding. The EU’s opportunities to influence at the HRC are limited, as it has a minority 
position while countries of the South make up the majority. Under these conditions, a positive external 
image seems to be a prerequisite for influence. It seems that external perceptions carry relevance 
especially in the case of those actors who traditionally have supported or opposed the EU. This is 
because the EU is more likely to listen to those who interact with it most often. In the case of 
opponents, the EU needs to consider carefully how to solve issues and find common ground. The 
reserved attitudes of the countries of the South do not necessarily affect EU policy outcomes if there 
are good reasons and incentives for finding an agreement. Overall, the dynamics at the HRC is likely 
to follow pre-existing logic and more stereotypical attitudes1017 among the participants.  
7.2 Who are the EU’s Relevant Others at the HRC? 
 
When studying the external perceptions of the EU’s role, it should be noticed that not all the other 
participants carry equal significance for reconstituting the EU’s role. Wendt notes how for example 
power and dependence relations are important to acknowledge1018. Also Lucarelli claims that the 
degree of sensitivity to external images is dependent on the authority of these others, the salience of 
the issue area, and the degree of consolidation of the group’s self-awareness1019. Hence, it can be 
claimed that the EU has more and less relevant others, also in the HRC context. The concepts of 
significant others, relevant others and powerful others are often used interchangeably in research 
literature to refer to those actors whose opinions about the EU matter most for its identity and role. 
In international relations these significant others cannot be selected randomly and they are often tied 
to past experiences of the role beholder.1020 For example, the former colonies of EU member states 
can have a special status as the EU member states’ others. In the case of authority and power the most 
                                                 
1014 Elgström 2007; 2015. 
1015 Lucarelli 2013, 440. 
1016 Torney 2014, 1369-1370. 
1017 Chaban and Holland note how stereotypes are resilient in the long-term memory of individuals. These create 
prejudices, which on their part rationalize and further confirm stereotypical representations (Chaban & Holland 2014, 9-
10). 
1018 Wendt 1999, 327. 
1019 Lucarelli 2011, 153. 
1020 Significant other can be for example a former colony, occupation power, or state which is most frequently 
mentioned in foreign policy documents (Harnisch 2011, 12). 
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relevant EU others are the so-called Strategic Partners, presenting key global and regional powers1021.  
Clearly the US deserves a special status when considering these others1022. As has been noted, the 
role of the US is central for the EU’s normative power role status. However, the relevance of the EU’s 
others also depends on the particular policy and issue area. In human rights policy this relevance is 
related, for example, to EU priorities, country cases or important alliances.  
 
The more specific multilateral setting, in this case the HRC, determines whose perceptions should be 
investigated. In the HRC there are several possible ways to study external recognition of the EU’s 
normative power role. Most perception studies have adopted a regional focus, but at the HRC regional 
groups are not decisive in issue specific questions. When perceptions of the normative power role are 
studied, the EU’s others at the HRC should be divided by taking into account the extent to which they 
share the EU’s interpretation of human rights norms. The EU norms are mainly shared in the wider 
West, and also remarkably in its Southern and Eastern neighbourhood1023. However, policy based on 
normative power meets considerable challenges when confronted with countries that do not share the 
same interpretation of values. In the HRC these challenges occur when questions related to culture 
and religion, such as gender, sexuality, and political rights are considered. The Organization for 
Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the main political group for the Muslim countries, has often held quite 
different positions than the EU. These differences are also manifest in global value studies1024, where 
perceptions of different countries, for example, towards homosexuality, premarital sex, and abortion 
are examined. It needs to be noticed that also many emerging powers, such as Russia, India, China 
and South Africa, are quite conservative in value questions when compared with EU countries. In 
general, it could be noticed that most EU members represent the liberal value extreme for the outside 
world1025. These value positions also influence the EU’s global human rights policy. Another 
noticeable aspect is the North-South-divide at the UN. The developing world is underlining the 
importance of social and economic rights, and claiming that the West does not give enough respect 
for them1026. In the HRC this division becomes highly apparent, for example, in questions related to 
the right to development, racism and attitudes towards foreign debt.  
 
All this suggests that power considerations, relations of dependence, and normative (dis)agreement 
are factors which must be taken into account when external perceptions of the EU role are studied at 
the HRC. Mattlin has made useful a division between the EU’s different others by classifying them 
into prospective future accession countries, other small/weak countries, countries that broadly share 
the same political values and norms, and other major countries that do not share the same political 
values and norms1027. These different others are likely to differ in their perceptions of the EU, which 
                                                 
1021 The term ‘strategic partner’ is ill defined in EU usage. It refers to countries whose diplomatic position in the eyes of 
the EU is considered higher. The EU’s strategic partners are countries such as Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, 
Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South Korea and the US. 
1022 See Aggestam 2006, 19. 
1023 The normative power role is also regionally relevant in this particular case, see Larsen 2014a, 906. 
1024 World Value Survey & Global Attitudes Project. 
1025 See for example the Pew Research Center’s 2013 Global Attitudes survey which has studied the views of 40,117 
respondents in 40 countries, http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/04/15/global-morality/ 
1026 According to Donnelly this is a myth created by the uncritical acceptance of the self-representation of the socialist 
bloc and Third World regimes in the West. Even if the conditions for this myth have changed, it has still important 
contemporary practical implications. (Donnelly 2013, 252-253) 
1027 Mattlin 2010, 8. 
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is also reflected in their voting behaviour. Gowan and Brantner have categorized actors according to 
their voting patterns at the UN human rights fora into four different groups: Wider Europe (align with 
EU positions), Liberal Internationalists (align with the EU in more than half the cases), Swing voters 
(align with the EU in 35-50% of cases) and Axis of sovereignty (align with the EU in less than 35 % 
of cases)1028. Here these two ideas are combined and perceptions of the EU role are studied in four 
different groups: 
1) EU Allies, referring to Western countries, which share the EU’s norms and human rights 
interpretations and most often vote in a similar manner to the EU 
2) Moderate countries, which broadly share the EU’s human rights positions and often co-
operate with the EU. However, they might also at times differ from EU positions. 
3) Former colonies/developing countries that have strong dependence relations with the 
EU/EUMS, and often prioritize economic and social rights debates at the HRC. 
4) EU Opponents, referring to strong actors, who are eager to defend the sovereignty of states. 
These countries are also openly critical towards the EU’s norm interpretations and 
consistently vote against EU positions. 
However, UN member states are not the only relevant EU others in the HRC context. That is why 
two additional categories are also examined in this study: 
5) Human rights organizations, active and important EU partners 
6) The UN secretary members, working on HRC related issues 
 
The group of Allies consists of UN member states that often represent the same kind of positions and 
values at the HRC as the EU. These countries come from the wider Europe and West, and mainly 
belong to Western European and Other States group or the Eastern Europe group. Most notably, an 
increasing number of countries from the EU’s neighbourhood align with EU positions, and usually 
also vote with the EU1029. Even if countries in this group mainly agree on values and aims, the EU’s 
normative power image may not be evident. This is because in the Western world the EU is perceived 
as a political partner, not necessarily a normatively different or superior actor1030. The normative 
power role may have more relevance in the Eastern neighbourhood and in EU candidate states. The 
relevance of the Allies’ perceptions of the EU is based on their closeness to the EU; the EU must be 
highly sensitive to the views of its closest partners in order to maintain their support. 
The second group, the Moderate countries, broadly share human rights interpretations with the EU, 
but they also have differing views, which makes alliances more issue-dependent. Most of the 
countries in this group are GRULAC1031 members. As part of the South, their position at the Council 
is difficult because they need to balance between the concerns of the North and the South. According 
to previous studies, Latin American countries, for example Mexico, perceive the EU as a fundamental 
actor in the defence of human rights, democracy and multilateral institutions. They are also quite 
accepting towards the EU’s “moral leadership” on the international scene.1032 The perceptions of this 
                                                 
1028 Gowan & Brantner 2009b, 4. 
1029 It is possible to see which governments align with EU positions for example by looking at EU statements at the 
HRC, see http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un_geneva/eu_statments/human_right/index_en.htm  
1030 Larsen 2014a, 905. 
1031 Regional Latin American and Caribbean Group at the UN. In this regional group there are also important EU 
opponents, such as Cuba and Venezuela, which could not be considered as normatively moderate form the EU 
perspective. 
1032 Chanona 2010, 130; Carta 2010, 213: Domininguez 2010. 
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group are important because they are in a key position when the EU aims to build alliances. These 
countries can make a difference, especially when the HRC resolutions end up going to a vote. 
 
The third group represents voices from former African and Asian colonies of individual EU member 
states. This group reflects the senses behind an asymmetric North-South distribution of power. The 
delegations of these countries in Geneva are small and their resources are scarce, which means that 
their representatives interact with the EU also in other IOs. Most of these countries have closer ties 
with individual EU member states than the EU-delegation1033. Thus, it is not clear how much the EU 
and its member states are separated in their perceptions. Some of the EU’s human rights positions 
may be considered to reflect neo-colonial attitudes, and there may be a rejection of the EU’s 
paternalistic interference in their affairs1034. This is evident when the EU applies human rights clauses 
to partnership agreements. The memory of a colonial past may also contribute to creating expectations 
of compensation and disappointment when the EU action does not fulfil their needs1035. The EU’s 
normative power might be generally read through a neo-colonial lenses1036. However, the EU is an 
important financial supporter, which may improve the EU image, and decrease willingness to criticize 
it. Perceptions of this group are important because they are often the main objects of the EU’s norm 
promotion efforts. As Sicurelli notes in her study of the African Union’s (AU) perceptions of the EU; 
the EU should improve its image as an equal partner and positive model in order to overcome its label 
as a colonial power, and to compete with emerging powers that are getting increasingly active in 
Africa1037. China, for example, has been viewed as a credible alternative to Europe in the African 
quest for development1038. China does not set similar conditions for its aid and avoids taking the 
‘patronizing’ attitude of Europeans.  
 
The fourth group consists of UN member states that more openly oppose EU positions in the HRC, 
and often do not share its human rights priorities and interpretations. This group is regionally diverse, 
and also includes one regional organization. EU resistance is evident when examining the HRC voting 
records, even if they cannot tell everything about the relationship between these countries and the 
EU. In general, countries in this group are eager to defend their sovereignty, and this is one obvious 
reason for objecting to the EU’s initiatives. But there are also differences in prioritizing and 
interpreting human rights between the opponent group and the EU. These powers may also be 
considered to compete for the leadership role of the HRC. From the normative power perspective 
these countries provide a remarkable challenge for the EU’s norm-diffusion efforts. It is likely that 
the Opponents do not support the normative power role assumptions, but rather perceive them as an 
                                                 
1033 This was evident in most of the interviews in this group. One country representative said that they have refused to 
negotiate with the EU delegation, because they do not know the persons there. Quite often important negotiations are 
conducted in capitals. 
1034 Bayoumi notes this as one of the key elements in Egyptian views of the EU. (Bayoumi 2007, 333.) Also Elgström 
notes how fears of exploitation and the perceived patronizing besserwisser EU attitude have influenced the EU-ACP 
economic partnership agreement negotiations (Elgström 2011, 145-146). 
1035 Sicurelli 2010, 180. 
1036 Larsen 2014a, 905. 
1037 Sicurelli 2010, 192. 
1038 About role competition and uncertainty between emerging powers, the EU and the US in trade and development 
nexus, see Ahnlid & Elgström 2014. 
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expression of Eurocentrism1039. By listening to what these actors think about the EU is relevant as 
they represent and drive a highly different agenda at the HRC.  
 
Besides specific UN member states’ perceptions, human rights’ organizations perceptions of the EU’s 
role at the HRC are also included in this thesis. Quite surprisingly, the more specific perceptions of 
the civil society have not been examined much in previous perception studies1040. Human rights 
organizations are important EU partners at the HRC and the EU organizes regular meetings with them 
in Geneva1041. The support for human rights defenders (individuals, but also NGOs) is a long-
established element of the EU's human rights policy1042. These organizations can provide information, 
determine priorities, and enact EU programs. The assumption is that these organizations evaluate the 
EU in rather positive terms. According to previous research, civil society organizations mainly see 
the EU as an important ally, especially in the area of democratization and human rights. The Union 
is perceived to be able to bring positive changes at local destinations.1043 It has also been noted how 
governmental stances are often related to more practical concerns, while civil society organizations 
are often attracted to normative issues1044. However, human rights NGOs may have high expectations 
concerning EU action, and they may be more critical towards its actual performance and impact. The 
sample includes the most relevant human rights organizations working in the HRC1045. Because the 
large human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, are of 
Western origin, human rights organizations from other regions (Africa, Middle East, Latin America, 
and Asia) were also included. It needs to be noted that some of the human rights organizations have 
a general focus, while others work on more specific issue areas. Their focus may influence their views 
on the EU’s role. 
 
As chapter five demonstrated, the EU represents itself as a strong supporter and contributor to the UN 
human rights machinery. The sixth group consists of HRC Secretary Staff, whose opinions can 
support or detract from the EU’s contributor role. Institutions themselves often have specific role 
expectations concerning participating actors. Because of the EU’s high profile and resources in 
human rights, it can be assumed that there are also considerable expectations towards the EU’s role. 
The UN and the EU are presented in UN reports as natural partners who together are able to contribute 
positively to several global issue areas1046. The UN-EU cooperation is also strengthened through the 
fact that the EU and its member states are the largest financial contributors to the UN system. These 
actors represent more independent EU others. 
 
                                                 
1039 Larsen 2014a, 905. 
1040An exception is, for example, Andreatta & Doerr 2007. However, civil society perceptions have also been studied as 
part of wider opinion studies. 
1041 The EU and NGOs meet before HRC regular session and UPR sessions. Here they can present their priorities and 
information concerning the countries or thematic issues coming to HRC consideration. 
1042 See http://eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/defenders/index_en.htm  
1043 Andreatta & Doerr 2007, 393. 
1044 Bayoumi 2007, 339. 
1045 The EU-delegation’s expert dealing with civil society relations listed their major NGO partners. The human rights 
organizations themselves were asked to name the most relevant actors at the Council. 
1046 The ninth annual Partnership Report "Saving and Improving Lives" 24.10.2014, see 
http://www.undp.org/content/brussels/en/home/library/partnership-reports/saving-and-improving-lives--un-eu-
partnership-report-2013/  
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7.3 External Perceptions of the EU Role 
 
This section studies how the EU’s different others perceive the EU’s normative power role. Before 
that, a few important clarifications must be made. First, when we are studying perceptions, it should 
be acknowledged that these provide a more subjective understanding of the state of affairs. Hence, 
these perceptions cannot be used as objective criteria for making conclusions about the EU’s role. 
This is because perceptions are complex constellations of meaning, shaped by a number of interacting 
factors1047. In order to explain why particular actors hold such and such perceptions, another extensive 
study would be needed. There is not much theoretical literature that could help in this kind of task1048. 
However, the specific relations to the EU, cultural contexts, history, political reasons and previous 
experiences with the EU may explain why the participants perceive the EU as they do. Secondly, 
external perceptions of the EU do not represent official country or organizational positions, but rather 
the opinions of those who have worked closely with the EU. It is even possible that their views 
sometimes contradict with the official country statements held by the capitals. The idea is to provide 
some external testing for the normative power role aspects. The third remark is related to the ways in 
which this testing could be done. Perceptions of the EU’s normative power role have been studied 
only as a part of wider perception studies. The variation in the achieved results suggests that there are 
many ways to interpret this kind of role. This research focuses on three key aspects of this kind of 
role:  
1) Do other actors perceive the EU principles and action to reflect the ideal type of normative 
power? Mainly, is the EU seen as a supporter and defender of universal (UN) norms? 
Secondly, is the EU perceived as a non-coercive actor that bases its human rights action 
mainly on socialization through persuasion, argumentation and the conferral of prestige and 
shame?  
2) The second theme considers the EU’s impact and its leadership through example at the HRC.  
As a leader, the EU should have clear objectives and solutions, which could be realized 
through its resources of power (here mainly ideational, but also economic power). Leadership 
would also demand working as an active initiator and agenda-setter at the HRC. The 
leadership position would benefit from good negotiation skills. Hence, it is relevant to study 
if the EU seen is as constructively engaging in dialogue with others, as well as encouraging 
understanding and agreement among HRC participants. Furthermore, coherence and 
credibility are important when the EU aims to lead through its example. 
3) As the EU’s normative power role is constructed through claiming difference, it is important 
to pay attention to how other actors perceive the EU in comparison with other HRC actors. 
As chapter two on normative power noted, the EU’s normative power role is constituted by 
claiming difference with the US. The EU is often described as a more multilateral, engaging 
and soft actor. However, the US is also an important partner and ally for the EU at the HRC, 
and shares its Western value interpretations. It is possible that other actors do not really see a 
difference between these two actors, but point to differences between the EU and more 
normatively distant others. It also needs to be noted that the EU and the US may also compete 
                                                 
1047 Chaban & Holland 2014b, 8. 
1048 Lucarelli 2013, 440. 
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for soft power1049 and leadership of the HRC. This might sometimes make it more difficult to 
find common agreements and drive forward shared projects at the HRC1050. 
The findings will be reported by following the group divisions; first the perceptions of other UN 
member states representatives are examined, by looking at the opinions of ally, moderate, developing 
and opponent countries. After that, the perceptions of human rights organizations and the UN 
secretary interviewees are introduced. 
  
1) The EU in the eyes of its allies1051 
 
The EU’s allies recognized the EU’s normative power role in the sense that the EU is highly 
supportive of international human rights standards and the main institutions, such as the ICC, the UN, 
and the Council of Europe1052. According to one interviewee, the EU “plays a role of reference in 
promoting the universal value of human rights”1053. The EU’s unique normative identity was, for 
example, considered to be most evident in the fight against death penalty1054. The EU was also 
perceived as being able to invoke human rights norms with several non-coercive measures, such as 
partnership programs, enlargement options, diplomatic demarches, and bilateral dialogues1055. One 
respondent mentioned that “the EU is the best bloc in the sense that they really want to advance 
human rights and they are the best delegations to be honest in their work”1056. Despite the possible 
normative power role observed by this group, all the interviewees saw that economic power and 
national interests still play an important role in the EU’s human rights approach. Interestingly, one 
interviewee also mentioned how sometimes individual EU countries are trying to bring down the 
normative element in the EU’s action1057. This is why another interviewee doubted whether the EU 
dimension is even needed to make deals: “if common EU position is the lowest common denominator 
between the member states, it is not evident that it helps human rights”.1058 The EU’s ability to 
persuade others was seen as being related more to its size as a bloc. The allies group mainly perceived 
the EU as a less attractive partner because it excludes others from its coordination and is not able to 
accommodate their views afterwards.1059 One interviewee also mentioned how the EU “has the self-
perception that it is the moral high ground”. This makes it difficult to come to a compromise.1060 
According to allies, the EU should deliver its position and rationale more actively with various like-
minded countries from different regional groups1061.  
 
                                                 
1049 Karen Smith sees the EU as the main soft power competitor for the US. This competition may also lead to 
confrontations in global arenas. (Smith K. 2014a) 
1050 One of my interviewees mentioned how the US is most concerned about and frustrated with the common EU 
approaches, as it would prefer to work individually with particular EU member states, external interview 37. 
1051 This group consists of six interviews, external interviews 1, 18, 21, 30, 35, 37. 
1052 External interviews 1, 18, 30. 
1053 External interview 1. 
1054 External interview 30. 
1055 External interviews 18, 30, 35, 37. 
1056 External interview 37. 
1057 This was mentioned to be the case when big EU countries start to think about their political priorities or smaller 
EUMS bloc issue-specific positions related, for example, to abortion. 
1058 External interview 21. 
1059 External interviews 18, 21, 35, 37. 
1060 External interview 18. 
1061 External interviews 1, 18, 30. 
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In the eyes of its allies, the EU leadership role divided opinions. Some thought that the EU was able 
to show leadership, for example, through its own human rights model, including a legally binding 
Charter of Fundamental Rights1062. The EU was also considered to be skilled to transform its model, 
most notably to the Eastern neighbourhood and the Balkans.1063 According to allies, the EU is very 
prominent at the HRC in the sense that it speaks on every single issue, delivers opinions, and follows 
processes. Furthermore, the EU was mentioned by some to be highly active in organizing side events 
and other informal discussions.1064 These opinions clearly support an active EU role. However, the 
EU leadership was perceived as being more related to specific issues, where united EU positions are 
reached1065. One interviewee also mentioned that with so many EU member states at the HRC, the 
EU should be much more influential1066. The EU leadership was seen as also being restricted by the 
HRC composition, consisting of many EU opponents. Some interviewees said that the EU’s colonial 
past creates opposition in the developing world.1067 EU credibility was also mentioned as being 
diminished because of its double standards in relation to country cases and because of some internal 
EU problems, such as the treatment of minorities and migrants.1068  
 
This group agreed that the EU is different when compared with other HRC participants. For some 
allies the EU appears as a normative power when compared with the US and Russia, which have 
adopted strong and even threatening attitudes1069. These differences were crystallized in some 
thematic issues, such as the death penalty, while in some other cases, like the Middle East, there was 
more congruence. Even if the EU was seen as being loud -spoken in several issues, it was not 
considered to go very far with its claims and take strong positions like the US. The EU’s more 
moderate position was seen to be apparent mainly in the HRC voting.1070 It was also mentioned by 
one interviewee that “the EU is better to fence human rights ideas as it is able to form more rounded, 
consensus seeking arguments to reach other blocs”.1071 The US was seen as more able to win tough 
issues and in that sense the US was seen to play the defensive agenda better at the HRC. It was also 
mentioned by one interviewee how the EU is unable to handle difficult themes and acts “as if these 
issues would not exist”1072. Such behaviour makes the EU weaker in the eyes of its allies. 
 
2) Moderate countries and EU role perceptions1073 
 
This group saw the EU as an important promoter and protector of human rights. However, most of 
them also noted how the EU mainly drives civil and political rights, whereas EU states are not that 
                                                 
1062 External interviews 1, 30. 
1063 External interviews 18, 30. 
1064 External interviews 30, 35, 37. 
1065 External interviews 18, 30, 35, 37 Internal EU dynamics was also considered to hinder EU leadership possibilities. 
1066 External interview 21. 
1067 External interviews 35, 37.  
1068 External interview 30. 
1069 External interviews 18, 21, 35. 
1070 Here it was mentioned how the EU abstains more often while the US votes against (see also section 6.3). However, 
it was also mentioned that individual EUMS may still adopt extreme positions, external interviews 18, 35. 
1071 External interview 37. 
1072 External interviews 18. 
1073 This group consists of five interviews with “moderate countries” from the GRULAC, external interviews 9, 14, 17, 
20, 24. 
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eager or united in questions concerning economic and social rights1074. For example, one interviewee 
noted how the right to development, dear to the developing world, was a difficult theme for the EU1075. 
Two interviewees underlined the EU’s strong agency in controversial human rights themes, which 
make the EU more unpopular in the HRC1076. In the eyes of moderate countries, EU action was mainly 
seen as value-based, and according to one interviewee, the dominance of values in the EU approach 
makes it a “superpower of values”1077. This image was considered as also being related to how the 
EU promotes these values. Many interviewees thought that the EU highlights universal law and 
international standards, instead of coercive (military) measures1078. The EU’s soft approach also 
makes it more persuasive in the eyes of others1079. However, the EU was not considered a persuasive 
partner because of the perceived complexity of its internal decision-making. Respondents in this 
group complained how difficult it is for them to know who is internally in charge, as the EU does not 
inform outsiders. In the eyes of moderate country representatives, the EU does its cooperation in 
secrecy, and it is not at all transparent how its positions are formed. Sometimes outcomes are quite 
surprising and this makes the EU an unpredictable ally.1080 The way the EU treats its potential partners 
was criticized. As two interviewees mentioned, there is not much dialogue, for example when the EU 
delivers its opinions and offers “take it or leave it option”.1081  
 
The EU’s influential role in the HRC was considered as being based on its own example as a 
progressive human rights region by many interviewees.1082 Even if the EU influence was considered 
to being limited by the institutional and political factors apparent at the HRC, most moderate country 
experts thought that the EU has all the potential to lead at the Council1083. However, the potential 
leadership of the EU is diminished because of its internal divisions and incoherencies. According to 
most interviewees, the EU merely adopts the lowest common denominator positions in some cases 
and refuses to handle more difficult and dividing issues1084. The EU’s way of communicating in the 
Council also raised some concerns among the moderates. The EU mainly blames others, most often 
developing countries, and also treats similar cases differently. In the case of important countries, such 
as China and Russia, the EU does not raise human rights issues at all.1085 This kind of selectiveness 
does not increase EU credibility. The EU should also be more open to listen to criticism pointed at 
its own problems, such as anti-terrorism measures, migration, and the treatment of Roma people. Two 
interviewees also mentioned that the EU or its member states do not criticize other Western states, or 
the human rights situations in EU member states during the Universal Periodic Review process1086. 
These incoherencies decreased EU credibility and example in the eyes of others. 
                                                 
1074 External interviews 14, 17, 20, 24. 
1075 The closer relations of this group to developing countries in Africa were also emphasized, external interview 14. 
1076 For example in the promotion of LGBTI rights and family related issues, external interviews 9, 20. 
1077 External interview 24. 
1078 External interviews 9, 17, 24. 
1079 It was, for example, mentioned that the EU is more honest than other Western powers, most notably the US, 
external interviews 14, 24. 
1080 External interviews 9, 14, 20, 24. 
1081 External interviews 14, 24. 
1082 The EU was, for example, praised for the space it can offer for civil society organizations, developed European HR 
institutions, and advanced human rights law, external interviews 9, 20, 24. 
1083 External interviews 9, 17, 24. 
1084 For example item 7 issues and Libya was mentioned, external interviews 14, 17, 20, 24. 
1085 External interviews 9, 17, 24. 
1086 External interviews 9, 20, 24. 
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Differences between the EU and the US were recognized in this group.  However, these two actors 
were also seen to be similar in many respects. They both were mentioned to use a lot of rhetoric and 
double standards in their policies. Many interviewees noted that the EU and the US also represent a 
similar position in the majority of cases and during voting.1087 The relevance of the EU-US 
partnership was also underlined by two interviewees: the EU will lose its positions if it cannot get US 
support1088. The US was clearly perceived to have an important role in the HRC, and these two powers 
were also considered as competitors. The EU benefit was seen as being related to its many voices and 
continuous presence in the Council through its member states1089. One interviewee mentioned that 
the US uses human rights to further its political interests. The EU is a more “honest” and less 
“antagonist” human rights defender.1090 According to another interviewee, the EU can sometimes act 
like the US if interests are high. However, in general, the EU was perceived as less willing to coerce 
others.1091 It was also noted how the EU can benefit from the support of other European non-EU 
members who represent the European human rights tradition. However, at times the EU was seen as 
too eager in overstretching the “western opinion”. This may not work because Switzerland and 
Norway do not necessarily follow the EU. They can still build bridges between the EU and others.1092  
 
3) How do developing countries perceive the EU’s role?1093 
 
The picture of the EU as a promoter of universal human rights norms was challenged by the 
developing countries. Differences in interpretation and prioritization of rights with the EU were 
evident in this group. The main difference, repeated in the interviews, was neatly summarized by one 
respondent: “the EU has this kind of hierarchy of rights, where political and civil rights come first. 
But we consider all human rights as equal, and this is already stated in all the UN Charters and 
Treaties”1094. Difficulties to also find an agreement with the EU on cultural and traditional issues 
were recognized by most of them1095. The developing countries considered the EU as a normative 
power in the sense that it is able to shape norms and standards in other countries, and it largely relies 
on values1096. However, the EU power was not considered as being based solely on ideational factors. 
The economic resources of the EU, as well as structural factors, were perceived to contribute 
essentially to the EU’s influence in human rights issues1097. According to developing countries, the 
EU places much importance on human rights concerns, which becomes evident for example in its 
                                                 
1087 External interviews 9, 20, 24. 
1088 External interviews 9, 20. 
1089 External interview 20, 24. 
1090 Even if individual EUMS differ in this respect; some EU members have a more honest and credible human rights 
policy, while others, mainly the UK and France, were seen to be strong and less willing to make compromises, external 
interview 14. 
1091 External interviews 17, 24. 
1092 External interviews 9, 20. 
1093 This group consists of nine interviews with developing country representatives, external interviews 2, 10, 11, 12, 
13, 19, 22, 26, 29. 
1094 External interview 19. 
1095 Differences were related to sexual orientation, gender roles, marriage, family issues and circumcision, external 
interviews 10, 12, 22, 26, 29. 
1096 External interviews 10, 11, 12, 22, 26. 
1097 For example, the EU position as one of the largest financial contributors to the UN was mentioned. Several 
interviewees referred also to the EU development aid and to bilateral special relations between individual EU countries 
and their former colonies, external interviews 2, 10, 11, 12, 13, 29. 
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(EU/EUMS) foreign policies1098, in EU policies within multilateral organizations1099, in the amount 
of issues discussed1100, and in EU cooperation agreements1101.  However, at the same time, many 
interviewees recognized how economic and political interests play a role in several cases1102. 
According to one interviewee, the HRC can provide a litmus test of how much importance human 
rights really have in EU foreign policy1103. The EU’s persuasiveness was related to its ability to 
provide economic incentives for the developing countries in the realization of human rights 
objectives. The EU was, for example, praised for its help in building the capacities of developing 
countries to face human rights challenges and developing more independent positions at the HRC1104. 
However, it was also mentioned by many interviewees of how the EU’s influence and credibility is 
diminished when it sets political conditions for its aid for third states. Sometimes the EU was also 
seen to misuse the conditions set for giving aid when it is not eager to help some state. At the same 
time the setting of conditions increases the power of other actors in developing countries, most 
notably the power of China.1105  
 
According to the developing countries, the EU can be a leader through its example, based on European 
human rights institutions, mechanisms, law and practices1106. One interviewee mentioned how the 
EU is represented as “a paragon of virtue”, and the tendency is high to see the EU as an example1107. 
Another interviewee said “the EU can play moral leadership in the Council”1108. However, EU 
leadership by example has several problems in the eyes of developing countries. Generally, the EU’s 
credibility as a human rights leader is diminished because of the colonial past. It was, for example, 
reminded by some that the EU has committed the gravest human rights violations in history, and it 
should bear this in mind when it aims to lead and criticize others1109. The EU’s negotiation skills were 
also evaluated rather negatively. The EU was not perceived to have much dialogue with others. 
Instead most interviewees mentioned how the EU lectures to others and points at their failures1110. 
According to one interviewee “our relationship is still very similar than in the colonial times, they are 
the masters…”1111. The main message in several interviews was that the EU should develop its 
capacities of listening to others and consolidating positions. The EU’s credibility as a human rights 
example was also decreased because of its internal human rights problems. For example, the growing 
amount of racism and xenophobia all over Europe and the inhuman treatment of migrants in European 
entry points were mentioned in many interviews.1112 If the EU wants to be an example for others it 
should, according to this group, fix its own problems first. Another thing that has relevance for EU 
credibility in the eyes of the developing world are internal EU divisions, which according to 
                                                 
1098 External interview 10. 
1099 External interview 29. 
1100 External interviews 10, 26. 
1101 External interview 12. 
1102 External interviews 2, 12, 13, 22. 
1103 External interview 29. 
1104 External interviews 11, 19. 
1105 External interviews 10, 11, 13, 19. 
1106 External interviews 10, 13, 22, 26. 
1107 External interview 29. 
1108 External interview 13. 
1109 External interviews 11, 13. 
1110 External interviews 2, 10, 11, 13, 22, 26. 
1111 Here special reference to the UK, France and Germany was made, external interview 13. 
1112 External interviews 11, 12, 13, 19, 26.  
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interviewees can present “a new form of imperialism inside the EU”1113, diminish internal EU 
democracy1114, and provide only the lowest common denominator approach1115. Even if most 
interviewees thought that the EU is more influential with a common position, this approach was 
perceived as creating more tensions in the work of the HRC1116. 
 
Even if the US and the EU present the rich West in the eyes of the developing world, the EU seemed 
to have a more neutral reputation among my interviewees. First of all, these two differed in respect 
to thematic issues1117. The EU was perceived by several interviewees to have more fundamental 
human rights positions in many issues1118. More obvious differences were related to the measures 
with which these powers drive their human rights agenda at the HRC. The US was considered to 
coerce others with different kinds of threats, while the EU was mainly seen as reluctant to use direct 
coercion towards others.1119 It was also mentioned that the US uses human rights as a political tool, 
by linking issues outside the Council to its demands, whilst the EU adopts such measures only on rare 
occasions1120. One interviewee also perceived the EU as a more flexible and constructive negotiation 
partner in bilateral relations1121. According to another interviewee “the US does not care what others 
think, it does not need others’ help or approval. The EU is more sensitive on issues”1122. Despite these 
differences, the positions of the EU and the US were also seen as closely related. Interestingly, two 
interviewees claimed that EU positions have been subordinated to US views at the HRC, and only 
recently has the EU developed a more independent, own voice1123. The EU’s possibilities to influence 
and lead were considered as being tied to the US; the EU must always find synergies with the US1124. 
The difference aspect was not only related to the US. Developing countries also mentioned several 
normative competitors for the EU: for example Cuba and China, who are able to use the “soft power” 
approach and value rhetoric to persuade others1125.  
 
4) The EU’s role in the eyes of its opponents1126 
 
The EU’s opponents did not generally support the view of the EU as a value-led actor. One 
interviewee mentioned how “the EU would like to project this kind of image, but it does not work in 
practice”1127. The EU was seen to act according to its political priorities and interests, like other actors. 
For example economic interests were mentioned to trump values in EU action.1128 In this group, the 
                                                 
1113 External interview 26. 
1114 External interviews 12, 19. 
1115 External interview 19. 
1116 External interviews 2, 10, 22, 26, 29. 
1117 Thematic differences noticed were water issues, Israel-Palestine questions, racism.  
1118 For example EU attitudes to climate issues, death penalty, and LGBTI rights, external interviews 10, 12, 26, 29.  
1119 It was for example mentioned that the US goes directly to capitals and pressures individual experts to vote 
according to their preferences, external interviews 12, 13, 26. 
1120 Here, the UK was mentioned as a political power player, external interviews 12, 13, 22. 
1121 External interview 29. 
1122 External interview 13. 
1123 External interviews 12, 26. 
1124 External interviews 19, 26, 29. 
1125 One example of influence mentioned was education programs for students, external interview 13. 
1126 This group consists of four “EU opponent” interviews, external interviews 3, 4, 6, 27. 
1127 External interview 6. 
1128 This was evident in the EU’s selection of country cases, and during the UPR, external interviews 4, 6, 27. 
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disagreement concerning the interpretation of human rights norms was evident. History, culture, and 
religion were mentioned as important factors explaining the differences1129. The EU was not 
perceived as a promoter of universal norms, instead opponents criticized the EU for imposing its 
human rights norms on others, and then presenting them as the only right ones1130. The EU was seen 
as most active in the promoting of civil and political values. However, the EU was not perceived to 
have much interest to act on issues important for the developing countries1131. Furthermore, the EU’s 
focus on individual rights, instead of community rights, was criticized by some interviewees1132. 
 
The EU’s opponents generally noticed the important role of the EU in the HRC, but the EU was not 
considered to be a leader. Opponents mentioned other big powers, such as the Organization for 
Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the US, China, Russia, South Africa and Cuba, which are able to 
challenge the EU.1133 It was also mentioned by one interviewee that “the EU takes only passive, not 
active positions”1134. Several factors were mentioned, which diminished the EU’s possibilities and 
credibility to play a leadership role. First of all, the EU divisions were seen to diminish its 
consistency1135. Secondly, the EU’s style of communicating with others was criticized; the EU mainly 
blames others, while the EU is reluctant to discuss its own problems, such as migration, at the 
Council1136. Some of the opponents thought that the EU desires dialogue, whilst others criticized the 
EU for the lack of reciprocity. One interviewee said that there is no reason for having a dialogue, 
because EU representatives refer to their limited competencies to handle EU member states’ 
problems1137. Thirdly, the EU was seen to criticize third countries in an incoherent manner1138. The 
EU was also accused of the strategic use of human rights concerns in some situations. For example, 
in the eyes of some interviewees the human rights conditionality provides an excuse not to give aid 
to other states1139.   
 
The EU was considered to differ from other actors mainly because, as a political group, it has 
mandated the EU to act on behalf of its member states1140. However, one interviewee said: “the EU 
cannot show its members the value of collective positions. It can only show the lowest common 
denominator positions”.1141 The difference between the EU and the US was not perceived to be very 
obvious. The US was seen as a clear and strong actor, able to lead at the Council. The EU’s objectives 
were not considered to be as clear and transparent because of its internal negotiations.1142 Their 
similarity was also underlined; one interviewee mentioned how “the EU and the US often act in 
                                                 
1129 External interview 3. 
1130 External interview 4, 6. 
1131 Interviewees referred, for example, to different economic and social rights, foreign debt, migrant workers, and 
religious minorities, external interviews 3, 6, 27. 
1132 External interviews 3, 6. 
1133 External interviews 3, 4, 6, 27. 
1134 External interview 6. 
1135 External interviews 6, 27. 
1136 External interviews 3, 6, 27. 
1137 External interview 27. 
1138 Cases mentioned were the UPR of Saudi Arabia and China, external interviews 6, 27. 
1139 External interview 6, 27. 
1140 External interviews 4, 6, 27. 
1141 External interview 6. 
1142 External interviews 4, 6. 
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similar lines and appear as a one bloc”1143. According to opponents, these two actors still differ in the 
ways in which they act. Interestingly, one interviewee said how “there is a tendency that the EU acts 
more like the US. It used to be much a more honest and credible power. Now it is more about the 
economic and political agenda of the EU”1144. Differences between the two were noted during voting, 
when the EU more often abstains in difficult cases1145. In some cases the EU was mentioned as being 
more committed to human rights concerns and UN procedures than the US1146.  
 
5) How do human rights organizations perceive the EU role?1147  
 
In this group, the EU’s normative power role divided opinions. On the one hand, the EU’s high 
commitment to UN bodies, principles and instruments was recognized. It was also noticed that the 
EU is a highly active and engaged actor at the HRC. For human rights organizations the EU represents 
a defender of universal human rights standards agreed at the international level. The EU is considered 
to offer strong positions against those states that are hostile to human rights.1148 However, the 
normative power role was also seen to be more in Europe than in the EU as such1149. Overall, human 
rights organizations thought that the EU can deliver more principled positions through individual 
member states. On the other hand, the EU’s ability to persuade other countries at the HRC was 
considered to be limited because the EU is composed of several former colonial powers1150. It was 
also noted how the EU or individual member states often have more principled stances on human 
rights issues, while the common EU approach may only provide the minimum standards1151. In this 
sense the EU’s common voice may diminish its normative power role. Furthermore, the EU’s most 
evident weaknesses noticed by this group is the way it communicates with others. The EU mainly 
gives lessons for others, and has difficulties in selling itself as a partner. According to human rights 
organizations, the EU should be able to act as a trustworthy partner, not a kind of “big muscular 
Europe” and learn to listen to others’ concerns1152. The EU is also seen as quite inflexible and unable 
to mediate because of its complex internally reached agreements1153. Another problem mentioned in 
these interviews was the EU way to bloc other actor’s initiatives and add nasty amendments to their 
resolutions. Even if this was considered to be necessary, it creates a bad atmosphere in the Council.1154 
As one interviewee put it: “the big challenge for the EU in the future is to be a principled actor, but 
at the same time not to polarize the debate too much”1155.  
 
In the eyes of human rights organizations, the EU region presents a strong model for others with its 
regional human rights system, high standards, active NGOs, and public opinion. However, according 
                                                 
1143 External interview 4. 
1144 External interview 27. 
1145 External interview 4. 
1146 Here the UPR process of Israel was mentioned, external interview 3. 
1147 This group represents the views of 13 human rights organization representatives (interviews 5, 7, 8, 16, 23, 28, 31, 
32, 33, 34, 36, 38, 39). 
1148 External interviews 5, 7, 8, 16, 28, 36. 
1149 Here Norway and Switzerland were mentioned as particularly important examples, external interview 8. 
1150 External interviews 5, 34. 
1151 External interviews 5, 8, 16, 28, 32, 36. 
1152 External interviews 7, 8, 23, 33, 34, 36. 
1153 External interviews 28, 34, 36. 
1154 External interviews 34, 36.  
1155 External interview 8. 
151 
 
to this group, the EU has not been particularly good at leadership at the HRC. As one interviewee 
noted, “action in the HRC is much about agenda-setting, and the EU has always been bad at this”1156. 
It was, for example, mentioned how the EU does not take up new issues, which is disappointing when 
many human rights situations in the world would demand urgent attention1157. The EU was also 
considered to be a slow and reactive force, rather than actor that provides a strong agenda1158. The 
EU’s lack of strategic vision and planning is the main thing that seemed to frustrate human rights 
organizations1159. Another issue is the EU’s unwillingness to deal with difficult cases.1160 According 
to on interviewee, for example “the EU’s incapability of dealing with the Arab Spring could be the 
greatest failure of the EU in its more recent history”1161. However, the EU leadership was also 
considered to depend on issues, and internal EU policies and agreements were seen to matter much. 
According to human rights organizations, the EU has to improve its policy coherence – between 
Brussels and Geneva, but also between its human rights guidelines and field operations1162. 
Furthermore, the EU was seen as reluctant to or incapable of dealing with its own human rights 
questions at the HRC1163. According to one interviewee “the EU seems pathologically incapable of 
having a proper discussion about anything to do with refugees or migrants. It directly becomes 
defensive…This defensiveness makes the EU an easy target for other countries”1164. However, most 
of the human rights organizations mentioned the EU’s leading role as a defender of civil society space 
and organizations. Here the EU was considered to be the only actor that really facilitates the NGOs 
and has a dialogue with them.1165 In general, the EU is only a potential leader in the eyes of human 
rights organizations. It was also mentioned that the EU does not necessarily even need to lead the 
Council; according to one interviewee, the EU could facilitate communication and support others 
from a backseat position. Several moderate countries could benefit more from this kind of EU role.1166  
 
In this group, the difference between the US and the EU was not emphasized as much as in other 
groups. Human rights organizations mainly considered both actors, the US and the EU, as occupying 
the “right side” on the battle for human rights. Many interviewees saw the US as more proactive and 
able to make changes1167. The EU was not considered to be eager to take strong positions and adopt 
leadership in the Council1168. However, the US was not seen as engaged to the HRC procedures and 
more generally to UN mechanisms. Here the EU’s role was to counterbalance the US and other strong 
actors.1169 One interviewee noted that the EU clearly has more in common with other countries than 
the US, mainly because of the colonial past. This gives it a lot of soft power and related influence, 
which the US does not have.1170 It was also noted that the US’s credibility is diminished because of 
                                                 
1156 External interview 28. 
1157 External interview 7. 
1158 External interviews 7, 16, 28, 39. 
1159 External interviews 7, 16. 
1160 External interviews 7, 28. 
1161 External interview 28. 
1162 External interviews 7, 8, 28, 36. 
1163 External interviews 16, 23, 28, 32.  
1164 External interview 16. 
1165 External interviews 8, 23, 28, 31, 33, 34, 36, 39.  
1166 External interview 23. 
1167 External interviews 7, 28, 32, 33, 36, 38. 
1168 External interview 7, 16, 32, 34. 
1169 External interviews 32, 33, 39. 
1170 External interview 5. 
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serious inconsistencies in the area of torture, prison conditions, and the death penalty1171. The EU was 
perceived to be less threatening, as it does not coerce others or present the extreme Western 
opinion1172. However, it was also noticed how other actors benefit from this: “It is so easy to defeat 
the EU and others use its weakness”1173. In this sense, the EU’s softer approach may actually weaken 
its influence at the HRC. 
 
6) The EU through the eyes of the UN1174  
 
The EU’s strong human rights focus was recognized by UN personnel. According to one interviewee 
“the EU really defends principles, values and its positions in these matters”1175. However, it was also 
mentioned how “the EU finds it more comfortable to speak about values than rights”1176. The EU’s 
prioritization of human rights was not considered to be evident in each and every case. According to 
one UN expert, “it is not always clear that human rights are the key objective of the EU”1177. Another 
interviewee complained how “the high EU officials have not shown their face in Geneva. If the EU 
sends someone, almost an irrelevant person, this is a clear sign of not taking human rights work 
seriously”.1178 Another thing that clearly divided the opinions of the interviewees was the EU’s 
commitment to the UN and multilateral working methods. Interestingly, EU attitudes towards UN 
procedures were not considered to be very supportive by two interviewees1179. One interviewee 
thought that the EU/EUMS are really supportive of the UN mechanisms and can deliver funding and 
extra resources when needed1180. This difference could be explained by the different positions of the 
interviewees in the HRC Secretary. The EU was not considered to be a very attractive partner for 
others. One complaint, for example, was how the EU is too complex and divided, and how others find 
it difficult to understand its working methods1181. It was also mentioned how the EU does not care 
about others’ ideas and is not willing to finance their initiatives1182. However, it was also noted that 
“the EU probably has much worse perception to what it actually is”1183. 
 
The EU’s leadership claims were associated with its identity, good human rights records, and efficient 
institutions by this group. However, the EU’s internal dynamics were perceived to confuse and 
diminish its efforts. One interviewee underlined that the lack of communication (internal and 
external) is the main problem of the EU at the HRC1184. According to another, the EU does not have 
                                                 
1171 External interview 32. 
1172 Canada, Australia and the US were seen to represent the “extreme West” , external interviews 5, 38. 
1173 External interview 38. 
1174 This group consists of three HRC secretary member interviews (interviews 15, 25, 40). 
1175 The fight against racism and defamation of religion were mentioned especially as exemplary cases where the EU 
has not compromised its values (external interview 40). 
1176 External interview 25. 
1177 External interview 25. 
1178 External interviews 15, 25. 
1179 The case of Israel UPR was mentioned as a case in point (external interview 15). The EU was also not supportive of 
the Advisory Committee, as it wants more independent experts. The EUMS were also mentioned to be “outrageous” 
with special rapporteurs. The EU’s support for the Complaints procedure was also doubted (external interviews 15, 25). 
1180 External interview 40. 
1181 External interviews 15, 25, 40. 
1182 External interview 15. 
1183 External interview 40. 
1184 External interview 40. 
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time for introspection because it spends too much time in internal coordination. The EU position was 
seen as being reduced with the common approach. Previously some EU member states were 
considered to have had a highly progressive agenda, while nowadays they were seen to follow only 
general EU positions.1185 Two interviewees also mentioned that the EU has high ambitions and 
rhetoric, but then nothing happens1186. When it comes to external communication, the EU was seen 
to be an “arrogant actor” that mainly blames others and “shows no empathy”1187. One thing that was 
considered to diminish EU leadership through example was the way in which some EU countries had 
treated UN Special Rapporteurs1188. This was related to EU attitudes towards its own human rights 
difficulties, such as migration issues and the popularity of far right parties, which the EU does discuss 
at the Council. For example one interviewee mentioned that “human rights start at home, this is 
something the EU should learn”1189.  
 
In this group, the difference between the EU and the US was not highlighted so much. However, their 
approaches to other countries were seen to be different. The EU was perceived to use its power in 
less visible ways, and it was not considered to be so loud about its successes. One interviewee 
reminded how the EU had been able to work in the Council before the US joined it1190. The US was 
considered a “mega power”, always aware of what it wants. The US was seen to pressure capitals and 
basically tell others what it wants them to do.1191 The EU was not seen to work in such a manner. The 
US was also seen as a very powerful and clear actor at the HRC, through which it was able to make 
more changes1192. The situation is quite the contrary for the EU, according to one interviewee “there 
is no clear EU positions to anything…and it takes forever before it reaches some kind of position”1193. 
The US was also seen as keen to maintain its individuality at the HRC by promoting distinct positions 
and explaining them carefully in each occasion, even if it works only as an additional sponsor of 
resolution1194. According to one interviewee, the EU is a more progressive actor, which aims to work 
in issue areas that are “in the interests of all players” (economic and social rights), and which the US 
often opposes. In this respect, the EU was considered as a possible bridge-builder by also tackling 
issues like torture, fight against terrorism, racism and conflict situations. In this sense the EU is “a 
very strong initiator, even stronger than the US”.1195 All the UN interviewees thought that the US 
uses human rights for reaching its political objectives. In this respect, it was thought that “the EU 
should not follow the US too much, but have their own say”1196. Some EU countries were also 
considered to follow US positions too much. Despite the negative evaluations of EU support for the 
UN, one interviewee underlined how the EU and its member states are still more consistent and 
                                                 
1185 External interview 15. 
1186 External interviews 15, 25. 
1187 External interviews 15, 25. 
1188 Here the special rapporteur of education in Germany and special rapporteur of housing in the UK were mentioned 
as cases (external interviews 15, 25). 
1189 External interview 15. 
1190 External interview 40. 
1191 External interviews 15, 25, 40. 
1192 External interview 25. 
1193 External interview 15. 
1194 External interview 25. 
1195 External interview 40. 
1196 External interview 15. 
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reliable financial supporters of the UN. In the case of the US, the finance was seen to be always highly 
dependent on domestic politics and in this sense unsure.1197 
 
7.4 The EU’s Normative Power Role in the Eyes of Others 
 
Larsen notes how studying the external perceptions of the EU could provide the missing link between 
the EU’s normative power role claims and the reality of this role1198. This chapter has provided such 
a “reality-check” for the EU’s self-image. In order to be a normative power, the EU cannot merely 
proclaim this role; it should also be recognized by others. Interviews with the EU’s external others in 
the HRC context are able to inform about the actual recognition of this kind of EU role. According 
to these perceptions, the picture of the EU as a normative power is rather mixed. While some aspects 
of this role are evident, others are met with suspicion or even denial. The findings support the 
assumption that external perceptions differ among different others. Not surprisingly, normative power 
role claims were better accepted among those actors who are normatively closer to the EU, while EU 
opponents contested such a role1199. However, there were also important similarities in the views of 
different others. These more “common external perceptions” are highly beneficial in explaining why 
the EU succeeds in having impact at certain times and not in others. These perceptions may be highly 
beneficial in reconstructing the EU’s global role in human rights. In the following, some general 
conclusions concerning the external perception of the EU’s normative power role are provided. 
 
In the eyes of others, the EU is seen to represent a normative power in the sense that it is recognized 
as a supporter and defender of universal (UN) human rights norms and institutions. The EU was also 
mainly seen as an active and dedicated participant at the HRC. When the EU’s defence of universal 
principles is considered, one problem is that the EU prioritizes civil and political rights, which 
decreases its legitimacy in the eyes of the Global South. Developing countries were eager to represent 
themselves as real advocates of universal and indivisible human rights. The EU opponents criticized 
the EU way of presenting its human rights interpretation as the only universally valid. This shows 
how the discursive context is highly important at the HRC, and how other UN members aim to 
challenge Western interpretation of rights1200. Here some controversial questions related, for example, 
to the freedom of religion and belief, family concepts and freedom of expression caused divisions. In 
these cases EU interpretations do not represent the opinions of the UN majority and the EU cannot 
easily persuade others to follow its opinions. According to moderate states, the EU actually 
diminishes its normative power role by working too loudly on controversial issues. These differences 
in the interpretation of human rights also have a long history1201. They remind that the EU’s normative 
power role becomes more contested when it is practiced in a global context, such as the UN. Even if 
the EU claims that it is not promoting European but universal values, it aims to legitimate the pre-
existing standards of human rights. However, those countries that oppose EU efforts are more willing 
                                                 
1197 External interview 40. 
1198 Larsen 2014a. 
1199 This is also in line with previous research findings, see for example Bengtsson & Elgström 2011. 
1200 See Larsen 2014b, Gowan & Brantner 2008. 
1201 For differences in interpretation of rights see section 3.2 and for problems in EU interpretation see Patomäki 2013, 
87-88. 
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to redefine these norms, for example, by taking into account the cultural particularities and rights of 
communities instead of individuals.  
 
The EU image as a value-led actor was mainly supported by its allies, moderates and human rights 
organizations. The EU was, for example, called a “superpower of values”, suggesting that its main 
way to influence others is through values. Developing countries and EU opponents were also more 
inclined to see economic and security interests behind the EU’s human rights agenda. When the 
normativity of EU behaviour was considered, the EU was generally perceived as rather reluctant to 
use coercive measures against other actors. The EU approach was perceived to be rather soft, 
cooperative and engaging among the interviewees. This kind of image supports the EU’s self-
perception as a normative power. However, the EU’s ability to diffuse norms by persuading others 
was also seen to be limited for many reasons. Others did not see the EU as a persuasive partner 
because of its internal complexity and inflexibility. This image was also highly predominant among 
EU allies, moderate states and human rights organizations. The lack of real dialogue between the EU 
and its possible partners was underlined, even if the situation was considered to be improving. The 
countries from the Global South criticized the EU for imposing its positions on others and adopting 
conditionality. Despite the obvious normative power potential, the EU image is negatively affected 
by the inequality apparent in these partnerships1202. Thus, the EU’s normative efforts are, like before, 
still seen through the neo-colonial lens1203. Several interviewees from the developing countries 
underlined the EU’s need to develop its capacities to listen to others.  
 
In order to be a normative power, the EU should also succeed in providing leadership through its 
example at the HRC. The EU’s leadership role divided opinions among the interviewees. This 
leadership was recognized in specific issue areas, such as in the inclusion and empowerment of the 
NGOs and in particular country resolutions. The EU was also seen as an active contributor to formal 
and informal HRC debates and events. However, in general the EU was not seen as a self-evident 
leader of the Council. The representatives of human rights organizations criticized the EU for the lack 
of new initiatives and clear vision1204. Many interviewees mentioned how the EU is a rather reactive 
force and its positions may reflect the lowest common denominator between the EU states. This kind 
of positioning was not considered to be a sign of leadership, or reflect the combined potential of the 
EU and its member states. Expectations towards EU action at the HRC are high, and the interviews 
with human rights organizations and UN personnel clearly demonstrated that the EU has not been 
able to meet all of them. The EU approach also suffers from several inconsistencies, which decrease 
the EU’s credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of others. One of the most evident weaknesses 
mentioned was the EU’s incapability to handle difficult issues. The EU was also claimed to 
selectively point to other countries, focusing mainly on weaker non-European countries. According 
to others, the EU’s criticism should also be pointed towards strong countries such as Russia, China, 
Saudi Arabia, Israel and EU allies in the West. Human rights organizations hold the view that the EU 
                                                 
1202 This has also been obvious in other studies concerning the ACP countries perceptions of the EU, see for example 
Brantner 2010, Bengtsson & Elgström 2011 and 2012. 
1203 See Larsen 2014a, 906-907. 
1204 Here it should be noted that knowledge about the EU priorities at the HRC among the EU’s others was very low. 
This supports previous findings according to which knowledge of the EU (concerning internal EU policies) among 
others is low, see Chaban et al. 2013. 
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should demand high standards, even when it is faced with challenging and important partners that do 
not share its value interpretations. This would make it a more credible human rights power.  
 
The EU’s difference formed the third relevant aspect of examination and encouraged comparisons 
between different HRC participants. Interestingly, most interviewees draw differences between the 
EU and the US, which supports the view that the EU’s normative role is crystallized in comparisons 
with other actors1205. According to the views presented, the roles of the EU and the US are closely 
intertwined at the HRC. For the non-Western participants, these two actors represent the perspective 
of the wealthy, rich and liberal states. In this respect, the EU’s others might not see a big difference 
between the goals of the EU and the US. However, the EU enjoyed a more neutral reputation at the 
HRC among the interviewees. The difference between the EU and the US in the eyes of others is 
predominantly based on their different methodology to promote human rights. The EU was 
considered to be a softer and more compromising actor, which increasingly aims to find common 
ground with others’ positions. It was also mentioned that the EU may use sanctions and conditionality 
as a part of its human rights approach, but it does not directly force other states in a similar manner 
as the US. The EU was also appreciated as a more honest and cooperative partner, which respects 
multilateral working methods and UN procedures. Despite the negative evaluation of the EU’s 
communication methods and arrogant ways to lecture to others, external others still thought that the 
EU is more sensitive to others’ opinions than the US. These observations also support previous 
findings according to which the EU is perceived as a strong supporter of human rights at the UN 
because the US “is so bad”1206. Strong US positions and pressure make others less willing to cooperate 
with them. In this respect several interviewees said that the EU should not imitate the US but further 
its independent positions.  
 
However, the observed differences also raised some less positive features of EU action. For example, 
in the eyes of human rights organizations, the US is a clearer and more decisive actor, able to win 
difficult cases. This kind of actorness was considered to be beneficial at the HRC. Thus, the more 
compromising and soft EU attitude may turn out to be its weakness in the eyes of others. The US 
clarity also explained why some interviewees appreciated its actions and partnership more than the 
EU’s. The EU was mainly considered a complicated actor that others find difficult to understand. 
Another important aspect related to EU difference was that the assumed normative example was seen 
to refer to wider Europe, not only to the EU example. This suggests that the EU’s normative power 
example is not unique1207. For example, Norway and Switzerland were mentioned in many interviews 
as visible and positive contributors to HRC work. According to one interviewee “Norway is highly 
respected among developing countries as it is good at listening to others”1208. Interestingly, Norway 
and Switzerland were seen as more constructive and engaging powers, which are able to 
accommodate the needs of their partners. These non-EU members of Europe are able to work in a 
more flexible manner with different partners, as EU coordination does not hinder their action. Quite 
the contrary, their more normative role could be facilitated by this coordination. This finding is 
                                                 
1205 Keene 2013. 
1206 Brantner 2010, 172. 
1207 Keene 2012. 
1208 External interview 4. 
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relevant, as it points to the underexplored relation between images of the EU and images of 
Europe1209. In general, the EU’s ability to provide an example for others could refer to wider Europe. 
 
Despite the differences drawn between Western powers, the interviewees also noted other possible 
competitors for the EU. For example, representatives from the developing states mentioned the 
competing value positions presented by Russia, China and Cuba at the HRC. Cuba was seen as 
persuasive as it counters Western dominance. According to one interviewee “Cuba does what we 
others would like to do” referring to Cuba’s role as an “antagonist” at the HRC1210. When the EU 
concentrates on blaming third countries and lecturing to them on human rights standards, it is 
perceived as a threat and other states find it necessary to combine their forces to resist the EU. China 
and Russia do not set similar political conditions for their aid, which makes them more persuasive 
partners in the eyes of the developing world. The credibility of the EU’s normative example was 
considered to suffer from the setting and using of different conditions. In this respect the EU’s 
normative power role is limited, not because of the rejection of these norms, but because of the EU 
way in which the EU aims to spread these norms. 
7.5 Chapter Conclusions 
 
The EU’s self-image as a normative power underlines, for example, the EU role as a defender of 
universal norms and institutions. This role perception also underlines the EU’s differences in 
comparison to other actors, most notably the US. However, in order to understand the EU’s role in 
the world also the alter side of the story needs to be examined. In order to understand how the power 
and role of the EU is perceived, the shift of focus from the EU to the world the EU engages with is 
essential. This chapter took such a step by examining how the EU’s different others at the HRC 
perceive the elements of the EU’s assumed normative power role. First, this chapter summarized 
various reasons for studying external perceptions of the EU. It is rather evident that knowledge 
concerning external images has high policy relevance. However, the feedback of external audiences 
is also crucial for reconstituting the EU’s identity and role in the world. Secondly, this chapter 
introduced different kinds of EU others in the HRC context. It was noted that perceptions of the EU 
may differ among these others, depending, for example, on others’ normative closeness to the EU but 
also because of power relations. On this basis, six different groups of the EU’s others were formed: 
EU allies, moderates, developing countries, EU opponents, human rights organizations, and UN 
representatives. Thirdly, perceptions of the different aspects of the EU’s normative power role, 
namely the defence of principles through non-coercive means, EU leadership, and difference in 
comparison to other actors, were studied following this group division.  
 
External perceptions of the EU’s role differed in the groups studied, but there were also interesting 
similarities. This chapter underlined the usefulness of the “common external perceptions” found. 
Most notably, in the eyes of the EU’s others the EU’s human rights practices and institutions were 
respected as a model for others. In this sense, the EU was noted to carry a normative power role at 
the HRC. Furthermore, the EU’s promotion of human rights was not considered to reflect purely 
normative behaviour. Secondly, the EU’s leadership, often related to its normative power role, was 
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seen to materialize in some issues, while in general the EU was perceived to be only a potential leader. 
Several problems related to EU action, such as inconsistencies in dealing with country cases, inability 
to discuss European problems, and lecturing to others, made it a less credible and coherent normative 
power in the eyes of others. However, the EU was still perceived to differ from others actors, most 
notably the US. When these two actors were compared, the EU was mainly seen to provide a less 
coercive and soft approach to human rights, which may work both as an asset and as a disadvantage 
at the HRC context. However, according to external partners, the EU’s softness can also reflect 
weakness and decrease the EU’s influence at the HRC.  
 
As a conclusion, the EU’s normative power self-image is only partially mirrored in the perceptions 
of its different others at the HRC. Clearly the EU’s normative power role has more support among 
those actors who mainly share the EU’s norm interpretations, while actors with different norm 
preferences usually contest such a role. However, this norm contestation may be restricted to 
particular human rights issues. More importantly, in the HRC external political factors precondition 
the EU’s possibilities to exercise its normative power role. Hence, the EU’s objection or rejection of 
its norms is not necessarily related to the substance of these norms, but to the EU’s more general 
position in global politics. From this perspective, changes in world politics have a great influence on 
the HRC proceedings and are able to create limitations, but also windows of opportunity, for the EU 
role as a normative power. 
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8 Discussion: the EU’s Normative Power Role at the HRC – 
Confirmed, Resisted and Reformulated 
 
This thesis has studied the role of the EU at the UN Human Rights Council from the normative power 
perspective. Examining the EU’s normative power role claims in policy areas where this role has 
particular relevance and appeal is a highly important exercise, as it provides concrete information on 
the reality of this role. The EU aspires to play a frontrunner role in human rights, and shape the 
discourse on these norms. However, such a EU role is currently challenged in many respects. The 
case of the HRC can demonstrate the limits and opportunities of the EU at the global level. In the 
Council the legitimacy of human rights principles is negotiated, and the use of more coercive forms 
of power, such as military or economic power, is restricted or even impossible. HRC decision-making 
is mainly based on consensus, and in case of disagreements, the majority wins. As the EU represents 
a minority position in this body, it must find agreement with other actors. Furthermore, in order to be 
effective and efficient, the EU must be persuasive in the eyes of third parties. 
 
This thesis can be considered as a part of the “third-wave” in normative theorizing on the EU, which 
aims to engage critically with the concept1211. It suggests a new strategy for studying the normative 
power role of the EU; role theory perspective is combined with the normative power idea. Role theory 
emphasizes how roles are constructed in the interaction between an actor and its different others. 
Underlining this co-constitution is highly important in the case of the normative power role because 
this role is often considered to represent a self-declared ideal-type, eagerly adopted by EU policy-
makers to mark a positive attitude towards the EU1212. Through role theory, which points at three 
elements of roles: self-perceptions, role performance and external prescriptions, it is possible to study 
the EU role in a more comprehensive and less introspective1213 manner. The self-perception reflected 
in the EU rhetoric does not necessarily match with the EU’s actual performance. In general, the 
external normative impact of the EU has been rather difficult to judge. The EU is considered capable 
of playing a role of “regional normative hegemon”1214, but outside Europe and its nearest 
neighbourhood, this role might receive less acceptance. The success of the normative power idea is 
also closely tied to specific historical periods and circumstances, which have evolved since the launch 
of the concept. As the preconditions for the normative power role in the world have changed, it is 
time to reconsider the recognition of such an EU role. 
 
One possible and promising way to examine the appeal of the normative power role is to look at those 
global forums where the EU aspires to promote such an image. The UN provides an important 
reference point for the EU’s human rights policy, and EU success in this organization is essential in 
order to gain a reputation as a more global human rights power. The EU and its member states have 
invested much energy and finance in UN activities, and aspire to “lead by model and example”. The 
empirical part of this thesis (Chapters 5-7) examined the EU role at the Human Rights Council. First 
the focus was on the EU’s self-perception, then on its role performance, and finally on the external 
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perceptions of the EU’s role. In the following each role aspect is considered separately, and the 
relevance of the findings for the normative power role is discussed. However, before that some 
general remarks concerning the relevance of the normative power perspective for studying the EU’s 
human rights policy is considered. This chapter concludes by providing a few scenarios for the future 
EU role in human rights and in the HRC. 
 
8.1 Normative Power Role in EU Human Rights Policy 
 
This thesis has demonstrated how the normative power Europe idea, first developed by Ian Manners 
in 2002, can be beneficial in describing and explaining the EU’s role in global human rights 
governance. The construction of the EU role in human rights is closely related to its more general 
role as a normative power, as such powers seek legitimacy through norms. Chapter 2 introduced the 
historical background for the EU’s normative power role debate, and outlined the main elements of 
this role. The normative power role was interpreted as an ideal-type, which the EU can more or less 
approximate. As a normative power, the EU should promote more universal norms through non-
coercive measures. Secondly, the normative power role was seen to underline the EU difference in 
comparison to other actors, most notably the US. Even if the EU’s claimed distinctiveness has been 
challenged both theoretically and empirically1215, it continues to play an important role in the EU’s 
self-perception. Thirdly, the normative power role was noticed as being closely related to the 
legitimacy of the EU’s principles and practices. It is important that this role receives the acceptance 
of possible norm-takers. However, it was also noted how this role, like other roles, is related to 
specific a historical time and events. The post-Cold war period marked increasing attention to 
normative questions and facilitated the increasing EU role in these policy areas. The context has 
changed, and the EU’s normative power role has become far more difficult to legitimize. Other actors 
do not necessarily perceive the EU example and norms as attractive as the Union assumes.  
 
The external human rights policy provides a key area for the EU to practice its normative power role. 
However, as Chapter Three outlined, the EU role in this area is rather new, and it shares this interest 
with other European organizations, such as the Council of Europe. Hence, it is not clear whether the 
normative power role refers to the EU or to Europe more widely understood. If the EU aims to 
approximate an ideal type of normative power in human rights, the EU needs to promote more 
universally accepted principles, it must act in a non-coercive manner, and it should succeed in 
achieving normative impacts in others. The key EU objective is to defend the universality of human 
rights. However, as this universality is increasingly contested by some states, the EU also faces 
serious challenges. For example, the idea that traditional, religious or cultural values could undermine 
universal human rights standards is against the EU agenda. It also more directly endangers some of 
the EU’s human rights priorities, including the rights of women, children and LGBTI people. Even if 
the EU’s definition of human rights is inspired by wider regional and international standards, which 
provide important legitimacy, the EU also has its own peculiarities. The EU’s interpretation differs 
from other geographical regions and in some respects from the wider West. In the first respect, secular 
interpretation of rights underlines, for example, the importance of freedom of religion and belief and 
freedom of speech and expression. Both of these are highly contested rights at the global level. In 
                                                 
1215 See for example Lucarelli 2013, 429-430. 
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comparison to the US, the EU interpretation focuses on economic and social rights, but also on the 
prohibition of the death penalty. As a conclusion, the EU’s export of human rights norms does not 
necessarily find support among different others. 
 
The EU instruments used in human rights promotion should also be considered from the normative 
power perspective. As a normative power, the EU should use non-coercive measures, such as 
dialogue, cooperation and engagement instead of more restrictive and hard power instruments. The 
EU’s human rights practices may support this kind of interpretation on a general level. Important 
forums for the use of soft instruments, such as persuasion, engagement and conferral of prestige and 
shame, are international institutions. The UN Human Rights Council provides an important forum for 
the EU because it is the leading political forum for the global human rights debate and decision-
making. Chapter 4 introduced the HRC and studied the preconditions for EU performance. It was 
underlined how important it is to acknowledge those legal-institutional and political factors, which 
enable and limit EU participation and performance. At the HRC the EU has ambitious objectives, but 
at the same time there needs to be a realistic perspective to what the EU can achieve. It was also noted 
how the Lisbon treaty, and the following more strategic approach to human rights give impetus for 
rethinking the EU’s role. As the EU aims to be a more coherent, effective and efficient actor in human 
rights, the use of a wider variety of instruments and approaches seems more likely. In order to be 
more effective, the EU is increasingly underlining the value of its bilateral negotiations with different 
parties. This is not necessarily harmful for the EU’s multilateral commitments. However, if the EU 
finds it difficult to achieve success in multilateral human rights forums, its interests towards them 
could diminish. Efficiency refers to practices that are able to produce more concrete and fast results. 
Short-term efficiency does not necessarily lead to long-term effectiveness. The normative power role 
would suggest that the changes the EU is able to make in promoting human rights norms take more 
time and can be proved and evaluated only in a longer timeframe. 
 
Finally, the normative power role can be claimed to be the “silver thread” in the EU’s external human 
rights policy. It manages to demonstrate the normative aspects of the story. From the EU perspective, 
the EU should play a more prominent role in the global governance of human rights. These normative 
concerns originally created a strong EU role and presence in this area within a relatively short period 
of time. This new EU human rights role also needed views of otherness or difference, and hence the 
creation of counter-roles1216. In the area of human rights, the difference between the EU and the US 
was not so easy to express because of their similar emphasis on individual, liberal rights. However, 
the example of the EU campaign on the abolition of the death penalty, used by Manners in the original 
article, pointed to differences between the EU and the US. Furthermore, the unilateral period of the 
US, evident in its campaign against the HRC and the ICC, supported such differences. However, in 
the eyes of others, the EU and the US role might not differ that much. Both of these actors share 
similar values and human rights positions when they are compared to more different global others. 
The US, with its more active and committed human rights role at the UN since 2009, might actually 
be an important role competitor for the EU. The willingness to lead and provide example for other 
regions is apparent in the self-perceptions of both actors. Even more likely is that they form a strong 
                                                 
1216 Harnisch 2011, 10-12. 
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coalition against those actors who represent a different kind of norm interpretations in the multilateral 
forums. The real and visible difference in these organizations is drawn between the West and the rest. 
  
8.2 The EU’s Self-image: Confirming the Normative Power Role  
 
The self-understanding of the EU was presented as one of the most essential factors shaping its role 
in world politics. That is why it provided the starting point for empirical research on the EU’s role at 
the HRC. The EU’s self-image as a normative power is often taken for granted. However, role theory 
draws attention to the fact that even dominant roles may be internally contested, and they may be 
interpreted in different ways. Chapter 5 examined the EU’s self-perception at the HRC by studying 
both the official role expressions and unofficial role perceptions of EU and member states’ human 
rights experts. The historical perspective demonstrated how the EU’s role claims at the HRC have 
been rather stable. Generally, the data confirmed the normative power self-image; official EU 
statements underlined the EU role as a defender of universal human rights norms, a supporter and 
contributor to the HRC, and a partner for different external others. This role was also evident in the 
perceptions of EU policy-makers. According to EU and member states’ interviewees, the EU has a 
clear normative value-basis and intentions at the HRC. Some EU experts characterized the EU as a 
“force for good” which fights against those (non-normative) others who aim to undermine the respect 
for human rights. According to some experts, the EU is promoting universal human rights even when 
this does not serve its interests. However, also several limitations for the EU role at the HRC were 
noted. Even if EU interviewees saw the EU as an influential player in the Council, they also 
underlined the need for realistic expectations. According to these experts, the EU is not perceived as 
a persuasive example by all the HRC participants. Hence, the EU’s possibilities to lead by its example 
were considered to be more issue-related and dependent on other actors.  
 
The HRC provides an interesting case for studying the ego part of the EU role, as individual EU 
member states have high importance in this context. It could be assumed that the attitudes towards 
EU cooperation and the forming of common positions would be quite different. However, the EU and 
member states’ representatives who live in Geneva are likely to be quite socialized to accept the 
common EU approach as they live in the HRC “bubble”. This is despite the fact that cooperation at 
different diplomatic levels is a rather new, post-Lisbon development in Geneva. Brussels and the 
capitals seem to be far away, and the sharpest disagreements do not end up at this level, partly 
explaining the rather coherent self-perception and high degree of unity. Hence, one interesting avenue 
for further research would be to examine perceptions of human rights experts serving in member 
states’ capitals. This could be done by interviewing those civil servants who take part in the COHOM 
work in Brussels and prepare national positions and statements for the HRC. This could bring 
additional information to the relevance of the EU dimension for member states, as well as what kind 
of EU role member states would like to see at the HRC. The interviews suggest that the EUMS do 
have different emphasis on the Council’s work, and behind the one voice approach more diverse 
national views could be detected. Some member states clearly prefer a more active EU role, and the 
delivery of strong human rights positions. Attitudes towards EU cooperation and common 
representation are different and often related to the national capacities of the EUMS to be active at 
the HRC. Much also depends on how the EU-delegation in Geneva succeeds in building trust, 
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enhancing cooperation, and serving the national priorities of different member states. In general, the 
external pressure probably makes the EU a more united and coherent actor at the HRC than it would 
otherwise be.  
 
Hence, the external environment and domestic policies essentially precondition the EU’s role and 
performance at the HRC. This leads to the question of how EU role conceptions will change as time 
passes. As the historical survey in chapter 5 demonstrated, the EU’s role perception has been 
considerably stable at the Council, even if it has faced external opposition and difficulties. This would 
suggest that the adopted normative power role in the UN human rights machinery is closely associated 
with EU identity. Still the composition of the HRC can influence the EU’s role conceptions, as can 
the agenda of the Council. On the one hand, some EUMS might find it more important to be active 
in the HRC when strong norm competitors raise their voices. On the other hand, they could be more 
willing to work through other channels if the HRC turns out to be too difficult a forum for the EU. 
Much also depends on the issues that the HRC has on the table. The EU shows high interest in some 
issues, while in others it does not even develop common positions. The EU’s actual role performance 
at the HRC also feeds back to its self-perceptions and internal expectations. If the EU ability to attain 
its goals is weak and contradicts its self-perceptions, the EU may not feel too confident. This could 
lead to lower ambitions and profile. However, EU successes in controversial and difficult issue areas 
would not only increase the EU’s credibility, but also its self-esteem at the HRC. After the economic 
crisis, skepticism towards the EU has increased among the European public and member states have 
been divided in some foreign policy issues. There have also been fears of the renationalization of EU 
foreign policy. However, according to my interviewees this is not reflected in EUMS attitudes at the 
HRC, and the atmosphere is rather cooperative. It is still likely that more general developments at the 
EU level will effect EU cooperation, financial issues and adopted priorities. 
 
8.3 EU Role Performance: Does the EU Perform According to its Self-Image? 
 
This thesis has underlined how EU role performance works as an important path to its legitimacy, 
and how this legitimacy also has key relevance for the normative power role. In order to receive 
legitimacy, the EU needs to act in coherence with its role claims. Hence, the normative power role of 
the EU is supported if the EU manages to behave according to its ambitious self-image. If there is 
much incoherence between the EU’s words and actual performance, the credibility of its normative 
power role is lost. According to previous research, the EU is not an effective actor at the HRC, and it 
has not achieved what was expected from it. Instead, the EU has been considered to sometimes play 
a marginal, even outsider role at the UN human rights fora1217. This thesis problematized the concept 
of performance and introduced different perspectives for evaluating the EU’s performance at the 
HRC. The EU’s role performance was examined by looking at both its being and doing, through 
relevance, effectiveness, resource viability and efficiency. First, in order to be an actor that can 
perform a role, the EU needs to be recognized as an actor at the HRC. This is not self-evident as the 
member states also play an active role in the Council. On the basis of the interviews it was concluded 
that the EU is an increasingly relevant and visible player at the HRC, both internally and externally. 
EU relevance was further supported by the fact that internally, the EU is a highly effective actor, 
                                                 
1217 See Kissack 2010, 49; Basu 2012, 98; Smith K. 2010, Gowan & Brantner 2008. 
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providing common positions and consistency in voting. The EU’s external effectiveness, namely its 
ability to reach its objectives, also seemed rather good. The EU has been successful in those 
resolutions it has initiated at the HRC. The active and visible engagement is consistent with the EU’s 
words, and supports the normative power self-image of the EU.  
 
However, if the EU’s ability to contribute to the effectiveness of the HRC is considered, there are 
more reservations. As a normative power, the EU should be supportive of the UN and its human rights 
bodies. The EU has worked actively at the HRC, even when this has not served its interests. This 
would point to a commitment to multilateralism as an end in itself. The HRC would definitely look 
quite different without any EU output. Furthermore, the EU has empowered developing states and 
civil society organizations through finance, political and educational support. It has invited non-
European human rights defenders to take part in the Council activities, and organized side events and 
cooperation meetings with human rights organizations in Geneva. The EU has also even engaged 
with more difficult actors, such as the OIC, in the HRC context and aspired to create more dialogue. 
This is why the EU has succeeded in some highly controversial human rights questions, such as the 
freedom of religion and belief. The EU has also promoted its priority issues, such as the rights of 
women and children. The promotion of country resolutions has always been challenging at the HRC, 
as some states have consistently opposed them. Despite the opposition, the EU has moved forward 
the UN agenda on the human rights situation concerning, for example, North Korea and Myanmar. 
Even if these cases have demanded several resolutions and a long-time perspective, they are able to 
show how the EU has challenged other states on their human rights violations. Another important 
HRC procedure, which points at human rights situations in individual states, is the UPR. There the 
EU member states have been highly active. These examples suggest that the EU has been able to 
contribute to the effectiveness of the HRC through its financial, diplomatic and normative resources. 
 
There are also EU practices that do not serve HRC effectiveness in the best possible manner. EU 
unity often creates more bloc mentality in the Council as other actors aim to join their forces to 
counterbalance the EU’s power. In this respect, some interviewees said that the EU would be more 
influential and efficient if it could promote human rights through individual EU member states1218. 
At the same time EU unity was considered to be an important precondition for EU success and 
visibility at the Council. Also the EU’s incoherence in pointing to third states for their human rights 
violations makes the HRC country mandates imbalanced. The HRC ends up discussing the same 
country cases year after year, and some violations are never discussed. In this respect, the EU could 
create new country resolutions and widen the focus of the Council. Another way of improving the 
effectiveness of the Council would be to point to those issues that the developing countries find 
important. This could create more dialogue and cooperation among HRC members. However, the EU 
member states have found it difficult to agree on some economic and social rights questions as they 
usually include economic burdens for Western states. With its new Strategic Framework on human 
rights and the following Action Plans, the EU aims to improve its focus on these issues, especially at 
the HRC. Furthermore, the human rights approach towards EU development policy is also 
contributing to the implementation of these rights on the ground.  
 
                                                 
1218 EU interviews 3, 15, 19. 
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By adopting stronger and less compromising human rights positions, the EU would show its firm 
commitment to human rights. At the same time such an approach would make the HRC divisions 
more apparent and decrease its effectiveness as a global human rights forum. Less compromising EU 
positions would probably be detrimental for the EU’s influence, and lead to a situation where both 
the HRC and the EU are on the losing side1219. Hence, the EU faces a dilemma, as the normative 
power role prioritizes engagement and dialogue, but the EU should, according to this role, also be a 
strong advocate of human rights. The challenge for the EU is to match its multilateral vocation with 
strong human rights positions, and find ways to improve in both respects. As Macaj and Koops 
conclude, the HRC seems to be a case for “inconvenient multilateralism” for the EU1220. The 
important question is if the EU can find the motivation to put forward more compromising positions, 
which may plant the seeds for cross-regional cooperation, but represents lower standards for the EU. 
According to some EU interviewees, such an attitude could really increase the HRC effectiveness and 
EU popularity among its others1221. However, this is not necessarily the case. Many of the interviewed 
human rights organizations were critical towards a softer EU approach at the HRC1222. If the EU 
lowers its ambitions, its credibility as a human rights power diminishes in the eyes of those actors 
who have high expectations concerning EU action.   
 
Finally, EU performance must also be evaluated in relation to its vast resources and ambitious self-
image. After the Lisbon treaty, the EU has aimed to improve its efficiency with institutional changes 
and by adopting a more strategic approach to human rights questions at the UN. However, the EU 
does not seem to be a very efficient actor at the HRC when its potential is compared to the achieved 
results. One explanation is that the EU accepts some level of inefficiency as it spends a lot of time in 
internal negotiations. This hindrance could be decreased through better planning and cooperation 
already at the Brussels level. The EU-delegation in Geneva could also improve EU cooperation, but 
so far it has had rather restricted resources, for example, in comparison to big EU member states. 
However, according to the findings of this thesis, the EU is actually playing a more prominent role at 
the HRC than previously thought. There are several possibilities to explain the EU’s better 
performance. One of the major problems of the previous studies has been that they concentrate on 
EU voting records at the UN human rights fora. As this thesis has argued, voting records do not tell 
the whole truth about the EU’s influence, and may lead to biased conclusions. This is first of all 
because voting occurs rather rarely at the HRC, as less than quarter of the resolutions need voting. 
Secondly, differences in voting outcomes may reflect other reasons for disagreement, and they cannot 
be solely interpreted as EU failures. According to one EU interviewee, if the HRC resolution ends up 
being voted on, it already means EU failure1223. Often disagreements in the final phase of resolutions 
reflect communication problems between HRC participants. The EU has objected to adopted 
resolutions rather seldom, and the difference between the EU and the US is striking. This could 
suggest that EU negotiators have really succeeded in their efforts during the processes. Hence, when 
EU performance at the HRC is evaluated, not only EU doing, but also EU being, needs to be taken 
into account even if its explicit evaluation is often difficult. In this respect, the interviews among 
                                                 
1219 See different scenarios for the interaction between the EU and multilateral organizations, Kissack 2010, 141. 
1220 Macaj & Koops 2011, 74-75. 
1221 EU interviews 5, 6, 10, 14, 23. 
1222 External interviews 7, 8, 16, 28, 34, 36, 38.  
1223 EU interview 14. 
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HRC participants may be highly beneficial. One likely explanation is also that the EU’s role 
possibilities at the HRC have changed after 2011. This might be a consequence of the changing world 
political situation, which has affected the working dynamics at the HRC and created new 
opportunities for the EU. At the same time, the EU has also developed its own approach to human 
rights, which aims to increase EU effectiveness and efficiency in multilateral human rights forums. 
Hence, both internal and external preconditions may explain EU role development.  
 
8.4 External Perceptions: Normative Power Role Contested? 
 
Research on the EU’s possible normative power role in the world has rarely incorporated the external 
perspective1224. This is strange because at the same time the importance of external recognition and 
acceptance of this role has been underlined. For example, according to Aggestam and Keene, 
normative powers are only those actors who are recognized as such by others1225. This thesis adopted 
the role theory framework, which draws attention to the co-constitutions of EU roles with several 
external others. By taking into account the alter side of this role, it is possible to achieve a more 
comprehensive and realistic image of the EU role at the HRC. External perceptions may also partly 
explain the impact and effectiveness of the EU, and hence, they are highly relevant for policy-makers. 
Previous research on normative power recognition has pointed to a limited, if yet identifiable, external 
perception of the EU as a normative power, for example depending on the geographical area1226. 
However, vast empirical studies that would point to external perceptions of the EU as a normative 
power in specific international institutions are still missing. In this sense, this thesis has provided 
important empirical insights concerning the perceptions of this more particular normative power role 
of the EU in one global institution, the HRC. 
  
Chapter seven studied the external perceptions of the EU’s role among different others, such as other 
UN member states, human rights organizations and the HRC Secretary. The EU’s normative power 
role recognition was noted as being mixed; some elements of this role were apparent, while others 
were contested. The EU’s image was also different among different groups. Tensions between role 
prescriptions at the HRC could be explained through normative closeness to the EU’s values and 
through power relations. However, there were also interesting similarities noted by most interviewees. 
The first important thing is that most interviewees praised the European system of human rights 
protection and promotion. In this respect the EU was often seen as able to “lead by example and 
model” at the HRC. As one interviewee said: “the EU is a superpower of values”1227. However, the 
EU’s example and possible leadership at the HRC also faces several challenges. Some interviewees 
mentioned how the EU and its member states also promote other interests at the HRC. In this sense, 
the EU action is not seen as purely normative. Developing countries and EU opponents accuse the 
EU of several inconsistencies. The different treatment of third states was noted to be highly 
                                                 
1224 Chaban et al. 2013 study it only as one aspect of general recognition of the EU, Larsen 2014a aims to collect the 
data from different studies in order to provide some information on normative power role recognition.  Björkdahl et 
al.(eds.) 2015 study in more detail how the normative power of the EU is perceived in different parts of the world 
through several case studies. However, their attention is more on the norm-taker’s side and in the conceptualization of 
interactions between norm-maker (the EU) and different norm-takers. 
1225 Aggestam 2013, 465; Kavalski 2013. 
1226 See Larsen 2014a, 897. 
1227 External interview 24. 
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problematic, diminishing the credibility of the EU agenda. The EU’s way to lecture to others and 
apply human rights conditionality were decreasing its persuasiveness among those actors, who often 
are the targets of EU sponsored resolutions. Furthermore, the EU’s reluctance to deal with its own 
problems was deteriorating its dialogue with others. If the EU refuses to talk about its own problems 
at the HRC, other actors are less willing to share their problems. In the eyes of many human rights 
organizations, the EU could be the leader of the Council, but it shows reluctance to lead. In this 
respect it has not achieved what they have expected. The EU seems to lack a clear vision or strategy 
of how things should proceed, which also makes cooperation with it rather difficult. The EU’s allies 
and likeminded countries found it hard to understand the EU and its internal processes and division 
of leadership. Furthermore, the HRC secretariat does not find that the EU supports the UN on each 
and every occasion. Even if the EU is investing a lot in the HRC, it could be more supportive. As a 
conclusion, these perceptions contest the EU’s self-image as a normative power. 
 
The third important element of the EU’s normative power role examined was its difference in 
comparison to other actors. Lucarelli has underlined the need to adopt a comparative perspective 
when studying external perceptions1228. For the normative power role, the making of difference 
between the EU and the US has been highlighted1229. My findings show that the EU and the US really 
do have different images at the HRC, despite the change in US attitudes towards the Council since 
2009. Even if these two share a liberal interpretation of human rights and are eager to use moral 
argumentation, their methodologies to promote rights were considered to differ by all the studied 
external groups. According to many external others, the EU is a more cooperative, engaging and non-
coercive partner, which respects the UN and its procedures. However, drawing the difference between 
the US and the EU has two sides; external actors underlined the less political and honest nature of the 
EU’s human rights policy, but they also pointed to the ineffectiveness of the EU approach in 
comparison to the US. The US was appreciated because it was seen as able to win tough cases. The 
EU was perceived as reluctant to deal with difficult cases. However, strong positions and pressure 
against other actors also make the US a less normative actor in the eyes of others. The active 
engagement of the US is also a possible threat for the EU’s aspirations to play a leading role. As one 
interviewee said: “there cannot be two lions in a jungle”1230. 
 
This research also tackled the important, yet understudied, relation between perceptions of the EU 
and images of Europe1231. In the eyes of others, this difference was not necessarily evident or clear. 
If the EU’s normative power role is related to the European human rights regime and institutions, it 
is not an outcome of EU action. The future EU accession to the European Convention on Human 
Rights, demanded by the Lisbon treaty, could make this division even more difficult. The issue of 
human rights protection within the EU has gradually become more important, in particular in the last 
twenty years. This has had clear consequences for the EU’s external human rights role and agenda. 
However, according to external perceptions, the normative power role would still refer to wider 
Europe. At the HRC, for example, Switzerland and Norway, both non-EU states, enjoy respect in the 
eyes of many external actors, in particular from the Global South. Their positive roles at the HRC 
                                                 
1228 Lucarelli 2013, 439. 
1229 See for example Kagan 2003, Smith M. 2011b. 
1230 External interview 10. 
1231 Lucarelli 2013, 439. 
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may even be facilitated with the less flexible and slow EU approach. Hence, there might also be role 
competition between the EU and other European states. In this respect Russia is also an interesting 
player in the Council context. Russia has increased the use of human rights language in its foreign 
policy. Some of the Russian sponsored resolutions at the HRC, such as the protection of Roma, 
arbitrary deprivation of nationality, and protection of the family1232, are problematic from the EU 
perspective. These quite clearly point to problems in the EU region or promote a different 
interpretation of human rights. Another issue is that Russia cooperates with EU opponents, such as 
Cuba, Venezuela and Belarus instead of European countries. However, even if Russia has been a 
member of the HRC, it has not sponsored many resolutions. The actions of Russia still contest the 
EU’s normative power role self-image, and promote an alternative vision at the HRC. 
 
Finally, external others also noted some non-European or non-Western role competitors for the EU 
at the HRC. In particular, the role of Cuba was seen as important, as it counters Western dominance 
in human rights issues. Cuba has been highly active at the HRC sponsoring many resolutions pointing 
to economic, social and cultural rights1233. All of these resolutions promote an alternative and 
sometimes even contradicting HRC agenda when compared with the EU objectives. The Cuban 
resolutions also achieve the wide support of the developing world. Besides Cuba, other regional 
leaders from the African Group, the OIC and the NAM are also likely to support such an agenda. 
These actors also point to racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and violent extremism, all 
difficult topics for the EU. If the EU aspires to compete or cooperate with these actors, it should 
strengthen its focus on those questions other participants at the HRC find dear. The EU may search 
for common ground with these actors, as it increasingly points to ESC rights, as well as racism and 
anti-discrimination in its Action Plans on Human Rights and Democracy 2015-2019. This suggests 
that external perceptions do have remarkable influence on EU roles and role-playing. However, the 
interaction between the ego and alter perceptions and its possible consequences for the EU role 
performance are likely to take time. 
 
8.5 Limitations of the Thesis 
 
The empirical part of the thesis concentrated on studying perceptions of the EU and non-EU human 
rights experts. It must be acknowledged that such a perspective includes several problems and 
methodological limitations. How should perceptions be studied in the first place? One option is to 
concentrate on the official documents and statements about the EU. However, official rhetoric often 
serves particular ends and is pointed to particular audiences, and does not necessarily reveal more 
interesting issues behind the scenes. That is why I decided to look at perceptions of those policy-
makers who are actively participating in the work of the HRC. The first challenge is the reliability of 
the perceptions that were given in the interviews. As several states’ and organization’s representatives 
found it a politically highly sensitive topic, their expressed opinions can be rather careful, and as such 
                                                 
1232 The resolutions sponsored by other states can be easily examined through the new HRC Resolutions Portal updated 
by the Universal Rights Group. The Portal is available at http://www.universal-rights.org/.  
1233 For example the right to food, effects of foreign debt, promotion of a democratic and equitable international order, 
human rights and international solidarity, promotion and protection of the human rights of peasants and other people 
working in rural areas, promotion of the right to peace, and promotion of the enjoyment of the cultural rights of 
everyone and respect for cultural diversity.  
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do not reflect all their concerns. The EU interviewees might find it inappropriate to criticize EU 
cooperation, other EUMS or the EU-delegation, and the process in which common positions are 
formed. External perceptions may also be, instead of opinions, more politically motivated statements 
about the EU. Secondly, perceptions are subjective and do not necessarily correspond with the official 
statements of the other (state, organization) in question. In this respect, the anonymity of the 
interviews, which was essential for getting them in the first place, made it impossible to explicitly 
compare the given external perceptions with the official statements made by these actors at the HRC. 
However, these interviews were able to go beyond the official rhetoric and reveal insights of those 
persons working with the EU. 
 
Even if this thesis succeeded in examining the perceptions of several external EU others at the HRC, 
it needs to be noted that many important actors refused to take part in this study. This could be 
considered as a problem of representativity. The perceptions of the US, and many other visible HRC 
participants such as Cuba, Brazil, South Africa and Norway are missing. The reason for refusals was 
that the actors in question did not find it appropriate to comment on another actor’s performance. 
These particular refusals could suggest that the EU is an important partner or opponent for these 
states. I also noted that individual human rights experts often needed the permission to speak from 
their ambassadors. Hence, the diplomatic traditions and rules might make it difficult to collect such 
data. Besides the interviewed states, some important states, such as China and India, would have been 
interesting cases, as well as many Middle Eastern states. The perceptions of these others could have 
contributed important insights to this research. In particular, how the EU is perceived in Israel and 
Palestine as the EU has often been divided in this case at the HRC. However, a few actors from each 
group (allies, moderates, developing states and opponents) were successfully included, which is likely 
to reveal at least some general features of external perceptions. Furthermore, many human rights 
organizations are included and their views carry high relevance. These more independent actors are 
able to provide more critical insights of the EU’s role, as they do not have diplomatic restrictions for 
presenting their views. The problem with NGO interviews was that some of them were general human 
rights organizations, while others worked in a more specific issue area. This might have effects on 
their perceptions of the EU. 
 
This thesis concentrated on the more specific EU role as a normative power in a more particular 
context, the HRC. In this respect, its abilities to reflect the wider perceptions of the EU’s role are 
limited. However, it may give some important ideas of how the EU is perceived in a more global UN 
context. Several interviewees were also working in other international institutions in Geneva and they 
had wider experiences of EU action. Also several EU interviewees had experience from other UN 
locations, such as New York.  As this thesis has claimed, external perceptions may help to reconstruct 
the EU’s global identity and role in human rights. The interaction between the ego and alter 
perceptions of the EU’s role is an area not yet much studied1234. However, for the normative power 
role, research on this interaction would be highly valuable and interesting. This idea in mind, I gave 
a presentation at the EU-delegation in Geneva on the external perceptions of the EU role at the 
HRC1235. The idea was to see the reactions of EU experts, and discuss their possible effects on the 
                                                 
1234 Lucarelli 2013, 439. 
1235 I was invited to give a presentation on my main results by one of the human rights experts of the EU delegation. 
This presentation was organized in the EU-delegation meeting room in 2.12. 2014. 
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EU’s self-image. The EU-delegation had tried to study the external perceptions of the EU in the 
summer of 2013, which supported the idea that the EU is interested in finding out what others think 
about it1236. Openness to other’s opinions and difference could be considered as an important feature 
of the normative power role1237. The claim that the EU is a “deaf global power”1238, did not appear to 
be true in this case. However, the extent to which external perceptions become significant in 
developing self-perceptions varies, and different others carry different relevance for the EU. In 
addition, the political atmosphere may also influence the EU/EU member states’ willingness to give 
space for others’ views. According to my experience, others’ perceptions of the EU raised various 
reactions in member state representatives. Some human rights experts were really concerned about 
the critical views, while others thought that these opinions do not have real relevance. It is impossible 
to provide general conclusions about how the external perceptions affect the EU’s role at the HRC in 
this thesis, as it would demand more research. However, this could be an interesting idea for future 
research on the EU’s role at the HRC. The event provided some general ideas for the creation of 
different future alternatives or scenarios1239 for the EU. These are outlined in the next section.  
 
8.6 The Future Role of the EU at the HRC 
 
This thesis has underlined the importance of looking at different aspects of actor’s roles; self-
perception, role performance and external perceptions. The findings point to different potential EU 
human rights role scenarios. The probability of these scenarios depends on internal EU dynamics as 
well as on the external environment and other actors. In this last section three alternatives scenarios 
are presented, based on the insights provided by the interviewees. 
1) The EU becomes an increasingly marginal actor in human rights even if it desperately 
continues to repeat its leadership aspirations in various global human rights forums. This is 
speeded up by the EU’s stubborn attitude to proclaim that it represents the only true 
interpretation of human rights in the world1240. The EU also lectures to others and concentrates 
on accusing them of human rights violations. At the same time the EU refuses to talk about 
its own problems.1241 The EU is in trouble with the inconsistent views of its member states, 
which do not find motivation to promote a common EU approach, as this provides only 
minimal standards and the lowest common denominator position1242. Some of the large EU 
member states develop more independent relations with third countries. External others notice 
the predominant position of these EUMS and aim to work through them, rather than through 
the EU-delegation.1243 Externally the EU seems to be ever more divided with open rifts on 
issue questions, which cause splits in the HRC voting. The EU has also become deaf to the 
external perceptions of its action, as these only represent the views of arrogant and politically 
                                                 
1236 However, this attempt, organized during a morning meeting with some EU partners did not succeed, as external 
partners were reluctant to discuss the matter (EU interview 22). 
1237 Smith M. 2011b, 129. 
1238 Lucarelli & Fioramonti 2010, 2. 
1239 If social sciences are to be relevant, they should be able to say something about the possible or likely futures, see 
Patomäki 2006. 
1240 External interviews 3, 6, 19. 
1241 External interviews 4, 7, 11, 14, 16, 18, 22, 24, 25, 30.  
1242 External interviews 5, 6, 8, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 24, 27, 28, 33, 36. 
1243 External interviews 7, 9, 12, 13, 19, 20, 21, 26, 29, 38. 
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motivated human rights violators1244. However, EU opponents succeed to persuade better 
third countries and the objection of EU positions is on the rise1245. Cooperation with the UN 
has diminished, as the EU is suspicious towards its mechanisms and mandate holders, which 
produce different outcomes than the EU would prefer. The UN perceives the EU way to 
finance its mandates as unfair as the EU supports only those initiatives, which it has suggested 
itself or which it can control effectively.1246 Finally, cooperation with the civil society remains 
a priority for the EU in principle, but the EU does not respect dialogue with NGOs. Meetings 
with these organizations consist mainly of EU speeches and declarations of priorities without 
any dialogue.1247 Because of economic austerity in the EU member states, further reductions 
to its aid for human rights protection have been implemented1248.  
2) The EU role in global governance of human rights remains rather unchanged. The EU 
continues to develop its approach incrementally, and also aims to respond partly to the 
external expectations for its action. It accepts the resistance towards its positions, and aspires 
to work in a more constructive manner with its different others. However, this does not lead 
to any major debates or new issues on its agenda1249. At the same time, EU member states 
continue to disagree, for example, on economic and social rights questions, and as a result, a 
proper EU approach cannot be developed1250. Member states are also reluctant to carry 
responsibility for more controversial human rights questions or country mandates. These are 
left for the EU-delegation, which is already fully employed with the tasks under its 
responsibility.1251 The role of the EU-delegation remains unclear; some member states have 
suspicions towards it and aim to undermine its relevance, while others are satisfied with its 
work1252. However, because the EU-delegation is not properly resourced for the increasing 
tasks of the HRC, it is only able to provide moderate outcomes. Competent human rights 
experts are not willing to work in the delegation, as the work is highly demanding and 
criticized from several directions1253. Also, because of the scarce resources the delegation 
must lean on the help of big member states, who are then more able to upload their preferences 
to the EU approach. The EU is an influential actor at the UN, but its approach continues to 
suffer from several inconsistencies and incapability, which undermines its credibility. 
3) The EU achieves a leading role in human rights. The EU adopts dedicated approach to its 
external human rights policy and acknowledges its major challenges. The work started in 2012 
to renew the EU approach leads to continuous self-reflection and evaluation, which is further 
supported by scholarly contributions and research. The EU also regularly checks what other 
actors think about its policies and aims1254, and openly discusses the future challenges already 
in Brussels. This leads to more frequent meetings of the COHOM, and also active 
                                                 
1244 This view clearly represents the attitude among some EUMS representatives. 
1245 External interviews 4, 6, 13.  
1246 External interviews 9, 11, 15, 18, 25. 
1247 External interviews 7, 8, 33. 
1248 External interview 10.  
1249 External interviews 6, 7, 8, 21, 28, 34, 36. 
1250 EU interviews 7, 13, 20, 23 
1251 EU interview 18. 
1252 EU interviews 3, 11, 15. 
1253 EU interviews 3, 15, 17. 
1254 EU interviews 4, 5, 6, 8, 22. 
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collaboration between various EU actors related to external human rights work. The EU’s 
focal points for human rights in different EU-delegations around the world are able to provide 
reports and information on the local situations of human rights. They can also assist and 
protect human rights defenders already in their own countries. Furthermore, the improved 
structures created for cooperation with civil society work as an efficient extra information 
provider for the EU.1255 As a result, the EU is able to produce more tailor-made human rights 
approaches to different locations, and able to answer the expectations of local partners. The 
EU’s efforts to mainstream its human rights approach to other foreign policy areas are further 
developed, and this move decreases EU inconsistencies. Better coherence between different 
foreign policy areas is considered an important aim, and the EU works to achieve this reality. 
Human rights protection and promotion forms a priority for the EU, and other policy concerns 
must face this fact. Better coherence also increases EU credibility in the eyes of other 
actors1256. The overall relevance of human rights is increased in the EU’s foreign policy 
approach and the EU-delegation in Geneva is provided with additional resources. The EU also 
finds it important to inform the general public about its achievements at the UN and improve 
its image. This kind of move also convinces member states and their motivation to find more 
principled common positions in human rights increases1257. Member states also develop more 
efficient mechanisms for informal EU cooperation. Because of the increased internal 
efficiency, the EU has more time for external outreach1258. The EU works actively to convince 
its allies and moderate partners, but also builds bridges in less self-evident directions1259. In 
the eyes of external others, the EU works as a united front, delivers one message but also 
offers several points of contact for external partners.  
As a final remark, it could be mentioned that all of these scenarios are possible in the future, 
because the future is essentially open for different possibilities1260. Because roles are always 
constructed in specific temporal moments, these scenarios need to face some challenges, but also 
windows of opportunity. This is clearly how the EU’s role in human rights has developed so far, 
as this thesis has demonstrated. However, the likelihood of these scenarios depends on both EU 
action and the external environment. On its own part, the EU itself plays a key role in influencing 
what its future in human rights will look like. In this respect, it must deliberate on how its own 
action will contribute to the realization of the different possibilities. The EU has clearly aimed to 
move forward with a new approach to human rights promotion, which better acknowledges the 
previous mistakes and future challenges. Only time will show how effective the EU is in the 
implementation of its new strategy. The normative power role would underline the need for self-
reflectiveness and the taking into account of other’s perceptions. Most importantly, as roles are 
constructed in cooperation with other actors, it is crucial to take their opinions and perceptions 
seriously. The best possible option is that these perceptions work as important construction 
material for EU identity and its future role in human rights. 
                                                 
1255 External interview 5, 23, 24, 28, 32, 34 
1256 EU interview 1 & External interview 22  
1257 EU interview 6, 15. 
1258 EU interviews 16, 18, 21, 23. 
1259 External interview 1, 3, 6, 23, 26, 33, 39. 
1260 Patomäki 2006. 
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APPENDIX 1: Internal Interviews 
 
Interview themes (with some additional questions): 
1. National/EU perspectives to HRC  
- why the HRC is important forum for the EU? 
2. EU coordination and coherence 
- how EU coordination works? 
- different roles of EU participants 
- is the EU coherent actor/are there internal tensions? 
3. Roles of the EU in the HRC 
- what roles does the EU play? 
- does the EU differ from other actors? If, how? 
- the EU is often presented as a normative power, based on ideational factors rather than 
coercive power. What thoughts does this bring to your mind? 
4. EU power and influence in the HRC 
- Do you find the EU influential at the HRC? 
- How EU influence is affected by other actors? 
5. Changes in the EU position at the HRC 
- How internal/external factors influence EU position 
- Future of the EU at the HRC 
 
List of internal interviews 
number time actor type 
1. 26.2.2013 13-14 COHOM participant 
2.  8.4. 9.15-10 EUMS  
3.  8.4. 11.30-12.30 EUMS  
4.  8.4. 13-13.45 EUMS  
5. 9.4. 9.30-10.20 EUMS  
6.  9.4. 14-15 EUMS  
7. 10.4. 8.30-19.15 EUMS  
8.  10.4. 10-11.50 EEAS, group interview with 2 
participants 
9.  10.4. 12-13.15 EUMS  
10.  10.4. 13.30-14 EUMS  
11.  10.4. 15-16.10 EUMS  
12.  11.4. 9.30-10.30 EUMS  
13.  11.4. 11-12 EUMS  
14. 12.4. 9.30-10.30 EUMS  
15. 12.4. 11-12.15  EUMS  
16. 12.4. 14-14.35 EUMS  
17. 5.6. 10-11.10 EEAS 
18. 5.6. 11.10-11.55 EEAS 
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19.  5.6. 12.30-13 European Parliament (MEP) 
20.  30.9. 16.30-17.15 EUMS  
21. 1.10. 15.10-16.10 EUMS  
22.  3.10. 10-10.40 EEAS 
23.  3.12. 2014 14-15 EUMS 
 
Participating Countries (17) were: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Romania, UK 
 
From the EEAS I interviewed (5) people responsible for human rights issues in Geneva (EU 
delegation human rights unit) and Brussels (EEAS human rights section) 
 
Other interviewees include persons working at the COHOM and European Parliament 
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APPENDIX 2: External Interviews 
 
Interview themes: 
1. Human Rights in EU foreign policy 
2. EU unity in the Human Rights Council 
3. The role of the EU delegation/ EU member states 
4. EU role and influence in the HRC 
5. EU as a normative power; human rights aims and means 
6. Factors that decrease/increase EU influence 
7. Consequences of internal EU changes for EU role 
8. Future perspectives to EU role at the HRC 
 
List of interviews 
number time type 
1. 3.4.2013  state  
2.  6.4.2013  state  
3.  11.4. 14-15 regional organization 
4.  11.4. 16-16.30 state 
5. 17.9. 17.20-18.10 human rights organization 
6.  30.9. 14-14.30 state 
7. 30.9. 15-15.40 human rights organization 
8.  1.10. 10-10.40 human rights organization 
9.  1.10. 14.30-15 state 
10.  2.10. 10-10.40 state 
11.  2.10. 11-11.30 state 
12.  2.10. 12.10-13 state 
13.  2.10. 14.40-15.45 state 
14. 3.10. 13-13.40 state 
15. 3.10. 16-17 OHCHR 
16. 3.10. 17.15-18 human rights organization 
17. 4.10. 9.15-9.45 state 
18. 4.10. 10.15-11.15 state 
19.  4.10. 16.30-17 state 
20.  4.10. 17-17.40 state 
21. 12.11. 14-14.45 state 
22. 12.11. 15-15.40 state 
23.  12.11. 16-16.50 human rights organization 
24.  13.11. 9.-9.45 state 
25.  13.11. 10.30-11.15 OHCHR 
26. 14.11. 10-11.00 state 
27.  14.11. 12-12.40 state 
28. 14.11. 15.30-16.00 human rights organization 
198 
 
29.  14.11. 16.60-17.20 state 
30. 15.11. 13-13.45 state 
31. 6.11. 2014 human rights organization 
32. 3.12. 10-10.45 human rights organization 
33. 3.12. 11-11.40 human rights organization 
34. 3.12. 13-13.45 human rights organization 
35. 10.12. 11-11.20 state 
36. 11.12. 17.15-17.35 human rights organization 
37. 16.12. 10.35-10.55 state 
38. 17.12. 15.30-16.00 human rights organization 
39. 18.12. human rights organization 
40. 19.12. 11.15-11.45 OHCHR 
 
Participating human rights organizations (13) were: ARC International, Amnesty 
International, Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, CIVICUS World Alliance for Citizen 
Participation, Conectas, East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project, Forum-
Asia, International Federation for Human Rights, International Service for Human Rights, 
Human Rights House Foundation, Human Rights Watch, Universal Rights Group, Women’s 
International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). 
Participating countries (23) were: Angola, Australia, Bangladesh, Botswana, Burkina Faso, 
Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Gabon, Ecuador, Egypt, Indonesia, Island, Kenya, Maldives, 
Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Russia, Sri Lanka and 
Switzerland. 
From the OHCHR I interviewed persons working in Human Rights Council and Special 
Procedures Division. 
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APPENDIX 3: Example of coding frame 
 
In qualitative content analysis, coding frame presents a way to organize the data and to avoid 
getting confused in the analysing process. Codes are organized in a hierarchical manner as there are 
both main categories and subcategories. These categories are part concept-driven and part data 
driven. In my coding frame the main categories consist of the main interview themes, outlined in 
appendix 1 and 2 of the thesis. These helped me to focus on specific issues in the interviews.  
Subcategories are mainly data-driven and they concentrate on what was told about these themes. In 
this example subcategory definitions (in bold) are followed by empirical examples from the 
interviews.  
 
Main category 6: Factors that decrease/increase EU influence at the HRC 
 
Decreasing factors: 
    EU internal:  
internal EU dynamics (acting as a group with only one representative/speaker, 
internal EUMS disagreements, EU unity, the EU acts as one bloc but with a price, 
time-consuming internal negotiations, internal EU dynamics, internal divisions, MS 
compete and contradict with each other, which EU states are HRC members, lack of 
transparency, acts in secrecy, behind the curtains, other actors cannot influence EU 
internal negotiation process, packing EU positions) 
communication and negotiation skills (pushing others to accept its views, no mood 
for compromises, exclusion of others from its decision-making processes, ways to 
communicate with others, blaming others and pointing at their problems, lecturing for 
others, showing no empathy, imposing its positions on others, representing itself as 
the moral high ground, eager to see opposition in others)  
political problems (focusing on political approach to human rights, focusing on 
economic priorities, strong national interests of some EUMS, economic interests come 
first, the EU does not act coherently, double standards, economic crisis in the EU, 
close relations with the US, driving too forcefully sensitive issues, lack of leadership, 
no clear positions on issues, historical reasons like colonialism decrease EU influence, 
EU conditionality, takes passive positions, not active, lowest common denominator 
positions) 
human rights related challenges (selective approach to human rights 
problems/country cases, does not find interest to promote some human rights issues, 
extreme HR positions, driving always same human rights topics, too little attention 
given for ESS –rights, no strong ownership in some cases like Libya, the EU does not 
talk about its own problems at the HRC) 
    EU external:  
Dividing HR issues at the HRC (traditional rights, women’s rights, freedom of 
religion, Israel-Palestine case, cultural value differences, racism, right to development, 
sexual orientation, gender roles, marriage and family issues, individual-collective 
rights) 
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composition of the HRC and behaviour of other actors (architecture and 
membership of the HRC, other powerful players/states/blocs, the US positions and re-
election to the Council, popularity and visibility of Norway and Switzerland, the EU 
does not have allies, group solidarity, growing activity of some Arab countries, 
weakness of non-EU missions, especially developing Asian and African countries) 
Global political context (migration, economic crisis, defence of state sovereignty, 
lack of support for human rights defenders, UN as a global institution, power politics, 
relative decline of the EU in global politics, universality of human rights has become 
more challenged) 
Increasing factors:  
     EU internal:  
unity and coherence (acting coherently and consistently, EU unity as a bloc, united 
in voting, has many voices to support positions, role of the EU delegation in bringing 
coherence, continuity and leaderhip, finding balance between values and interests) 
living by example (the EU’s own human rights practices, when it “lives by example”, 
acts in a principled manner, efficiency, capable persons/human rights experts, 
expertise, well-prepared initiatives, honesty in human rights issues, pointing strongly 
on difficult human rights questions, progressive human rights actor, deals with all 
kinds of issues, defends principles and the UN, does not compromise its values, 
number of initiatives and positions at the HRC) 
capability to co-operate and negotiate (sharing its views with other actors, searching 
for cross-regional initiatives and cooperation, dialogue, willingness to compromise 
and cooperate, flexibility, moderate positions, burden-sharing with others, bilateral 
relations to other countries especially to former colonies, gives space for civil society 
organizations, economic power and incentives for other states, supports the UN and its 
procedures) 
position in the world (economic power, resources to influence, possibility to use 
conditionality in relation to weaker parties, structural “master position”, others actors 
dependence on the EU, power of discourses, able to act as a bridge-builder, special 
relations to many countries, funding for the UN) 
    EU external:  
willingness to co-operate with the EU (WEOG cooperation, cross-regional 
initiatives at the HRC, Grulac supports the EU views, other states want to get the EU 
on board, many like-minded states, support for the UN, the EU helps capacity building 
in other missions, good cooperation between the EU and the AU)  
difficulties of other actors (lack of unity in other actors, strong positions of the US, 
UN dependence on EU funding, decreasing influence of the OIC after the Arab spring, 
NGOs willingness to cooperate with the EU) 
changes in political context (Arab spring, new actors and issues at the HRC, 
collective answers to crises) 
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